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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Consensual crimes are unusually difficult to detect, since
the forbidden acts take place in private and none of the
participants is likely to complain. To expose such crimes, police
have had to resort to the use of informers and undercover offi-
cers. Often, these agents will solicit the commission of a criminal
act for purposes of prosecution. For example, agents offer to
purchase drugs from suspected narcotics dealers in order to
gather evidence of guilt.
Some solicitations are innocuous. An agent who merely asks
for a drink in a speakeasy creates no danger of corrupting the in-
nocent. However, because persons engaged in criminal enter-
prises are wary of strangers, police usually must do more than
simply approach a target and request the commission of a crime.
They must work through an informer trusted by the target, or
have an undercover officer cultivate the target's trust. More-
over, it may be necessary to make multiple requests before
the target agrees to commit the crime solicited.
When agents do more than make a single arms-length re-
quest, they create a danger of inducing crimes by persons not al-
ready engaged in criminal enterprise. For example, an agent
who has formed a close relationship with a drug user may,
by appealing to friendship, be able to persuade him to sell
drugs even though he has never previously done so. The
danger increases if the agent also offers windfall profits, plays
on the target's sympathy (as by pretending withdrawal symp-
toms), or provides assistance that facilitates the crime (as by giv-
ing the target drugs to sell to another agent).
Because of concern about the dangers created by police solic-
itation of crime, almost every American jurisdiction has made
the defense of entrapment available to criminal defendants. The
defense has won acceptance in the federal courts and in every
state except Tennessee.' However, agreement that a defense by
1. By 1955, 43 of the 48 states had expressly accepted the entrap-
ment defense; two had expressly rejected it. See Comment, The Doc-
trine of Entrapment and Its Application in Texas, 9 Sw. L.J. 456, 465 n.44
(1955), for a state-by-state tally of cases in these states. The three un-
committed states-Vermont, Delaware, zand New Mexico-have since en-
dorsed the defense. See State v. Girouard, 130 Vt. 575, 298 A.2d 560
(1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 432 (1975); State v. Sainz, 84 N.M.
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this name should be recognized has not been accompanied by con-
sensus about what its elements should be.
Two opposing versions of the entrapment defense have re-
ceived substantial authoritative support. The first, usually la-
beled the "subjective" 2 approach, focuses upon the culpability of
the particular defendant, asking whether he was predisposed to
commit crimes of the nature charged. If he was ready and will-
ing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, then the
entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an un-
duly persuasive inducement.3
The other version of the defense, which I will call the "hypo-
259, 501 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App. 1972). Alaska and Hawaii, which became
states after 1955, have also recognized the defense. See notes 14, 16 infra.
New York, one of the states which previously rejected the defense,
has now enacted it by statute. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.05 (McKinney
1975). Tennessee is the remaining holdout. In Roden v. State, 209 Tenn.
202, 352 S.W.2d 227, 228 (1961), the court noted that it had "held consis-
tently and repeatedly that entrapment is not a defense in Tennessee," al-
though it went on to demonstrate that under the facts before it no entrap-
ment had occurred.
TsNN. CRIM. CODE & CODE OF CRmI. PRO. § 39-605 (Proposed Final
Draft, 1973), now pending before the General Assembly, would establish
a defense of entrapment based upon the Model Penal Code.
2. The words "subjective" and "objective" are commonly used la-
bels for the two standard formulations of the entrapment doctrine. The
words are meant to refer to the circumstance that the "objective" ap-
proach considers whether the conduct of police agents would have
tempted a hypothetical person, while the "subjective" approach considers
whether the defendant himself was led astray by the government's con-
duct. However, the terms create a risk of confusion:(1) The terms have occasionally been used in a fashion which sug-
gests that the "subjective" approach leaves greater room for interposition
of personal value judgments. See, e.g., Note, The Entrapment Defense
in Kansas: Subjectivity Versus an Objective Standard, 12 WASHBURN
L.J. 64 (1972). The "objective" focus upon the morality of police con-
duct leaves just as much room for subjective value judgments as does
the "subjective" focus upon the defendant's state of mind.
(2) The word "objective" has often been used to describe stand-
ards of criminal or tort liability that evaluate the defendant's behavior
by comparing it to that of a reasonable person. See, e.g., Seavey, Negli-
gence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1927). The "objec-
tive" entrapment test does not compare the defendant's conduct to that
of a reasonable person; it evaluates the agent's conduct by considering
its probable impact upon a hypothetical law-abiding person. See text
accompanying notes 21-33 infra.
In an attempt to avoid confusion, I have referred to the "subjective"
test as the "federal defense" except where that usage would be inappro-
priate. I have referred to the "objective" approach as the "hypothetical-
person" defense.
3. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), and the stand-
ard jury instruction quoted in note 39 infra.
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thetical-person" approach,4 focuses upon the inducements used
by police agents. If an agent used inducements likely to cause
a nondisposed person to commit the crime charged, then the fact
that the particular defendant was ready and willing to commit
it will not defeat the entrapment defense.5 Proponents of this
approach hope to deter police misconduct, and to keep the crimi-
nal justice system from being soiled by unworthy action.0
Supreme Court Justices have been the oracles of both theo-
ries of entrapment. In two leading cases decided in 1932 and 1958
-Sorrells v. United States7 and Sherman v. United Statess -the
Court endorsed the subjective defense. However, articulate mi-
norities, led by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter respectively,
urged a version that would focus solely on the issue of whether
police conduct had fallen below proper standards. 9 In the 1973
case of United States v. Russell,'0 a sharply divided Court de-
clined to depart from the doctrine established in Sorrells and
Sherman; four dissenters reiterated the views expressed by the
earlier minorities."
In 1962, the American Law Institute endorsed the minority
view by placing a hypothetical-person definition of entrapment
in its Model Penal Code.' 2  However, despite support by an
4. This version of the defense is often called the "objective" or
"police conduct" approach. I have refrained from using the term "objec-
tive" in hopes of avoiding confusion. See note 2 supra. I have avoided
the label "police conduct" because it suggests that by grounding the en-
trapment defense upon distaste for police misconduct rather than upon
the theory that the defendant is not sufficiently culpable, a court must
necessarily reject the "subjective" apprcach. Supporters of the "subjec-
tive" test may reasonably base the defense upon a "police conduct" ra-
tionale. See People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 8-9, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959).
Benford endorses the "subjective" test but is sometimes cited as an
"objective" decision because of its statement that "[e ] ntrapment is a de-
fense not because the defendant is innocent but because. . . 'it is a less[sic] evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignoble part."' See also text at 240-43 infra.
5. For typical formulations of the hypothetical-person defense, see
note 17 infra and text accompanying notes 22-28 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 202-08 infra.
7. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
8. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
9. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-
59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
10. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
11. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-39 (1973) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting); id. at 439-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft, 1962). For the text
of this section, see note 17 infra.
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ENTRAPMENT CONTROVERSY
overwhelming majority of commentators, 3 the hypothetical-
person defense did not achieve authoritative acceptance in any
jurisdiction until Alaska adopted it by judicial decision in
1969.14 Since then, two other state supreme courts have fol-
13. Impressive commentary supporting the hypothetical-person ap-
proach may be found in L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, DE-
TECTION OF CRIE 265-72 (1967) (report on police practices sponsored by
the American Bar Foundation) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY]; 1 U.S.
NATIONAL COMM ssION ON REFORm OF FEDERAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
320 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BROWN CO1NrIssION COMMENTARY]; and
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agents
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Donnelly].
Other supporters include Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflec-
tions on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea
Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); McLean, Informers and Agent
Provocateurs, 1969 Canm. L. REv. (London) 527; Sagarin & MacNamara,
The Problem of Entrapment, 16 CPmvm & DELIN. 363 (1970); Schecter,
Police Procedure and the Accusatorial Principle, 3 Cmm. L. BULL. 521
(1967); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in
Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHA L. REv. 399 (1959). Cf. W. LAFAvE
& A. SCOTT, CRmnanNA LAW 371 (1971).
It appears that only one law review article in the past 25 years has
favored the subjective approach to entrapment. See Defeo, Entrapment
as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Appli-
cation, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 243 (1967). Mr. Defeo would prefer to
abolish the entrapment defense completely, but recognizes that it
is firmly embedded in American law. He finds the subjective ap-
proach to be the lesser of two evils because under it "the present rela-
tively narrow coverage of the defense would not be appreciably ex-
panded." Id. at 275.
In the same period, over 100 student notes and case comments were
written on the subject of entrapment. Partial examination of this com-
mentary indicates that it overwhelmingly favors the hypothetical-person
approach. See, e.g., Comment, Entrapment-Predisposition of Defendant
Crucial Factor in Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546 (1974);
Comment, Entrapment: A Critical Discussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633 (1972);
Comment, Entrapment by Federal Officers, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033 (1958);
Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of
Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. Cnr. L. REv. 137, 170 (1963);
Comment, Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 177
(1966); cf. Note, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat"--The Con-
stitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965).
On the other hand, see Note, Entrapment, 73 HAsv. L. REV. 1332 (1960),
and Note, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some
State Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cnnw. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959), which favor
modified versions of the subjective approach.
The fact that scholarly opinion favors the hypothetical-person test is
reflected in the opinions in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
The majority opinion relied solely upon case law authority. Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion claimed the support of a majority of com-
mentators, citing the Model Penal Code, the Brown Commission pro-
posal (note 17 infra), and three law review pieces. See id. at 445 n.3
(dissenting opinion).
14. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alas. 1969). A few lower fed-
eral court cases prior to Grossman seemed to favor the hypothetical-per-
19761
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lowed suit,15 and at least four other states have adopted it by
statute. 6 These cases and statutes have invariably formulated
the defense in language similar to that contained in the ALI's
son test. See United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972),
vacated in light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), conviction af'd, 494 F.2d
562 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal.
1970); United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). How-
ever, these cases were not consistent with the doctrine expounded by the
Supreme Court.
15. State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974) (adopts Brown
Commission proposal quoted in note 17 infra); People v. Turner, 390
Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (Spec. Supp. 1975) (verbatim
copy, except for immaterial changes in third paragraph, of Brown Com-
mission proposal); 5 N.H. xEv. STAT. Ain. § 626:5 (Supp. 1973) (based
on Model Penal Code); Hawaii Sess. Laws 1972, act 9, § 237 (verbatim
copy of Model Penal Code's substantive definition of entrapment).
State courts have displayed a remarkable tendency to construe stat-
utes based upon the Model Penal Code as codifications of the subjective
approach. For example, Pennsylvania has enacted a statute that is a
verbatim copy of the Model Penal Code provision, except for omission
of the requirement that the defense be tried by the judge. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 313 (1973). However, an intermediate appellate court
in Pennsylvania, construing the statute, has stated that "the prerequisites
to allowing an entrapment defense are dual: a defendant not disposed
to commit the crime and police conduct which may ensnare the innocent
victim." Commonwealth v. Mott, 234 Pa. Super. 52, 334 A.2d 771, 773
(1975) (emphasis in original). Perhaps the derivation of the statute
was not called to the court's attention.
In UT u CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975), entrapment is defined
as use of methods "creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." This statute seems
to establish a hypothetical-person test (it refers to the "risk" of seducing
an innocent person, rather than whether an innocent person was in fact
seduced), but the Supreme Court of Utah recently reiterated its adher-
ence to the subjective test despite the statute. See State v. Curtis, 542
P.2d 744, 747 (Utah 1975). A strong dissent by Justice Maughan pointed
out that the statute was based on the Model Penal Code and argued
that it should be construed accordingly. Id. at 747-53.
The highest court of New York State has also interpreted a statute
that was apparently based on the Model Penal Code as establishing
a subjective test in which predisposition is a dispositive fact. Peo-
ple v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 2B2 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1972);
accord, People v. Mann, 31 N.Y.2d 253, 288 N.E.2d 295, 336 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1972). The Calvano case construed a statute that defined entrapment
as use of methods which "were such as to create a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to
commit it." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1975). The statute's
language is very similar to the Model Penal Code's definition of entrap-
ment as use of methods of persuasion or inducement which "created a
substantial risk that such an offense would be committed by persons
other than those who are ready to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.13 (1) (6) (Official Draft, 1962). In State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 319
A.2d 636 (1974), the New Hampshire supreme court construed a statute
[Vol. 60:163
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Model Penal Code or the new federal code proposed by the
Brown Commission.17
that defined entrapment in the same words used by the New York stat-
ute, 5 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (Supp. 1973), to establish a hypo-
thetical-person test, and this construction seems preferable.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-709 (Supp. 1973) defines entrapment
as use of methods "such as to create a substantial risk that the acts would
be committed by a person who, but for such inducement, would not have
conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced." Although Col-
orado's statute is phrased in language which suggests a hypothetical-
person test, it may have been intended to codify the subjective test, in
view of the Revisor's comment that "[t]his is codification of well estab-
lished case law" and the comment's citation of Gonzales v. People, 168
Colo. 545, 452 P.2d 46 (1969), a case following the traditional subjective
approach.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (a) (1975) defines entrapment as "us-
ing persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the of-
fense." There is uncertainty about whether the statute will be inter-
preted to establish a hypothetical-person test. For a useful discussion of
this statute, see Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. Csnvr. LAw
165, 192-202 (1974).
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft, 1962); U.S. NA-
TIONAL COMIIssION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAws, A PROPOSED NEW FED-
ERAL CRImINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROWN COm-
MISSION PROPOSAL]. Section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code provides that(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in co-
operation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for
the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an of-
fense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in con-
duct constituting such offense by either:(a) making knowingly false representations designed to
induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be com-
mitted by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a
person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves
by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in re-
sponse to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried
by the Court in the absence of the jury.(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the of-fense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing
or threatening such injury to a person other than the person per-
petrating the entrapment.
Section 702(2) of the Brown Commission proposal provides that
[e]ntrapment occurs when a law enforcement agent induces the
commission of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely
to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense.
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment.
The Brown Commission proposal was modeled on the Model Penal
Code, but the language of the latter was "altered somewhat to insure that
an objective standard is employed to determine whether police conduct
is sufficiently unsavory to justify an entrapment defense." BROWN COm-
MISSION COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 320.
19761
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This Article will evaluate the federal defense and the hypo-
thetical-person defense. Although these versions of the defense
do not exhaust the universe of possible alternatives, 8 they do
seem to be the ones most likely to receive authoritative support.
Therefore, it seems worthwhile to ask which of these two ortho-
dox formulations is more desirable.
My thesis is that the federal defense, with some modifica-
tions, is preferable to the hypothetical-person defense. I will be-
gin with a description of the two defenses, with emphasis upon
how they deal with predisposition and agent misconduct. On the
basis of this description, I will argue that the hypothetical-person
defense creates a greater risk of unjust treatment of individual
defendants than does the federal defense, and that the possibility
of beneficial effects upon conduct of police agents is not strong
enough to justify taking this risk.
I will also respond to various criticisms of the federal test.
Commentators have repeatedly argued that it is based on a ficti-
tious view of legislative intent; that it is confusing and obscure;
that its emphasis upon the "innocence" of the defendant is incon-
sistent with the rule that entrapment by a private person is no
excuse; and that it allows the introduction of unreliable and
prejudicial evidence. Most of these criticisms have not been an-
swered. Academic commentary has lopsidedly favored the hypo-
thetical-person approach, 19 and judicial opinions supporting the
The sponsors of Senate Bill S. 1 (the proposed Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 1975) rejected the Brown Commission proposal in favor
of a codified version of the subjective approach. See S. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 551 (1975).
18. For examples of other proposals, see Hearings on the National
Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12, pt. 3B, at 1443-44 (1971) (testi-
mony of the American Civil Liberties Union) (advocates alternative sub-jective and hypothetical-person defenses supplemented by requirement
that police have reasonable suspicion before offering inducement); Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mnmi. L. REV. 349,
406-09, 416-17 (1974) (recommends that courts require legislation or po-
lice rules governing police spying); Note, supra note 13, 74 YALE L.J.
at 952 (arguing that fourth amendment requires that police have reason-
able cause to solicit crime); Comment, supra note 13, 31 U. Cm. L. REV.
at 178 (advocates alternative hypothetical-person and reasonable-cause-
to-solicit defenses). See note 239 infra. (reasonable suspicion defense).
For a discussion of the question whether it would be desirable to
combine a hypothetical-person defense with a subjective defense, see text
at 273-74.
19. See note 13 supra.
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federal test have avoided many of the issues raised by scholars. 20
Finally, I will discuss how the burden of proof should be allo-
cated, and whether the defense should be the province of the
judge or of the jury. I have placed this discussion toward the
end of the Article because resolution of these procedural is-
sues depends largely upon one's views about the substantive is-
sues.
At the close of the Article I have placed a summary of its
principal themes and conclusions.
II. DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
The federal defense and the hypothetical-person defense dif-
fer both in substantive definition of entrapment and in ancillary
rules about the admissibility of evidence. This section describes
those differences. Subsequent sections will evaluate the com-
parative merits of the two defenses.
A. SuBsTAxTrm DocTmNE
1. The Hypothetical-Person Defense
Under the hypothetical-person defense, the issue of whether
an agent2 ' used an improper inducement is dispositive. If an
agent caused the commission of an offense with an improper in-
20. For example, none of the Supreme Court's majority opinions at-
tempt to meet the argument that the rationale of the subjective approach
is inconsistent with the rule that entrapment by a private person is no
excuse or to deal seriously with the argument that the subjective ap-
proach is based on a fictitious view of legislative intent. Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion in Russell merely notes that "[a]rguments such
as these, while not devoid of appeal, have been twice previously made to
this Court, and twice rejected by it, first in Sorrells and then in Sher-
man." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,433-434 (1973).
21. In this Article, the term "agent" refers to (1) personnel of law
enforcement agencies and (2) persons who are cooperating with law en-
forcement agencies, including persons charged with crime who are coop-
erating in hopes of obtaining leniency. Such persons are universally con-
sidered to be government agents for purposes of the entrapment defense.
See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.13 (1) (Official Draft, 1962); BROWN COIUnVISSION PROPOSAL, SU-
pra note 17, § 702(3).
When the term "informer" is used in this Article, it refers to an agent
who is a cooperating private person. When the term "officer" is used,
it refers to an agent who is a regularly employed law enforcement offi-
cial.
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ducement, the defendant must be acquitted; if the inducement
was proper, he must be convicted.22
The propriety of the inducement is determined by its prob-
able effect upon a hypothetical person. Under the Model Penal
Code, inducements are improper if they "create a substantial risk
that [the] offense will be committed by persons other than those
who are ready to commit it. '"2 3 Under the Brown Commission
proposal, they are improper if "likely to cause normally law-abid-
ing persons to commit the offense."24 Most of the hypothetical-
person jurisdictions have adopted one of these two formula-
tions.25 However, the leading case of Grossman v. State26
phrased the test somewhat differently, indicating that an induce-
ment would be improper if it "would be effective to persuade an
average person" to commit the offense.
Although these three formulations of the defense all use the
concept of a hypothetical person, they may differ in the strength
of character with which the hypothetical person is endowed.
If Grossman means that inducements are prohibited only if
they would actually cause an average person to commit an of-
fense, then the coverage of its entrapment defense is very limited.
The average person may occasionally commit a petty offense, but
22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 & Comment at 19 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959); BROWN Co~awmssio- PRoPosAL, supra note 17, § 702
(2) & CommN=TARY, supra note 13, at 320-21; State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d
375 (Iowa 1974).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (Official Draft, 1962) (quoted in
note 17 supra).
24. BROwN CommissioN PRoPosAL, supra note 17, § 702(2) (quoted
in note 17 supra).
25. See cases and statutes cited in notes 14-16 supra.
26. 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969). The full text of the paragraph
in which the quoted words appear reads as follows:
The objective test can be stated as follows: unlawful entrap-
ment occurs when a public law enforcement official, or a person
working in cooperation with him, in order to obtain evidence of
the commission of an offense, induces another person to commit
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be ef-
fective to persuade an average person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit such an offense. Conversely, insti-
gations which would induce only a person engaged in an habit-
ual course of unlawful conduct for gain or profit do not consti-
tute entrapment.
Many inducements will fall between the two extremes described in
the first and second sentences of the quoted paragraph. It is not clear
how the Grossman court would deal with such inducements. However,
in a footnote to the quoted paragraph, the court stated that it intended
to permit police activity which would tempt "situational" as well as
"chronic" offenders. Id. n.9. This statement suggests that it did intend
to create a test that would require the target to exercise substantial self-
control
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he will not commit a serious crime unless he is severely pressed.
The man on the Clapham omnibus would not sell heroin even
if he were offered inducements that would be quite tempting to
a member of the drug culture. A test actually based upon the
proclivities of the average person would rob the entrapment de-
fense of any significance in cases involving serious or unusual
offenses.
The Model Penal Code seems more lenient. Its hypothetical
person is described as someone who is not "ready" to commit the
offense. This language can be construed to prohibit induce-
ments likely to seduce a person who, though possessing a greater
than average weakness for the crime solicited, would resist or-
dinary temptations to commit it. 27
The Brown Commission proposal is susceptible to a similar
construction, since a "normally law-abiding person" could be
someone who, though usually law-abiding, has a weakness for a
particular crime. However, the Commission commentary
equates "normally law-abiding" with "average law-abiding," and
rejects the idea that the inducement should be judged in terms
of its probable effect upon a person who was susceptible but not
already disposed to commit the crime.28
It seems unlikely that the "average person" language in
Grossman v. State and the Brown Commission commentary was
really intended to endow the hypothetical person with the
27. The Model Penal Code provision is essentially a codification and
elaboration of Justice Frankfurter's influential minority opinion in Sher-
man. Frankfurter's opinion contains language which indicates that he
would have favored an approach which would have prohibited induce-
ments likely to cause crime by law-abiding but ductile persons:
This does not mean that the police may not act so as to detect
those engaged in criminal conduct and ready and willing to
commit further crimes should the occasion arise .... It does
mean that in holding out inducements they should act in such
a manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime only
these persons and not others who would normally avoid crime
and through self-struggle resist ordinary temptations.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 269, 383-84 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
28. The Brown Commission commentary includes the following:
The proposed California entrapment statute is said by its drafts-
men to be based on the propensities of those "who are suscepti-
ble but not already disposed at the time of the event, rather
than at the citizen of strong law-abiding habits." This rather
particularized standard is eschewed here in favor of one pat-
terned after the oft-encountered reasonable man.
BROWN CommIssIoN COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 321 (emphasis
added).
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strength of character possessed by an average person. Such an
interpretation would seem to require conviction even in Sherman
v. United States,29 where all of the Justices agreed that entrap-
ment had been conclusively established. The defendant in Sher-
man was an addict who, while undergoing treatment in an at-
tempt to cure his addiction, was lured into selling heroin by a
police agent. The inducements offered were extremely tempting
to an addict, but would not have caused an average person to
commit the offense. However, both Grossman and the Brown
Commission commentary endorse Justice Frankfurter's concur-
ring opinion in Sherman, which expressed the view that the
agent's conduct constituted entrapment as a matter of law. 30
Against this background, it is difficult to know what to make of
the "average person" language. Perhaps it should be viewed as
a warning that inducements will not be condemned merely be-
cause they require the target to exercise a substantial amount
of self-control. The Grossman court seems to have had some-
thing of this nature in mind. In a footnote to its "average per-
son" definition, it expressly stated that it intended to permit in-
ducements which would tempt both "situational" offenders and
"chronic" offenders. 31
The types of inducements prohibited by the hypothetical-
person defense cannot be described with particularity. Some
proponents of the defense have expressed blanket disapproval of
badgering, appeals to friendship and sympathy, and offers of easy
profit.32 However, the case law is still very sparse, so it is too
early to know how far courts will go in prohibiting such induce-
ments. Courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the defense
have so far been cautious, emphasizdng that although such temp-
tations would be impermissible in some instances, each case must
be judged on its own facts. 33
Proof that an agent used persuasion which would corrupt the
hypothetical person is not, in itself, sufficient to establish en-
29. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
30. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 228-29 (Alas. 1969); BRowN
Comlwssiozi COmmENTARY, supra note 13, at 316-17, 322.
31. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 n.9 (Alas. 1969). The
Grossman footnote indicates disagreement with the version of the hypo-
thetical-person test proposed in Professor Donnelly's influential article,
supra note 13. Professor Donnelly distinguished "situational" offenders
from "chronic" offenders and stated that "[t]he question should be, Was
the officer's (or stool pigeon's) conduct of such a nature that only a
chronic violator would be tempted?" Id. at 1114.
32. See note 212 infra.
33. See note 213 infra.
[Vol. 60:163
ENTRAPMENT CONTROVERSY
trapment. There must also be a causal connection between the
agent's conduct and the defendant's offense. The Model Penal
Code provides that a defendant is entitled to acquittal only if
he proves that his conduct occurred "in response to" an "entrap-
ment" by an agent.34 Other formulations of the hypothetical-
person defense establish a causation requirement by providing
that the agent's conduct must be shown to have "induced" the
defendant's crime.35
The Brown Commission commentary states that its drafts-
men intended to avoid "an investigation of causation." Noting
that Justice Roberts's minority opinion in Sorrefls defined entrap-
ment as the procurement of criminal conduct "by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or
fraud of the officer," the commentary states:
The difficulty with this analysis is that it tends to shift one's
sights from the police conduct involved to the issue as to
whether it caused the accused to commit the alleged crime. An
investigation of causation, of necessity, must treat the question
of the accused's criminal predisposition. 36
The quoted language should not be interpreted to mean that
the Brown Commission proposal does not require any causal con-
nection between the agent's misconduct and the defendant's of-
fense. Such an interpretation would lead to bizarre results. The
Commission could not have intended that an offender be entitled
to acquittal because of police conduct completely unrelated to his
offense. For example, suppose that an agent used improper
methods to try to overcome the suspicion of a heroin dealer, but
never succeeded in making a purchase. His conduct should not
prevent conviction of the defendant for an unrelated sale to a
third person. Yet that would seem to be the result called for
by a test which completely discarded any requirement of causal
connection.
The Brown Commission statute provides that "[e] ntrapment
occurs when a law enforcement agent induces the commission of
an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause nor-
mally law-abiding persons to commit the offense."37 This lan-
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (2) (Official Draft, 1962) (quoted in
note 17 supra).
35. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969); State v.
Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-
11(2) (Spec. Supp. 1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626.5 (Supp. 1973);
BROWN ConwssIoN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, § 702 (2).
36. BROWN Com-AnssIoN CommENARY, supra note 13, at 320.
37. BROWN CoU IssION PROPOSAL, supra note 17, § 702 (2).
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guage indicates that the Brown Commission proposal does carry
a causation requirement. An agent does not "induce" an offense
unless he causes it. However, probably all that is needed to sat-
isfy the causation requirement is a showing that the particular
offense would not have occurred but for government inducement,
regardless of whether the overreaching aspect of the agent's con-
duct may be said to have caused the offense.
2. The Federal Entrapment DefeSe
Two issues arise in federal en'trapment cases: (1) whether
the defendant was predisposed to commit the type of offense
charged, and (2) whether the offense charged was induced by a
government agent.38
A defendant is considered to have been predisposed if he was
ready and willing to commit the type of crime charged whenever
presented with a favorable opportunity.39 He can be predisposed
38. See United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952).
(This case reversed Sherman's conviction and ordered a new trial. The
second trial led to a conviction that was affirmed by the court of appeals,
United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957), and reversed by
the Supreme Court, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).)
39. The following jury instruction, from 1 E. DEWTT & C. BLACK-
WAR, FEDERAL JURY PRAcTIcE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.13, at 290-91 (2d ed.
1970), contains a typical definition of predisposition:
The defendant asserts that he was a victim of entrapment as
to the crime charged in the indictment.
Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate
the law, but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers
or their agents to commit a crime, he is a victim of entrapment,
and the law as a matter of policy forbids his conviction in such
a case.
On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness
and willingness to break the law, the mere fact that Govern-
ment agents provide what appears to be a favorable opportunity
is not entrapment. For example, when the Government sus-
pects that a person is engaged in the illicit sale of narcotics, it
is not entrapment for a Government agent to pretend to be
someone else and to offer, either directly or through an informer
or other decoy, to purchase narcotics from such suspected per-
son.
If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from
the evidence in the case that, before anything at all occurred
respecting the alleged offense involved in this case, the de-
fendant was ready and wiling to commit crimes such as
charged in the indictment, whenever opportunity was afforded,
and that government officers or their agents did no more than
offer the opportunity, then the jury should find that the de-
fendant is not a victim of entrapment.
On the other hand, if the evidence in the case should leave
you with a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the pre-
vious intent or purpose to commit any offense of the character
here charged, and did so only because he was induced or per-
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to commit a crime even if he did not form an intent to commit
the specific criminal act charged until it was solicited by an
agent.40 For example, a regular dealer of heroin would be con-
sidered predisposed to commit the crime of selling heroin even
if the idea of consummating the particular sale for which he was
indicted originated with a government agent.
A defendant's predisposition must relate to crimes of the na-
ture charged; it is not sufficient that he was ready and willing
to commit dissimilar crimes.4' Moreover, the fact that the de-
suaded by some officer or agent of the Government, then it is
your duty to acquit him.
The foregoing instruction has received widespread acceptance in the
federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 347-48
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 118 (1975) ("the district courts should in
the future be guided by the instruction on entrapment found in E. Devitt
& C. Blackmar"); United States v. Penz-Ozuna, 511 F.2d 1106 (9th
Cir. 1975) (trial judge's use of Devitt & Blackmar instruction sustained
on appeal); United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1973)
("The first five paragraphs of the [trial court's] charge conform to the
suggested language in 1 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar ... which we [have]
approved."); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 932 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974) ("The entrapment instruction
included in the court's charge in this case can be found in Devitt &
Blackmar ... and has been approved by this court time and time
again."); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 712, 717
n.5 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333, 1338 n.5
(10th Cir. 1972) (approving instruction identical in relevant respects).
See also cases cited in 1 E. DnvnrT & C. BLAcmVAn, supra, § 13.13 (1970,
Supp. 1974).
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 427 n.4 (1973), the Supreme
Court quoted parts of the Devitt & Blacknar instruction and noted that
the district judge had given the "standard entrapment instruction." The
instruction given by the district judge in Russell was identical to the in-
struction quoted above in all material respects except for the omission
of the narcotics example given in the fourth sentence. See Appendix
to Brief of the United States at 17-18, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973).
(The authors of the quoted instruction made a minor change in the
final paragraph in 1974. See 1 H. DEVITr & C. BLACKmAn, supra, § 13.13"
(Supp. 1974).)
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir.
1952). See also instruction quoted in note 39 supra; United States v.
Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pollard, 483
F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); Dix, Under-
cover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REv. 203, 254-55
(1975).
41. See, e.g., Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th
Cir. 1968); DeJong v. United States, 381 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (dictum). Note that
the standard instruction, note 39 supra, requires the jury to find that the
defendant was ready and willing to commit crimes "such as charged in
the indictment" before it can determine that he was predisposed.
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fendant failed to exhibit the amount of control possessed by the
average person does not necessarily mean that he was predis-
posed. Personal weaknesses (such as a proclivity for drug use)
that made him more susceptible to temptation than the average
person do not constitute predisposition unless the defendant's
self-control was so slight that he was ready and willing to com-
mit the crime at any favorable opportunity.42
The federal courts have avoided further particularization of
the definition of predisposition by treating entrapment as a
quintessential jury issue. The defense is easy to raise43 and su-
premely difficult to establish as a matter of law.44 Jurors are
given general instructions to the effect that the issue is whether
the defendant was ready and willing;45 and on this issue they both
42. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); instruc-
tion quoted in note 39 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 48-59 infra.
44. Of 405 reported federal entrapment decisions in a five-year pe-
riod beginning January 1, 1970, 27 involved reversals or acquittals be-
cause of entrapment-related error. Only two of these cases involved a
determination that entrapment had been established as a matter of law.
The remainder were reversals for refusal to instruct, erroneous instruc-
tions, exclusion of entrapment-related evidence, or other reversals enti-
tling the government to another trial. (For a description of the means
by which this data was gathered, see note 223 infra.)
One reason why it may be difficult to establish entrapment as a mat-
ter of law is that the facts are rarely undisputed. There is usually a
divergence between the agents' testimony and the defendant's. Even
when the defendant's testimony is not directly contradicted, cases are
normally permitted to go to the jury on the theory that it is entitled to
disbelieve him. See Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958) (in-
former did not testify; jury entitled to disbelieve defendant's entrapment
story); United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078 (1st Cir. 1974). But see
United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (held, defendant's un-
contradicted testimony must be accepted; Masciale distinguished on
ground that in Masciale the defendant's conduct when dealing with
other agents provided support for an inference that he was not testifying
truthfully about dealings with informer).
In one of the leading Supreme Court cases, Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1950), the Court did hold that entrapment had been
established as a matter of law. This result was made possible by the
fact that the testimony of the government informer who had induced the
crime provided grounds for a determination of entrapment.
45. For a widely used instruction see note 39 supra.
The author's review of federal case law indicates that trial judges
have rarely attempted to give binding instructions to the jury explaining
what results it should reach under alternative assumptions of fact.
Appeals claiming that instructions were erroneous have usually involved
an attack on one of the general form-book instructions instead of an at-
tack upon binding instructions tailored to the facts of a particular case.
See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 118 (1975) (disapproving of the instruction carried in W. LABUY,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 6.12 (1965); favoring
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interpret the legal standard and determine the facts. Judicial
opinions rarely contain descriptions of particular circumstances
that would constitute entrapment as a matter of law.
The other element of the federal defense, government in-
ducement, requires at a minimum that the crime be attended by
the intervention of a government official or of a person acting
in cooperation with a government official. A defendant who was
seduced by a private temptor is not entitled to acquittal.46
There is a division of opinion about whether government
inducement occurs when an agent merely solicits the commission
of an offense, or whether something more is required, such as
use of persuasion, badgering, or pressure. The Brown Commis-
sion commentary, in describing the federal defense, states that
inducement means overreaching government conduct:
The defense of entrapment, as defined in Chief Justice
Hughes' [majority] opinion [in Sorrells v. United States]....
seeks to determine whether it was the strength and persistence
of the government's urging or the accused's own pre-existing
criminal intention which gave rise to the commission of the con-
duct constituting an offense. The defense has, therefore, come to
require both that: (a) the government has engaged in activities
beyond the reasonable limits of those artifices or stratagems nec-
essary to produce evidence of criminality, and that (b) the ac-
cused was not predisposed in fact or by reason of his past con-
duct to engage in the prohibited conduct. These twin elements
of inducement and predisposition, when conjoined, form the
presently recognized basis for the entrapment defense.47
the instruction described in note 39 supra); cases cited in note 39 su-
pra.
46. See note 254 infra and accompanying text.
47. BROWN CommssloN COmmENTARY, supra note 13, at 306. How-
ever, the commentary, at 321, also states:
It is recognized that this objective test [proposed by the Com-
mission] may work injustice in particular cases.... [P] ersons
who were not predisposed to commit crime may be convicted
when the police conduct is not so offensive as to violate the stat-
utory standard for entrapment.
Apparently the Commission either is not referring to the federal test
in the second sentence quoted above, or it views the degree of offensive-
ness required for acquittal under its proposal as higher than the "activi-
ties beyond the reasonable limits of those artifices or stratagems neces-
sary to produce evidence of criminality" which it describes as being nec-
essary for acquittal under the federal test.
The Model Penal Code commentary indicates that its authors did not
believe that the federal test required a showing of improper inducement
Tentative Draft No. 9 of the Model Penal Code proposed a test based on
the federal case law, offering as an alternative the version ultimately ap-
proved by the Institute. Its commentary noted that "[u]nder the main
formulation [federal approach], A's mere offer to purchase narcotics
from D may give rise to the defense provided D is not predisposed to
sell. A contrary result is reached under the alternative. A mere offer
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The foregoing passage exaggerates the requirements of the
federal defense. The federal case law indicates that the element
of "inducement" can be established without any showing that an
agent "engaged in activities beyond the reasonable limits of those
artifices or stratagems necessary to produce evidence of criminal-
ity."
Since the defendant has the burden of production on the is-
sue of inducement, 48 appellate courts have frequently had occa-
sion to define "inducement" in opinions describing the evidence
which the defendant must produce in order to present an issue
for jury consideration. Several have held that the defendant may
satisfy his burden on inducement without producing any evi-
dence that the government agent used persuasion or pressure. In
an influential opinion, Judge Learned Hand defined "induce-
ment" as merely a "soliciting, proposing, initiating, broaching or
suggesting the commission of the offense charged."49  Others
have stated that the defendant may satisfy his burden by bring-
ing forward evidence that the government initiated the crime, re-
gardless of the amount of pressure applied to the defendant.50
These decisions do not mean that a defendant is entitled to
entrapment instructions even if uncontradicted testimony estab-
lishes beyond any doubt that he was eager to commit the crime.
to buy hardly creates a serious risk of offending by the innocent." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.13, Comment at 19 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
48. See text accompanying notes 325-30 infrTa.
49. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
50. United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975) (ele-
ment of inducement involves only "'the Government's initiation of the
crime and not ... the degree of pressure exerted'"); United States v.
Armocida, 515 F.2d 49, 55 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Watson, 489
F.2d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 1973) (burden of production on inducement satis-
fied by "evidence that the Government initiated the crime, regardless of
the amount of pressure applied to the defendant"); United States v.
Johnson, 371 F.2d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1967) (quoting Judge Hand's defini-
tion of "inducement"); United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.); United States v. Jones, 360 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1012 (1967); United States v. Pugliese, 346
F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1965). The First Circuit has reached essentially
the same result. See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 372 & n.2, 373-
74 (1st Cir. 1967); Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). Kadis could be read to hold that the defend-
ant does not even have a burden of production on the issue of induce-
ment, since it states that "consideration of inducement as a separate is-
sue serves no useful purpose." 373 F.2d at 373. However, it seems
doubtful that the Kadis court meant to require entrapment instructions in
cases where there is no evidence that a government agent solicited, en-
couraged, or participated in the criminal act. Such instructions would
serve no purpose; entrapment is not a defense unless the alleged entrap-
per was a government agent. See note 254 infra and accompanying text.
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Courts that have defined "inducement" as mere initiation have
supplemented the defendant's burden of production on the in-
ducement issue with the requirement that he produce some evi-
dence negating his propensity to commit the crime.51 The focus
has thus been placed on the issue of predisposition rather than
on the issue of whether the police conduct was reasonable.52
The view that the defendant can satisfy his burden on in-
ducement merely by producing evidence that an agent initiated
the crime has not been universally accepted. Some federal
decisions have indicated that an unadorned solicitation does not
constitute "inducement. s53 However, these cases do not neces-
51. United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 509 (3d Cir. 1973) ("any
evidence negating the defendant's propensity to commit the crime" is suf-
ficient); accord, Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967)
("If the defendant shows, through government witnesses or otherwise,
some indication that a government agent corrupted him, the burden of
disproving entrapment will be on the government; but such a showing
is not made simply by evidence of a solicitation. There must be some
evidence tending to show unreadiness."); United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d
955, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (submission to the jury is not required if uncon-
tradicted proof has established that the defendant was ready and willing
to commit the offense, but "the production of any evidence negating pro-
pensity, whether in cross-examination or otherwise, requires submission
to the jury, however unreasonable the judge would consider a verdict in
favor of the defendant to be").
52. Cf. text accompanying notes 328-30 infra.
53. The Fourth Circuit has apparently construed the term "induce-
ment" to require something more than mere solicitation. See United
States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950(1971). The defendant, a physician, sold thousands of Dexedrine pills to
an undercover agent. The defendant did not claim that the agent had
used any form of pressure or persuasion. He based his entrapment de-
fense upon his testimony that he had made the sales as part of a secret
plan to inculpate the buyer and turn him over to the police. The trialjudge instructed the jury on entrapment. On appeal, the court ruled that
entrapment had not been established as a matter of law, and added that
the trial judge need not have given instructions on the issue because the
defendant "failed to make an adequate showing of inducement." Id. at
1071.
The Fifth Circuit's position is unclear. One Fifth Circuit case con-
tains language stating that the defendant must produce evidence which,
if believed, would show that "the government's conduct created a sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than
one ready to commit it." Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 168 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). However, the subsequent case of
United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 933 (1971), appears to construe this language to require that the
defendant produce some evidence that he was corrupted, not that some
hypothetical person might have been corrupted. See id. at 606 (Uncon-
tradicted evidence indicated that the defendant in Groessel acquiesced
without coaxing, but the court stated that he had met his burden of pro-
duction, noting that he was employed as a fireman and apparently "en-
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sarily mean that the federal defense requires evidence of im-
proper conduct by the agent. They are equally consistent with
the theory that the defendant may satisfy his burden by bringing
forward evidence that the agent used persuasion, properly or im-
properly, in order to cause the offense.54
joyed an unblemished reputation as an honest, law-abiding citizen.")
Groessel seems consistent with the approach described in text accom-
panying note 50. On the other hand, in a more recent opinion, the court
upheld the refusal of entrapment instructions in a mere solicitation case,
remarking that
Costello [the defendant] himself tesified that after a brief "so-
cial exchange" the party on the telephone, known to him only as
Sue, asked him if he could get some "acid." He replied that he
had heard of some and agreed to "check on it." Such testimony
does not show the least reluctance on his part nor does it evince
even an inference of inducement by Sue. According to Costello
himself, Sue [the agent] merely inquired. She never tried to
persuade.
United States v. Costello, 483 F.2d 1366, 1368 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis
added). This language indicates that the Costello panel regarded "in-
ducement" as something more than mere initiation.
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion could be read to define "inducement"
as something more than mere solicitation. In United States v. Chris-
topher, 488 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1973), the court affirmed a conviction in
a case in which the trial judge had refused to give entrapment instruc-
tions, saying that
there is not a scintilla of evidence tending to show ... that the
appellants were unwilling to commit the crime or that the Gov-
ernment's deception planted the criminal design in the minds of
the defendants .... The slight testimony which we have held
allows the issue of entrapment to go to the jury must still con-
stitute some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the Gov-
ernment.
Id. at 850-56. The Chistopher court's attention was clearly focused upon
the facts before it. In Christopher, uncontradicted evidence showed be-
yond doubt that the defendant was predisposed to sell heroin. Christo-
pher does not necessarily mean that the Ninth Circuit would hold that
instructions should not be given when, despite the fact that the govern-
ment exerted no pressure, there is evidence that the defendant was "un-
willing to commit the crime."
The pending Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 551 (1975), could be read to require that "inducement" be evi-
denced by something more than mere solicitation. The Act states that en-
trapment is a defense if "the defendant was not predisposed to commit
the act and did so solely as a result of active inducement" by a federal
agent, and that '"mere solicitation that would not induce an ordinary law-
abiding person to commit an offense" does not "in itself" constitute en-
trapment (emphasis added).
54. With the exception of Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163 (5th
Cir. 1969), which seems to have been undermined by subsequent cases,
the cases cited in note 53 supra are all cases in which the defendant failed
to produce any evidence that the agent had used persuasion, properly or
improperly, to induce the offense.
Even if the cases were interpreted to mean that a defendant cannot
satisfy his burden on inducement without producing evidence of im-
proper persuasion, a federal defendant would still be entitled to acquittal
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Moreover, the factual illustrations supplied by federal opin-
ions indicate that the defendant may raise the issue of entrap-
ment without necessarily producing evidence of improper police
conduct. Evidence that the defendant hesitated before comit-
ting the criminal act and that he refused on other occasions to
commit similar acts is sufficient to raise an issue for jury consid-
eration,55 as is any evidence that government agents pleaded or
argued with the defendant on the occasion in question.5 6 Evi-
dence that a period of friendly conversation preceded a request
to purchase moonshine whiskey has been considered sufficient to
justify an instruction,57 as has evidence that an undercover agent
provided funds for a purchase of narcotics and transportation to
the place of purchase.58 One court has even indicated that the
defense can be raised by evidence that the defendant had re-
spectable employment and an unblemished reputation.59
in some circumstances in which acquittal would not be required under
the hypothetical-person approach. The defendant need only produce
some evidence that an inducement occurred; he need not persuade the
trial judge that the evidence is credible. Once he has produced the evi-
dence, he is entitled to instructions which focus upon his predisposition
rather than the quality of the agent's conduct. See text accompanying
note 60 infra. More importantly, judges administering the hypothetical-
person approach are likely to approve police conduct that would raise ajury issue under the federal test even if the inducement element of the
federal test were construed to require some form of undue persuasion.
See text accompanying notes 181-88 infra.
55. See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967); cf.
United States v. Cohen, 431 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1970) (repeated requests
for bribe by IRS agent); Carson v. United States, 310 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.
1962) (repeated requests by informer to whom the defendant owed 80
dollars). See also United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1973)(held, defendant presented sufficient evidence to require entrapment in-
struction by testifying to persistent, though noncoercive, requests by
agent over three-month period).
56. See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1962); Carson
v. United States, 310 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1962); cf. United States v. Wor-
kopich, 479 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. See United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606, 609-12 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also text accompanying notes 181-83 (discussion of Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932)).
58. See Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963). In
Johnson, the government agent also permitted the defendant to keep part
of the narcotics that he had purchased for the agent as a reward for mak-
ing the purchase. However, this action could not have affected the ques-
tion whether the agent offered an inducement that might have led a
hypothetical law-abiding person astray, since the division of the narcotics
occurred after the commission of the crime and was not part of the origi-
nal plan.
59. United States v. Groessel] 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 933 (1971). But see Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374
(1st Cir. 1967) (mere evidence of good reputation insufficient where de-
fendant readily agreed to commit crime).
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Once the defendant has satisfied his burden of production,
he is entitled to jury instructions on entrapment. The federal
courts have favored a standard instruction that focuses upon the
issue of predisposition rather than the propriety of government
conduct. The jury is told to acquit unless it finds beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was ready and willing to con-
mit the crime at any favorable opportunity. 60 The degree of pres-
sure that agents exerted upon the defendant-whether they used
threats, appeals to sympathy or friendship, offers of inordinate
gain-is of course relevant for its bearing upon whether the de-
fendant was ready and willing, but it is not dispositive. Govern-
ment pressure is only one of the evidentiary facts that the jury
may take into account in deciding whether the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime.
3. Federal Quasi-entrapment Defenses
The federal entrapment defense is the product of decades of
case law development. Among the hundreds of cases dealing
Two state cases from subjective-test jurisdictions provide illustra-
tions of situations in which defendants were held to have raised the de-
fense despite the fact that the inducements used were extremely mild.
See People v. Goree, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1966); People v. Sarto, 65 O.O.2d 353 (Mont. Co. Common Pleas
1973).
In the Sarto case, the agent, on meeting the defendant for the first
time, made a simple request to purchase marijuana. The defendant ac-
quiesced. In a jury-waived case, the trial judge acquitted the defendant
of the sale count on grounds of entrapment. Applying the federal test,
he noted that he credited the defendant's testimony that the marijuana
sold was the defendant's own personal supply. Id. at 353.
In Goree, the officer merely requested that the defendant provide
him with marijuana. The court held that the defendant was entitled to
an entrapment instruction because the evidence indicated that he was
normally a user, not a dealer.
Compare State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 319 A.2d 636 (1974). In Ba-
con, the defendant testified that, after two requests by the agents, he sold
them his own supply ($15 worth) of marijuana at no profit. Applying
a statutory formulation of the hypothetical-person test modeled on the
Brown Commission report and the Model Penal Code, the court held
that the defendant had not produced sufficient evidence even to justify
submitting the entrapment defense to the jury, since there was no indica-
tion of fraud, appeal to sympathy, or trickery on the part of the agents.
It does not appear from the opinion whether the defendant had ever pre-
viously sold drugs; such evidence would presumably have been inadmis-
sible unless known to the agents at the time of inducement. See text ac-
companying note 177 infra.
60. See note 39 supra. A majority of the federal courts which have
considered the issue have ruled that, in order to avoid confusion, the jury
should not be instructed that the defendant must show "inducement" in
order to qualify for acquittal. See text accompanying notes 328-30 infra.
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with issues described as "entrapment," a number may be found
which resemble the standard entrapment defense in that they
deal with situations in which an agent solicited commission of
a crime, but differ from it in that they have excused defendants
who were predisposed to commit the offenses charged. In order
to get a rounded view of federal doctrine, it is necessary to con-
sider the current status of these quasi-entrapment defenses.
a. The due process defense
Under federal law, proof that the defendant was predisposed
will defeat the entrapment defense even if the agent used an
improper inducement. However, in instances of particularly out-
rageous conduct by government agents, the defendant may be en-
titled to a quasi-entrapment defense based upon the due process
clause.
The Supreme Court alluded to the possibility of a due proc-
ess defense in the 1973 case of United States v. Russell.6 1 In Rus-
sell, an undercover agent had provided the defendant with an es-
sential ingredient for manufacturing amphetamines. The de-
fendant was clearly predisposed to commit the crime, and hence
his defense did not fall within the traditional confines of entrap-
ment doctrine. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit overturned his
conviction on grounds that providing the ingredient constituted
"an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the crim-
inal enterprise."02  In reversing, the Supreme Court reiterated
the traditional predisposition rule, and admonished that the en-
trapment defense was "not intended to give the federal judiciary
a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which
it did not approve." 63 However, it did not completely close the
door on the possibility that a predisposed defendant could be en-
titled to acquittal. The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist
indicated that in some circumstances police conduct might be so
outrageous that the due process clause would prevent the govern-
ment from obtaining a conviction notwithstanding the defend-
ant's predisposition. 4
The Russell opinion did not describe the types of instigation
which might be prohibited by due process. It simply repeated
familiar formulas, saying that government conduct would be un-
61. 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
62. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
63. 411 U.S. at 435.
64. Id. at 431-32.
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constitutional if it violated "fundamental fairness" and was
"shocking to the universal sense of justice."65 The Court cited
Rochin v. California66-the notorious stomach-pump case-as an
example of sufficiently outrageous conduct.67
One can only speculate about the coverage of the Russell due
process defense. Inducements involving a threat of physical vio-
lence probably fall within its scope18 It may also apply to situa-
tions in which the plan for ensnaring the target involves commis-
sion of crimes that pose a danger to other persons or to the crim-
65. Id. at 432.
66. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
67. The Russell case, 411 U.S. at 431-32, cited Rochin in a passage
which reads as follows:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that dueprocess principles would absolutely bar the government from in-
yoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the instant case is distinctly not
of that breed.
In Rochin, state agents illegally broke into defendant's home and, af-
ter seeing him swallow some capsules, took him to a hospital where his
stomach was pumped, producing two morphine capsules which formed
the basis for his conviction. The case was decided before Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), so the illegal search and seizure in itself did not pro-
vide a basis for reversal. The Court held that the conviction could not
stand because the police conduct involved "shocks the conscience." 342
U.S. at 172.
68. Threats of physical harm would normally prevent conviction
under the federal entrapment defense, since there would be a reasonable
doubt about predisposition if a crime were committed in response to such
a threat. Some such threats would also require acquittal on grounds of
duress.
However, it is possible to conceive instances in which a defendant
who committed a crime in response to a threat of physical violence
would not be entitled to acquittal on grounds of duress or entrapment.
For example, suppose that a regular heroin dealer was reluctant to sell
to an informer because he suspected the informer of being a government
agent. If the informer induced a sale by a threat of harm at some future
date, the defendant would not be entitled to acquittal by reason of du-
ress. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRm=nAL LAw 374-78 (1971). Predis-
position might be demonstrated by evidence of contemporaneous sales to
other persons, possession of large quantities of drugs and paraphernalia,
and admissions of the defendant, thus defeating the traditional entrap-
ment defense.
The Russell due process defense was raised in a recent case in which
agents threatened physical harm. In United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d
867 (7th Cir. 1975), the agents, posing as Italian gangsters, purchased
some supposed heroin from the defendant. After discovering that the
heroin was counterfeit, the agents confronted the defendant, collared
him, and told him that "somebody would get hur[t]" if he did not
straighten things out by returning the money or getting genuine heroin.
The defendant later delivered heroin to the agents. His conviction was
sustained. The court reasoned that the threat was a necessary part of
the agents' undercover role. Id. at 878.
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inal justice system. For example, Judge Friendly has indicated
(in a case decided on other grounds) that the Russell due process
defense might have prevented conviction of a defendant netted
by a complex undercover investigation that involved perjury be-
fore a grand jury by an agent.69 A similar view could be
taken when an informer sells drugs, commits burglaries, or en-
gages in other crimes harmful to third persons as a means of es-
tablishing his credibility with targets.70 The defense may also
be effective in areas where concern for overreaching government
inducement overlaps with concern for first amendment free-
doms, as where the government sends provocateurs into political
organizations to suggest the commission of crimes.
The due process defense is also likely to be raised when
agents have played a substantial role in leading or organizing a
criminal enterprise. Before Russell, federal courts occasionally
ordered judgments of acquittal on the ground that government
agents had provided excessive assistance to would-be criminals.71
In two leading cases, the basis for decision was described respec-
69. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973) (cit-
ing Russell's due process dictum).
70. Cf. id. at 676-77 (Friendly, J.): "It would be unthinkable, for
example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies and beat-
ings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a gang of
hoodlums. Governmental 'investigation' involving participation in activi-
ties that result in injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts
should be extremely reluctant to sanction." But cf. United States v. Spi-
vey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975), where
the defendant's conviction for selling heroin was affirmed despite the
fact that the crime was induced by an informer who allowed the defend-
ant to live rent-free in his apartment, supplied him with loans and free
marijuana, and engaged in marijuana dealing himself.
71. For example, in the 1971 case of Greene v. United States, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit di-
rected the acquittal of three undoubtedly predisposed moonshiners. The
defendants had recently been released from prison and, though willing
to resume production of whiskey, they experienced some practical diffi-
culties in doing so. A government agent encouraged them to make a new
start, offering to supply equipment and a still operator. He did in fact
supply 2000 pounds of sugar, and for over two years was the defendants'
only whiskey customer. The court of appeals held that he had become
so deeply enmeshed in criminal activity that the defendants were enti-
tled to acquittal as a matter of law. It explicitly recognized that the en-
trapment defense did not apply, but reasoned that the policy supporting
the defense justified establishing an analogous (and unnamed) defense.
Id. at 786, 787. Other examples include United States v. McGrath, 468
F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated in light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973),
conviction afld, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974) (agents supplied would-be
counterfeiters with a printer and supervised printing and delivery of the
bills); Russell v. United States, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411
U.S. 423 (1973).
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tively as "entrapment" and as an unnamed doctrine founded
upon "the same underlying objections which render entrapment
repugnant."72  Since Russell, the entrapment rationale has been
dropped and claims of excessive assistance have been treated as
raising an issue of due process.
In at least one federal trial, the due process defense appears
to have contributed to an acquittal. In that case-United States
v. Anderson78-the defendants ("The Camden 28") were accused
of raiding a draft board and destroying records. They had been
aided by an informer who subsequently admitted:
I provided 90% of the tools necessary for the action. They
couldn't afford them, so I paid and the FBI reimbursed me. It
included hammers, ropes, drills, bits, etc. They couldn't use
some of the tools without hurting themselves, so I taught them.
My van was used on a daily basis (the FBI paid the gas). I
rented trucks for the dry runs and provided about $20 to $40
worth of groceries per week for the people living at Dr. Ander-
son's. This, and all my expenses, were paid for by the FBI.74
The trial judge charged the jury that even if the defendants
were predisposed to commit the crime, they were entitled to ac-
quittal if the "overreaching participation" of the informer was
"so fundamentally unfair [as] to be offensive to the basic stand-
ards of decency." 75  Since this instruction has been noted in
a widely used manual of federal jury instructions,76 it is likely
that other federal judges will give similar instructions. 7
72. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated
in light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973) (court held that evidence demon-
strated entrapment as a matter of law); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
784, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1971) (court stated that the case was not an entrap-
ment case, but that the "same underlying objections which render en-
trapment repugnant" required reversal of the conviction).
73. Cr. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. 1973). The trial judge instructed the
jury on the due process defense. After a period of deliberation, the
jurors asked for a reiteration of the instruction. They then continued de-
liberating and ultimately returned verdicts of acquittal.
One of the defendants' attorneys, Martin Stoler, talked to 11 of the
jurors after the verdict. He reported that six of them told him that they
voted for acquittal because of the due prccess instruction. Telephone in-
terview with Martin Stoler, Esq., June 20, 1973.
74. Pretrial Affidavit by the informer, Robert Hardy, at 4, Feb. 28,
1972, filed in United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. 1973).
75. Record at 8728-29, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 602-71
(D.N.J. 1973).
76. 1 E. DBrn= & C. BLAcKwAR, supra note 39, § 13.13, at 189-90
(Supp. 1974).
77. However, some federal judges may take the position that the
due process issue should not be sent to the jury, on the theory that de-
fenses based on a policy of controlling police rather than one of meting
out justice to the particular defendant should be reserved for determina-
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Despite the Anderson case, it seems clear that this "excessive
assistance" defense will be difficult to sustain. Several federal
courts of appeals have recently affirmed convictions in cases in
which government participation was quite heavy. For example,
in United States v. McGrath,78 government agents provided some
would-be counterfeiters with a printer and supervised the manu-
facture and delivery of the bills. The court of appeals originally
sustained a defense based upon excessive assistance, but on re-
mand from the Supreme Court after Russell it reversed course
and held that the defense must fail. Other courts have upheld
convictions in cases where the government provided an aviator
to aid the defendants in smuggling marijuana 9 and where an in-
former provided laboratory equipment, technical advice, and in-
gredients for manufacturing amphetamines.8 0
These cases demonstrate that in the wake of Russell lower
federal courts have been reluctant to place constitutional re-
straints upon participation by investigators in criminal enter-
prises. This attitude is consistent with Russell's indication that
the due process defense should be applied with restraint. How-
ever, Russell does not necessarily prevent use of nonconstitu-
tional entrapment doctrine to protect a defendant who became
involved in a type of crime that he otherwise could not have com-
mitted.
When the government has provided essential leadership or
logistical support in committing a sophisticated crime (such as
manufacture of drugs or counterfeiting), there will sometimes be
serious doubt that the defendant would have been able to obtain
similar support from other sources. Such cases raise the question
whether a defendant is "predisposed" when he is willing to com-
mit the type of crime charged, but would not be able to do so
without extraordinary aid. This issue was not resolved in Rus-
sell, where the defendants had established a laboratory and man-
ufactured drugs before receiving any government aid.81 Other
tion by the judge, because he can take a long-term view and articulate
specific rules for official guidance. Cf. Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 385 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78. United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated
in light of Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), conviction affd, 494 F.2d 562 (7th
Cir. 1974).
79. United States v. Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072 (5th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975).
80. United States v. Weber, 518 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975).
81. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
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Supreme Court cases provide little guidance.8 2 A lower federal
court could, therefore, take the position that a defendant is not
"predisposed" unless he is both willing to commit the type of
crime charged and likely to do so.B Under this view, there could
be a reasonable doubt84 about predisposition where the govern-
ment provided extraordinary assistance, even if the defendant
readily acquiesced in the crime.8 5
b. The furnishing-contraband defense
Several federal courts have held that a defendant may not
be convicted for possessing or selling contraband furnished to
him by an agent.8 6 Although some courts have characterized this
82. The Supreme Court has never attempted a comprehensive defi-
nition of "predisposition." Its statements that the entrapment defense is
designed to protect "innocent" persons, see note 116 infra, are ambiguous;
and its expressed concern that the defense protect persons who were led
into crime by the "creative activity" of government agents, see Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 451-52 (1932), is consistent with the view that a defendant who
could not have committed the type of crime charged without excessive
assistance by the government should be excused.
83. This view of entrapment is slightly at variance with the stand-
ard instruction quoted in note 39 supra. The instruction requires that the
defendant be ready and willing, but not that he be ready, willing, and
able to commit offenses of the nature charged without government as-
sistance. However, this instruction, though consistent with the Supreme
Court's doctrine in most of its applications, may not adequately reflect
the Court's concern that the entrapmen't defense protect defendants who
were led into crime by the "creative activity" of government agents. See
note 82 supra.
84. Under federal law, the prosecution has the burden of proving
predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has satis-
fied his burden of coming forward with evidence raising the defense. See
cases cited in note 332 infra.
85. This approach might be justified on the theory that no purpose
is served by convicting a person who would not have committed the type
of crime charged without government assistance, since society needs no
protection from persons who refrain from criminal activity, regardless of
their reasons for doing so. Cf. Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396
F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968) (held, defendant who was willing to transport
heroin from one place to another in Mexico in violation of Mexican law,
but unwilling to take it across United States border because of fear of
discovery, had been entrapped by agent who importuned him to cross
border).
86. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1975)
(alternative holding); United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1015-16
(5th Cir. 1974) (reversed for failure to instruct that, even if predisposed,
defendant was entitled to acquittal if agent supplied him with the contra-
band); United States v. Oquendo, 490 -. 2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949
(1973) (informer furnished drugs to defendant); United States v. Dillet,
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rule as an aspect of the entrapment defense,8 7 it falls outside the
scope of the traditional federal defense, since it bars conviction
even if the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime
charged.88
As a matter of policy, the furnishing-contraband rule is ap-
pealing. It seems easy to understand and to explain to police
agents, and it seems to give clear guidance about the limits of
permissible conduct. Moreover, it seems to strike at a dangerous
and unnecessary law enforcement technique. If an agent sus-
pects that a target is dealing in contraband, the agent can at-
tempt to make a decoy purchase from him. There will normally
be no need to provide the target with contraband; a person who
has been trafficking will have his own sources. Indeed, the fact
that an agent found it expedient to provide contraband raises a
suspicion that the target was not predisposed. Of course, the
factual question of whether the particular defendant was predis-
posed could be left to the jury under an appropriate instruction.
However, the rule against furnishing contraband, like the exclu-
sionary rule in search cases, can be seen as a prophylactic rule
intended to protect innocent persons from police action intended
for the guilty. An agent who feels free to give drugs to targets
creates a danger of corrupting the innocent that an agent who
merely makes decoy purchases does not.89
265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant willingly acted as paid drug
carrier between informer and agent). Contra, United States v. Hampton,
507 F.2d 832, 834-36 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975);
United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir. 1974) (if defendant
is predisposed, fact that informer supplied contraband "unbeknownst to
the government" would not justify acquittal).
87. See United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980,
985-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1974) ("the law of this Circuit is that a defendant, where entrapment is
an issue, may be acquitted for lack of predisposition, or, even though dis-
posed, where the undercover agent supplies him with the contraband");
United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 949 (1973) ("The government's case cannot rest on the mere fact
that he entered into the Informer's plan willingly").
89. If officers and informers are allowed to possess and sell drugs
for purposes of trapping users and sellers, there is a chance that the
drugs will be used by the recipients, including novice users. There is
also a chance that the drugs will be diverted to illegal channels before
the decoy purchase can take place.
Other abuses may arise from the fact that a practice of furnishing
contraband gives agents an excuse for possessing narcotics. For exam-
ple, the Knapp Commission found that New York City police officers
were "involved in possession and sale of narcotics in a variety of ways,"
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Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which application of
the furnishing-contraband rule might interfere with legitimate
law enforcement. Mechanical application of the rule would have
defeated prosecution in a recent case in which officers inter-
cepted a drug smuggler about to make a delivery to drug dealers.
The officers convinced him to incriminate his customers by going
ahead with the delivery.90 In another case, an agent who had
infiltrated a large drug conspiracy -was asked by the conspirators
to deliver drugs to an established customer.91 He delivered heroin
from Hong Kong to a drug dealer in California. 92 Cases like these
could be treated as falling outside the general rule, but only at
the cost of complicating it and thereby making it more difficult
for officers and informers to understand. 93
and that it was "common" for police officers to use narcotics as a medium
of exchange for goods and services. Addict-informers carried on a lively
business selling stolen merchandise to police officers in return for nar-
cotics. CoAMvIssIoN To INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF PoLIcE CORRUPTIONS
AND THE CiTy's AwTI-ComuP=rON PRoCEDuREs, THE KNAPP CoMMIssIoN
REPORT N POLICE ComupmoN 105-10 (1973). Although the furnishing-
contraband rule is certainly not a panacea for such practices, the rule
would eliminate any excuse for agents to possess narcotics except during
the brief interlude between making an undercover purchase and placing
the narcotics in the police evidence locker. Therefore, the rule might fa-
cilitate enforcement of anticorruption measures. The rule might also
make it more difficult for persons to act as informers while also selling
drugs at a profit. Cf. United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980, 986(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
90. United States v. Mahoney, 355 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1973). The
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice. In a
thoughtful opinion, the trial judge held that at trial
there will be a heavy burden on the government to show that
these defendants were the intended recipients of this contraband,
from some point in time prior to the government's involvement
with it. This will be an essential element of the government's
case against these defendants, because I am prepared to hold as
a matter of law that entrapment was practiced in this case if
Brannon, Caves and Mahoney are not in fact the original 'con-
signees' of this illicit merchandise, irrespective of any criminal
predisposition on their part.
Id. at 428 (emphasis in original).
91. United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1031 (1974) (affirming conviction of heroin recipient over attack
based upon contraband rule and due process dictum in Russell).
92. Id.
93. See, for example, the relatively elaborate rule prescribed by the
trial judge in United States v. Mahoney, 355 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1973)(quoted in note 90 supra).
Conceptually, Mahoney and Lue can be regarded as cases which fall
outside the contraband rule, rather than as exceptions to it. Thus, contra-
band discovered "in transit" or contraband delivered from a preestab-
lished "connection" could be seen as contraband not "furnished" by the
government. See United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D.
Cal. 1970):
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The theoretical basis of the furnishing-contraband rule has
never been entirely clear. One opinion based it upon the idea
that the lower federal courts were free to follow the doctrine es-
poused in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman.9 4
This view was, of course, decisively rejected by the Russell case.
Another leading case based it upon a strained interpretation of
language in the majority opinions in Sherman and Sorrells, say-
ing that the crime charged was the product of the "creative ac-
tivity" of the government because without government-furnished
contraband the crime would never have occurred. 95 This inter-
pretation of Supreme Court doctrine would require acquittal in
every case in which government activity was a but-for cause of
the particular crime charged-i.e., in virtually every case in
which the defense has ever been raised, including Russell.
Perhaps a more comfortable basis for the furnishing-contra-
band defense lies in the supervisory power of the federal courts.90
This [holding dismissing indictment based upon possession of
counterfeit money furnished by informer] does not mean that
the government, after the discovery of contraband in transit,
may not take effective measures to arrest the consignee for pos-
session after it has been delivered. In such cases the govern-
ment does not supply the contraband.
However, whether the "in transit" or "previous connection" cases are
regarded as exceptions or as instances falling outside the rule, they nev-
ertheless complicate the rule, which would be simpler and easier to ap-
ply if government officers and informers were absolutely forbidden to
transfer contraband to targets.
94. United States v. Dillet, 265 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
95. United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
The majority opinion in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369(1958), stated that "[e]ntrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct
was 'the product of the creative activity' of law-enforcement officials."
Id. at 372 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932)).
Apparently drawing on this language, Buena said that:
The facts of this case clearly fit within the framework of the
law [of entrapment]. If Defendant is to be believed, the sales of
heroin were made through the creative activity of the govern-
ment. The Defendant would not have had the heroin to sell if
it had not been purchased by the Informer. In fact, this particu-
lar heroin would apparently not have been in the United States
at all, if it had not been smuggled in by the Informer.
447 F.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
96. Cf. Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965) (supervisory power used as basis for re-
versing conviction in case in which informer had been offered contingent
fee for apprehension of particular defendant). (For a discussion of Wil-
liamson, see text accompanying notes 104-11 infra.) But see United
States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 343, n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
118 (1975) (noting that United States v. Russell seems to disapprove of
the use of supervisory power in circumstances such as those presented in
Williamson).
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However, the supervisory power has generally not been used to
abort prosecutions except when police conduct has exceeded lim-
its based upon the Constitution or statute,97 and Russell seems
to display an antipathy toward using it to enforce court-created
limitations on police tactics.9 8 Alternatively, the rule could be
based upon the due process clause, though it seems that not every
instance of furnishing contraband constitutes the sort of "shock-
ing" or "outrageous" conduct that Russell indicated might offend
the Constitution. 99 Moreover, the majority opinion in Russell
expressed unwillingness to establish "fixed rules" of due proc-
ess.10 0 Instead of giving the rule constitutional status, the fur-
nishing of contraband could be treated as a form of government
leadership that will normally raise a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's predisposition. This approach would, in appropriate
97. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69
COLUm. L. REv. 181, 193-212 (1969) (arguing that courts may not bar a
prosecution because of otherwise valid police conduct that falls below
standards of judicial propriety); Comment, Entrapment Rationale Em-
ployed to Condemn Government's Furnishing of Contraband, 59 MmuqN.
L. REV. 444, 450 n.34 (1974); cf. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
450 (1932) (federal courts lack the prerogative to decline to enforce
criminal statutes on grounds of public policy). But see Dixon v. District
of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Williamson v. United
States, 311 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). In
Dixon, Judge Bazelon invoked the supervisory power as the basis for dis-
missing a prosecution brought in retaliation for the defendant's breach
of an agreement not to file a complaint against the prosecuting police of-
ficers. The two other judges on the panel concurred in the result but
not in the opinion.
98. The Court noted that the conduct of the agent in the case before
it had not violated due process, 411 U.S. at 431, any other constitutional
provision, id. at 430, or any federal statute or rule. Id. at 430. It indi-
cated that in the absence of such a violation a federal court should not
dismiss a prosecution for overzealous law enforcement. Id. at 435. See
also United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 343 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 96 S. Ct. 118 (1975) (described in note 96 supra).
99. For examples of such instances, see the cases cited in notes 90-
93 supra.
Even in cases which do not fall within the "in transit" and "previous
connection" categories, see notes 90-93 supra and accompanying text, the
provision of contraband in particular circumstances may not shock the
conscience. For example, even if the ingredient supplied by the agent
in Russell had been contraband, his conduct would still not seem shock-
ing, since the defendants had already established a laboratory for the
manufacture of amphetamines and had previously obtained the same in-
gredient elsewhere.
100. Russell exhibited a reluctance to erect flat per se rules of due
process in quasi-entrapment cases. The Court characterized the defend-
ant's argument as one advocating a "rigid constitutional rule" and ex-
pressed concern about "the difficulties attending the notion that due
process of law can be embodied in fixed rules." 411 U.S. at 431.
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circumstances, require that the government bring forward evi-
dence that the defendant was already engaged in criminal enter-
prise in order to satisfy its burden of production on the issue of
predisposition. 01
At any rate, it appears likely that the Supreme Court will
soon resolve the uncertainty about whether the furnishing-con-
traband defense survives Russell. The circuits have divided on
the issue, 0 2 and the Court has recently granted certiorari in a
case raising it.1°3
c. The contingent-fee defense
In Williamson v. United States,0 4 the Fifth Circuit reversed
the conviction of a defendant who had been trapped by an in-
former working on a contingent-fee basis. Federal officers had
promised the informer $200 for incriminating Williamson. 05 Al-
though Williamson was apparently ready and willing to sell
moonshine whiskey, 0 6 his conviction for doing so was reversed
on grounds that contingent-fee arrangements produce an intoler-
able danger that informers will persuade innocent persons to
commit crime.0 7 However, the court indicated that it would al-
low contingent-fee arrangements if their use could be "ex-
plained" or "justified" in a particular case-for example, by
showing that the officers had sufficient grounds for believing
that the target was engaged in crime. 08
In theory, Williamson had broad potential. It could have
been construed to limit the widespread practice of offering leni-
ency to arrested persons who agree to incriminate others by mak-
ing purchases of contraband. These informers are likely to be
101. Cf. text accompanying notes 81-85 supra (discussion of the "ex-
cessive assistance" defense).
102. See note 86 supra.
103. United States v. Hampton, 507 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
104. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
105. The informer was promised $200 for Williamson, $200 for an as-
sociated defendant, and $100 for a third associate, plus $10 a day and gas
expenses. Id. at 442.
106. The court acknowledged that
(u]nder the law of entrapment as developed in prior decisions
of the Supreme Court and of this Court, no reversible error
would appear except for the evidence of employment of the
informer Moye on a contingent fee basis.
Id. at 444.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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even more desperate to get convictions than persons who co-
operate for money.
Despite its theoretically broad reach, Williamson has had vir-
tually no impact. Courts faced with a defense based on it have
almost invariably found a way to distinguish it.109 It has been
construed to apply only to cases where payment was contingent
upon the conviction of a particular person." 0 Even in such cases,
officers have had little trouble justifying contingent-fee arrange-
ments. The Fifth Circuit itself has affirmed convictions in con-
tingent-fee cases on the basis of rather unimpressive showings
of grounds for suspecting that the target was engaged in crime.'
For reasons I have discussed in the section concerning the
furnishing-contraband rule, Russell places the vitality of the con-
tingent-fee rule in doubt. However, the rule had been so nar-
rowly construed that it had little practical importance even be-
fore Russell.
d. The reasonable suspicion defense
Some federal opinions have suggested that a predisposed de-
fendant may be entitled to acquittal on grounds of entrapment
if the agent who solicited the offense lacked reasonable grounds
109. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 118 (1975); United StaLes v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078 (1st Cir.
1974); United States v. Grimes, 438 F.2d 391, 395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 989 (1971) (Williamson both distinguished and disapproved).
One recent commentator reported: "Apparently the only other re-
ported decision following it is a 1968 federal district court decision." Dix,
Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203,
287 (1975). The case referred to is United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp.
458 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
110. See United States v. Cuomo, 479 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973); Henly v. United States, 406 F.2d 705, 706
(5th Cir. 1969); cf. United States v. Jett, 491 F.2d 1078, 1081 (1st Cir.
1974).
111. See Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 851 (1964), where a contingent-fee arrangement was upheld be-
cause the agents knew that the defendant had a past record for moon-
shining and numerous complaints had been received from neighbors. Cf.
Harris v. United States, 400 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1968). The court's opinion
in Harris does not clearly indicate what the officers' grounds for suspi-
cion were. The only specific evidence alluded to in the opinion was Har-
ris's own admission that he had been "known" to "know about whiskey,"
and his speculation that that might have been the reason he had been
contacted. Id. at 266 & n.4. See also Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d
139 (5th Cir. 1965). In Sears the court held that, in an investigation
made more difficult by the fact that the defendant was a county sheriff,
information received from the same informer who was promised the con-
tingent fee was sufficient grounds.
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to suspect that his target was engaged in criminal activity.1 12
However, most of the circuits have rejected this theory,1 3 and
Russell seems to have sapped it of any remaining vitality by in-
dicating that the entrapment defense is intended to protect non-
disposed defendants rather than to control police conduct.1 1 4
The "reasonable suspicion" doctrine has another face. Occa-
sionally courts and commentators have suggested that the prose-
cution can rebut the federal entrapment defense by showing that
at the time of the inducement police agents had reasonable cause
to suspect that the defendant was engaged in the commission of
crime."" ; This approach seems contrary to the Supreme Court's
112. See Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948 (1959) (defendant claimed that police had no
probable cause to invite him to engage in criminal activity; in affirming
conviction, court said that reasonable suspicion was sufficient); Morales
v. United States, 260 F.2d 939, 940 (6th Cir. 1958) (lack of reasonable sus-
picion ground for reversing conviction); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d
827, 836-37 (6th Cir. 1942) (same, alternative ground). See also United
States v. Perry, 478 F.2d 1276 (7th Cir. 1971) (semble), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1005 (1973); Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th
Cir. 1948) (in affirming conviction, court held that hearsay evidence was
admissible to prove reasonable suspicion, stating that "officers may en-
trap one into the commission of an offense only when they have reason-
able grounds to believe that he is engaged in illegal activities"). The
"reasonable suspicion" doctrine is discussed in Dix, Undercover Investi-
gations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203, 249-54 (1975).
113. United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974) (trial judge correctly refused to give instruc-
tion that defendant should be acquitted unless agents had reasonable
suspicion that defendant was already engaged in crime; conviction af-
firmed); United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971); United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998(3d Cir. 1969); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373, 394 (1st Cir.
1967); Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76-77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 884 (1963); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1958); United States v. Abdallah, 149
F.2d 219, 222 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945); Swallum
v. United States, 39 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir. 1930). A comparison of the
cases cited in notes 111-112 supra indicates that a majority of the circuits
have rejected the reasonable suspicion defense, and that the position of
most of the others is unclear.
114. For a discussion of this aspect of the Russell case, see notes 63,
96-103 supra and accompanying text.
One court of appeals has cited Russell as a basis for rejecting the
reasonable suspicion defense. In United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210,
211 n. (9th Cir. 1973), the court noted that in Russell:
[T]he Court emphasized that the entrapment rule was designed
to protect those innocent people cajoled into committing crimes,
not as a tool to check overzealous police conduct. The reason-
able suspicion requirement would not add to the protection al-
ready afforded the innocent by requiring proof of a defendant's
predisposition. It is, rather, intended to control police conduct.
115. See C.M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852, 856 (8th
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expressed desire to make the defense turn on the culpability of
the defendant,11 6 since it would permit conviction of a previously
innocent defendant who had been badgered into crime. (The fact
that agents had reasonable cause to suspect crime does not, of
course, mean that the defendant was actually engaged in crime.
A belief may be reasonable and still be mistaken.)
The notion that reasonable suspicion is an alternative basis
for rebutting the entrapment defense now seems to be falling
into disrepute. It may safely be said that most federal courts
would hold that an entrapment defense, once properly raised, can
be defeated only by proving actual predisposition.11 7
Cir. 1926); United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134 (D. Minn. 1926); Orfield,
The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 48-
49; cf. United States v. Tyson, 470 F.2d 381, 383 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 985 (1973) (court confused the concepts of reasonable
suspicion and predisposition, saying that "reasonable suspicion is all that
is required to establish predisposition").
116. See Sorells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) ("the con-
trolling question [is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise inno-
cent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense
which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials"). See
also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) ("Congress could
not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting inno-
cent persons into violations").
117. There is language in at least one decision of this court tend-
ing to support the view that the critical predisposition inquiry
is whether the officers had reasonable grounds to believe the ac-
cused had a predisposition. . . . The more recent entrapment
decisions, however .... establish that the critical issue on the
predisposition facet of that defense is not whether the officers
who induced the accused had reasonable grounds to believe he
had such a propensity, but whether he did, in fact, have such a
propensity.
United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 291 n.12 (9th Cir. 1969).
In United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1972), the trial
judge had instructed the jury that if the federal narcotics agents "had
reason to believe that these people were trafficking in drugs, then they
had a perfect right to do what they did." Id. at 1221 (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court of appeals decided that the instruction was reversible
error, stating that "it is inconsequential whether law enforcement officials
did or did not act on well-grounded suspicion that the defendant was en-
gaging in wrongdoing, or whether they had probable cause for approach-
ing the defendant." Id. at 1220 (emphasis in original). See also
United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1001 (3d Cir. 1969).
The widely accepted standard entrapment instruction, supra note 39,
focuses solely upon predisposition and does not mention reasonable sus-
picion. The paucity of recent cases raising the issue of whether reason-
able suspicion can rebut an entrapment defense is probably attributable
to the reluctance of trial judges to depart from the safety of the standard
instruction. See United States v. Silver, supra, at 1220-21 (the trial judge
"unhappily" decided to elaborate on the standard instruction).
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4. Comparison of Federal Law and the
Hypothetical-Person Defense
The principal differences between federal law and the hypo-
thetical-person defense lie in the consequences attached to proof
of predisposition and of agent misconduct. These differences can
be illustrated diagramatically:
FEDERAL LAW
Predisposition
nondisposed predisposed
Not Guilty Not Guilty
"Outrageous! (entrapment; (due process)
due process)
Improper, Not Guilty Guilty*
but not (entrapment)
outrageous
Not Not Guilty** Guilty
improper (entrapment)
HYPOTHETICAL-PERSON DEFENSE
Predisposition
nondisposed predisposed
Not Guilty Not Guilty
"Outrageous" (entrapment; (entrapment;
due process) due process)
Improper, Not Guilty Not Guilty
but not (entrapment) (entrapment)
outrageous
Not Guilty Guilty
improper
* Some federal courts would excuse the defendant on a quasi-
entrapment theory when a government agent furnished contraband or
when the government induced the crime by offering a contingent fee to
an informer. See text accompanying notes 86-111 supra.
** Some federal cases could be interpreted to require that the
defendant produce evidence of improper inducement in order to raise
the entrapment defense. See note 53 supra. However, others clearly
hold that no such evidence is required, note 50 supra, and the standard
federal entrapment instruction permits the jury to acquit even if it
finds that the agent acted properly. See note 39 supra.
As the diagrams illustrate, neither approach is uniformly
more favorable to defendants than the other. Federal law is
more favorable to nondisposed defendants who succumbed to in-
ducements not sufficiently compelling to be deemed improper.
The hypothetical-person defense is more favorable to predisposed
defendants who have been subjected to improper inducements.
Inducement
Inducement
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B. ADmissIoN AND EXCLUSION OF Evmi:ENCE
1. Admissibility of Evidence of the Nature of the Inducement
Offered by the Agent
Evidence about the nature of the inducement offered is ad-
missible under either version of the entrapment defense. Since
improper inducement is a dispositive fact under the hypothetical-
person defense, evidence about it is indispensable. Under the
federal test, evidence about the nature of the inducement is
highly relevant for its bearing on the issue of predisposition. For
example, if the inducement consisted of an unadorned offer to
purchase drugs, the target's acquiescence in itself would indicate
that he was predisposed. However, if the agent badgered the tar-
get with repeated requests, pretended withdrawal symptoms in
order to play on the target's sympathy, or offered the target an
inordinate price for a small quantity of drugs, then other evi-
dence would be necessary to establish predisposition. 118
2. Admissibility of Evidence of the Defendant's Predisposition
a. Predisposition evidence under the federal defense
Predisposition is a dispositive fact under the federal defense.
Evidence bearing on it has been freely admitted.
Predisposition may be shown by evidence that the defendant
had previously engaged in other criminal activity of the nature
charged. This activity may be proven by prior convictions or by
testimony about prior crimes which never led to conviction."19
Predisposition may also be shown by testimony about the
target's actions during negotiations leading to the offense
charged. The target may reveal his outlook by confiding or
bragging to a police decoy about his past deeds or future plans.120
His ready acquiescence in the agent's solicitation may itself
indicate predisposition, 12' as may displays of expert knowledge
118. See Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (lst Cir. 1967).
119. See, e.g., Nutter v. United States, 412 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 927 (1970) (prior conviction for similar offense);
United States v. Owens, 346 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 848(1965) (other sales of drugs prior to offense charged). See generally
Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 293 (1975).
120. See, e.g., Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958) (defend-
ant bragged to officers about his heroin connections, inferentially contra-
dicting his testimony that informer had pressured him into committing
the offense).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 496 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Prieto-Olivas, 419 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (dictum).
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about criminal activity. 22
Subsequent events may throw retrospective light upon the
issue of predisposition. The fact-finder may consider, for exam-
ple, whether the defendant proved to have ready access to contra-
band, 23 whether a search of his dwelling turned up evidence of
criminal activity, 24 and whether he later committed other crimes
of a similar nature.125
Many federal judges have been permissive about the form
of predisposition evidence. They have admitted various types of
hearsay and opinion testimony, including evidence about the de-
fendant's reputation for criminal activity 2 6 and records of arrests
that did not result in conviction. 27
b. Predisposition evidence under the
hypothetical-person defense
(1) Admission of predisposition evidence for its bearing on
the decency of police conduct
Advocates of the hypothetical-person defense have some-
times described it in terms suggesting that evidence of the de-
122. See, e.g., Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 516-17 (1st Cir.
1961).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir.
1975) ("ability of these defendants to supply large quantities of mari-
juana shortly after they had been requested to do so" was probative evi-
dence of predisposition); cf. United States v. Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198, 1200
(5th Cir. 1973) (defendant's post-crime statement, "If you need more, I'll
be here," probative evidence of predisposition).
124. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958) (fact
that subsequent search of defendant's apartment failed to turn up nar-
cotics used as one factor supporting a holding that defendant had been
entrapped as a matter of law).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 474 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1973)
(another sale of drugs subsequent to offense charged admissible as evi-
dence of predisposition).
126. See, e.g., United States v. McKinley, 493 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1974)
(officer's testimony that unnamed informer had told him that defendant
was "one of the major dealers of narcotics in the City of Mobile" held
admissible); United States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1973) (offi-
cer's testimony that confidential informer had told him that defendant
had a reputation for dealing in drugs held admissible). This view has
not been universally accepted, and some courts have not permitted such
evidence to be used to prove predisposition. See notes 294-95 infra. An
extended discussion of the use of reputation and other hearsay evidence
to rebut the entrapment defense is contained in text accompanying notes
281-305 infra.
127. See, e.g., Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970).
Contra, United States v. White, 390 P.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1968) (alternative
holding).
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fendant's criminal propensities would be absolutely inadmissible.
In his influential minority opinion in Sherman v. United
States,'128 Justice Frankfurter stated that the question whether
the intention to commit the crime originated with the defendant
was "wholly irrelevant,' 1 29 and indicated that all evidence which
would "show the defendant's reputation, criminal activities, and
prior disposition" should be excluded.130 He declared in sweeping
terms that "[p]ermissible police activity does not vary...
according to the suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, of the
police concerning the defendant's activities."'' 1
Similar statements appear in the commentary to the Brown
Commission proposal and the Model Penal Code. The Model Pe-
nal Code commentary indicates that under its proposal neither
prior convictions nor subsequent criminal activity would be ad-
missible, 3 2 and criticizes the federal defense for turning the
courtroom inquiry away from the character of police conduct to
"the history of the accused and his immediate reaction to entice-
ment."133  The Brown Commission commentary states that
"[n] eedless to say, the accused's penchant for criminality, either
on this occasion or in the past, is not to be placed in issue under
this proposal, unless such evidence is admissible under some
theory other than entrapment."'13 4
Statements such as these, as their authors would no doubt
have recognized, cannot be applied with mechanical literalism.
Even under a hypothetical-person test, it will sometimes be ap-
propriate to admit evidence bearing on a defendant's "penchant
for criminality." The ultimate aim of a hypothetical-person test
is to acquit defendants who have been subjects of improper police
conduct, either in hopes of preventing future misconduct, 35 or be-
For a discussion of whether arrest records should be admissible, see
text accompanying notes 313-14 infra.
128. 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (concurring opinion).
129. Id. at 382.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 383. Compare Comment, Entrapment by Federal Officers,
33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1040 (1958):
[S]ince the test [urged in Justice Frankfurter's opinion] is not
concerned with any particular defendant, but rather with a fic-
tional "reasonable" defendant, evidence of the defendant's prior
criminal record, his reputation, other grounds for suspicion by
the officers, or his ready complaisance during the transaction,
would be properly excluded as irrelevant.
132. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
133. Id.
134. BRoWN CoI :ssIoN COMWENTARY, supra note 13, at 320.
135. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 20 (Tent. Draft No.
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cause the purity of the courts would be soiled by a conviction
acquired by unworthy action.1 3 6 Sometimes no fair assessment
of the decency of an agent's conduct can be made without con-
sidering what the agent knew about the defendant's propensity
for crime.
For example: an undercover agent approaches his target
with a request to buy drugs. The target responds by acknowl-
edging that he is a drug dealer, but says that he is afraid to sell
to the agent because he has heard that the agent may be working
for the police. Instead of giving up, the agent badgers the target,
appealing to past friendship, offering more than the market price,
or even feigning the onset of withdrawal symptoms. These in-
ducements, considered in the abstract, fall within the category
of conduct that ought to be prohibited.137 However, it is doubtful
that a court following the hypothetical-person approach would
hold that an entrapment had occurred, notwithstanding state-
ments by wise men that "[p]ermissible police activity does not
vary according to the particular defendant concerned"'' 38 or that
attention should not be directed to "his immediate reaction to en-
ticement." 39
The relevance of the particular defendant's predisposition to
the decency of police conduct is not restricted to situations in
which he displays criminality during negotiations attending the
commission of the offense. Prior conduct can also be relevant.
For example: an undercover agent is present in the defendant's
apartment when the defendant sells drugs to other persons. For
various reasons the agent does not want to solicit a purchase at
that time. Therefore he fails to acquire evidence necessary to
ensure conviction. A week later the agent asks the defendant
to sell him drugs. The defendant answers that he has none. The
agent persists. Repeated requests are proper under the circum-
9, 1959) (alluding to "deterrent effect" of hypothetical-person approach);
BROWNq COMMISSION COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 306-07, 317; TiFFANY,
supra note 13, at 267-70.
136. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932)
(Roberts, J., concurring); text accompanying notes 202-05 infra.
137. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (condemning "[a]ppeals to sympathy,
friendship, [and] the possibility of exorbitant gain"); BROWN COMmis-
sioN COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 307-08.
138. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
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stances. They would not be if the agent knew that the defendant
was merely a user of drugs.
Sherman v. United States14" was itself a case in which knowl-
edge of the target's predisposition -was relevant to assessment of
the agent's conduct. The agent knew that the defendant was un-
dergoing treatment for addiction. His offer to buy narcotics
through the defendant was reprehensible because he knew of the
defendant's propensity. The quality of his conduct would have
been different if he had thought that his target was a non-user
dealing in drugs for profit, or even if he had chosen his target
at random. An agent's knowledge that his target has a weakness
for a vice crime but is currently abstaining is surely a fact that
merits consideration when assessing the agent's conduct.
The foregoing illustrations simply show what has long been
known about the reasonable person of the law of torts-that a
hypothetical person cannot be wholly hypothetical. He must be
endowed with some of the actual qualities of the defendant.141 The
qualities with which he is endowed ought to depend upon the
purpose for which the hypothetical person has been created. His
purpose in the entrapment context is to prevent the use of in-
ducements that might have tempted nondisposed persons into
crime.142 To serve this purpose, evidence of criminal proclivity
ought to be taken into account when it bears on the question of
whether the agent should have known that his inducement would
create a substantial risk of corrupting a person not otherwise dis-
posed to commit the offense. If such evidence is excluded, courts
and juries will be taking a one-eyed view of the decency of police
conduct.
Statutes based upon the Model Penal Code and the Brown
Commission proposal 43 can be construed to permit introduction
of predisposition evidence. Section 2.13 (1) (b) of the Model Pe-
nal Code defines entrapment as "employing methods of persua-
sion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an
140. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
141. See Seavey, Negligence---Subjective or Objective?, 41 HAIv. L.
REv. 1 (1927).
142. See, e.g., BROWN COMMISSION COMMENTJ-ARY, supra note 13, at
322-23: "The test there [in the Model Penal Code], as here, is an
objective one, i.e., has the police conduct fallen below the minimum
standards of decency required by society in the conduct of police affairs
so that it bears a significant risk of embroiling innocent persons in crimi-
nal behavior." For further discussion of rationales of the hypothetical-
person approach, see text accompanying notes 202-08 infra.
143. For citation of statutes based upon these model codes, see note
16 supra.
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offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it." The substantiality of the risk created can-
not be assessed without considering the surrounding circum-
stances, including facts about the target that were known to the
agent. An offer to purchase drugs at a premium creates a
greater risk if the target is known to be an indigent drug user
than if he is known to be a rich man. The risk of inducing a
crime by one "not ready to commit it" is less if the agent has
recently seen his target sell drugs to other persons than it is if
he knows nothing about the target.
The Brown Commission's proposed statute is susceptible to
a similar construction. Section 702 (2) defines entrapment as "us-
ing persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-abid-
ing persons to commit the offense." The statute requires an as-
sessment of the likelihood (i.e., risk) that the means used would
induce crime in a normally law-abiding person. The risk created
by the agent's inducement cannot fairly be assessed without con-
sidering the surrounding circumstances, including facts about the
target which were known to the agent.
Moreover, the Commission's commentary is ambivalent about
the exclusion of predisposition evidence. In explaining why the
Model Penal Code definition was not adopted, it states that a new
formulation was considered necessary "to insure that an objective
standard is employed to determine whether police conduct is suf-
ficiently unsavory to justify an entrapment defense," and the
sentence immediately following states that "[n] eedless to say, the
accused's penchant for criminality" is "not to be placed in issue
... , unless . . . admissible under some theory other than en-
trapment."'144 However, a few pages later the commentary indi-
cates that one of the factors relevant to the reasonableness of a
police agent's conduct is whether he had a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.145 Con-
144. See BROWN COMMISSION COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 320.
The last clause of the quoted language presumably refers to cases in
which the defendant denies committing the criminal act and simultane-
ously raises the entrapment defense. If he then offers evidence of char-
acter to prove that he did not commit the act, this testimony can be re-
butted by evidence of bad character. FED. R. Ev. 404(a) (1). Evidence
of prior criminal acts also would be admissible in such cases if relevant
to matters such as intent, motive, opportunity, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. 404(b). Moreover,
in any case in which the defendant testifies evidence of certain prior con-
victions is admissible for impeachment purposes. Id. 609 (a).
145. See BROWN COMMISSION COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 322-23:
Proposed section 702 does not propose to limit governmental
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sideration of that factor will obviously involve admission of evi-
dence concerning "penchant for criminality."
The opinions of the three state supreme courts which have
adopted the hypothetical-person defense by judicial decision can
also be construed to permit introduction of predisposition evi-
dence.
The first of these cases, Grossman v. State, stated that an
entrapment occurs when an agent "induces another person to
commit... an offense by persuasion or inducement which would
be effective to persuade an average person, other than one who
is ready and willing, to commit such an offense."'1 6 Although the
court's use of the "average person" standard suggests that the
inducement should be considered abstractly, its opinion else-
where indicates that evidence of surrounding circumstances is
admissible:
In applying the objective test we do not mean that the course
of conduct between the officer and the defendant should be ig-
nored. The transactions leading up to the offense, the interac-
tion between the officer and the defendant, and the defendant's
response to the inducements of the officer are all to be consid-
ered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be
on a normal person.' 47
Because of its final clause, this language has elements of am-
biguity. If in fact the only purpose for which the interaction be-
tween the defendant and the officer can be considered is "judging
what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal
inducements to those situations in which the government has
"some knowledge at the time of the offer that its target might
respond to a criminal suggestion." ...
Neither the Model Penal Code's entrapment section nor its
accompanying commentary adverts to this "reasonable suspi-
cion" requirement. It is likely that the authors of the Model
Penal Code's formulation felt that this issue could best be
resolved within the context of their standard as proposed. The
test there, as here, is an objective one, i.e., has the police con-
duct fallen below the minimum standards of decency required
by society in the conduct of police affairs so that it bears a
significant risk of embroiling innocent persons in criminal be-
havior. In determining whether police conduct meets the meas-
ure of this standard, it is necessary to evaluate a number of
factors, of which their reasonable suspicion of the accused's
predisposition is but one. The nature of their activity, its dura-
tion, and other factual considerations bulk large in resolving
this objective test. None of these matters are specifically
enumerated, but that is not to say that they are not relevant
in a final appraisal of the police conduct.
146. 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969).
147. Id. at 230.
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person," it would seem that the interaction could not be used
to shed light upon the propriety of the officer's conduct by show-
ing that his overtures were a permissible reaction to the target's
statements. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the de-
fendant's reaction could show what a normal person would do
in the circumstances. A normal person does not sell drugs even
if a police decoy uses a fairly extreme inducement, and the fact
that a particular defendant yielded is a rather insignificant basis
for predicting what a normal person would have done. The
quoted language is probably best understood as a caution that
the permissibility of the agent's conduct is not to be determined
out of context, and that the reaction of the defendant to initial
overtures ought to be considered in judging the propriety of sub-
sequent overtures.
The opinions of the other two supreme courts which have
adopted a hypothetical-person test are also consistent with the
theory that the agent's conduct is to be judged in the context
of contemporaneous conduct by the defendant. The Iowa su-
preme court's opinion in State v. Mullen1 4s adopts the Brown
Commission's formulation of the defense and contains a passage
about the admissibility of evidence of "transactional negotia-
tions" between agent and target that is almost identical to the
one quoted from Grossman v. State. The Michigan supreme
court's opinion in People v. Turner 49 indicates that evidence
about the defendant's response to the agent's overtures is admis-
sible for purposes of evaluating the agent's later conduct by al-
luding to the fact that the defendant had warned the agent of
the harmful effects of heroin.
Although the three opinions agree that evidence of the de-
fendant's conduct during negotiations with the agent is admissi-
ble, they diverge on the question whether his prior conduct is
also admissible. State v. Mullen takes the most restrictive view.
The Mullen case involved a purchase of three ounces of hashish
by an undercover police officer. The court reversed the defend-
ant's conviction in an opinion indicating that on retrial the pre-
148. 216 N.W.2d 375, 382-83 (Iowa 1974):
In adopting an objective test we do not intimate that the
transactional negotiations and conduct of the government official(or his agent) and the defendant should be ignored. What was
said, and the defendant's response to the inducements, should all
be considered in judging what the effect of the government con-
duct would be on normally law-abiding persons.
149. 390 Mich. 7, 13, 210 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973).
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siding judge should not admit evidence that the defendant had
sold marijuana to the same police officer three months previ-
ously.150
Grossman v. State seems to have reached the opposite result,
despite the fact that its announced test-whether the inducement
would be "effective to persuade an average person"--suggests
that the agent's conduct should be considered without reference
to the history of the particular defendant. In Grossman, the de-
fendant was charged with selling morphine to an undercover of-
ficer. The court indicated that the fact that on earlier occasions
the defendant had agreed to obtain marijuana and dexedrine for
the officer could be considered in deciding whether the officer's
later conduct was justifiable.151
People v. Turner also indicates that evidence of prior activi-
ties will be admissible. In Turner, police agents engaged in a
two-year campaign to purchase drugs from the defendant. All
that they succeeded in getting during this period was caffeine
pills. After closing the investigation for a few months, the
agents decided to try again. They cultivated the defendant's
friendship with favors and friendly gestures. Finally, one of
them asked the defendant to supply some heroin, saying that it
was for a girlfriend "who was an addict and very good looking
and who would quit dating him if he didn't find some heroin for
her.":5 2 The defendant obtained a small amount of heroin for the
agent. He subsequently declined to make other sales, although
he did introduce the agent to the person from whom he had got-
ten the heroin. 5 3
In ordering acquittal, the Michigan supreme court stated
that it was adopting the "objective" test and aligned itself with
the minority opinions of Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Stew-
art.154 However, it seemed to impose no restrictions upon the evi-
dence which could be considered in judging the propriety of the
150. 216 N.W.2d at 377.
151. The defendant sold morphine to the officer on December 18, in
response to a solicitation made on December 13. Previously, on Decem-
ber 2 and 3, the defendant had agreed to obtain dexedrine and marijuana
for the officer. The officer subsequently pursued a "policy of friendship"
with her, seeing her almost every day until the arrest. The court re-
marked, "After appellant evinced an interest in supplying marijuana and
dexedrine pills to [the officer], he was justified in continuing his con-
tacts with her and in asking to purchase morphine." 457 P.2d at 231.
152. 390 Mich. at 13, 210 N.W.2d at 338.
153. Id. at 14, 210 N.W.2d at 338.
154. Id. at 22, 210 N.W.2d at 342.
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agent's conduct. In support of its conclusion that entrapment
had been established as a matter of law, the court noted that
the police had no cause to believe that the defendant was dealing
in drugs when the investigation began, that the first investiga-
tion of the defendant had turned up nothing, and that the trial
judge had found that the defendant was not a dealer in drugs.1' 5
At the very least, Turner stands for the proposition that the de-
fendant may introduce evidence about lack of criminal propen-
sity when it relates to the propriety of the agent's conduct. If
he does so, surely the prosecution must be permitted to rebut
with evidence that the agent knew of prior criminal activity.
(2) Admission of predisposition evidence to show causal
relationship between government misconduct and the
offense
Because of uncertainty about the nature of the causal rela-
tionship between inducement and crime required by substantive
doctrine under the hypothetical-person approach, 150 it is difficult
to predict circumstances in which predisposition evidence would
be admissible on this issue. However, two examples will suffice
to suggest circumstances in which an argument for admissibility
could be made.
A strong case for admission would be presented if a defend-
ant claimed that, like the unfortunate addict in Sherman v.
United States, 5 7 he was launched on a criminal career by the ac-
tivities of an agent. For example, he might claim that, even
though no improper pressure had been exerted by the particular
officer to whom he sold drugs, his entire career as a drug dealer
155. In explaining why it considered the conduct of the officers to
be improper, the Turner court, id. at 23, 210 N.W.2d at 343, mentioned
the following factors: (1) "there was no intimation at all that Turner
was dealing in heroin when the investigation began," (2) "the first inves-
tigation turned up nothing," (3) "the sale only occurred after the inven-
tion of a fictitious girlfriend [with withdrawal sickness] to play on the
sympathy of a friend," and (4) "Turner was not found to be a [regular]
dealer in drugs by the trial court." Two of these factors clearly seem
to relate to the knowledge of the agent about the defendant's predisposi-
tion rather than to the nature of the agent's inducement. The fourth
factor seems to be inappropriate in an opinion adopting any version of
the hypothetical-person test, since it relates to the defendant's predispo-
sition per se and not to what was known by the agent at the time of the
inducement. Only the third factor, the invention of the fictitious girl-
friend, could properly be considered by a court taking the position that
predisposition evidence is absolutely irrelevant under the hypothetical-
person test.
156. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
157. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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was the product of another agent's overreaching inducements. In
such a case, the prosecution ought to be permitted to put in evi-
dence of prior criminal activities in order to rebut the defendant's
claim that the agent launched his criminal career. If the defend-
ant regularly dealt in drugs before meeting the agent, the agent's
conduct, even if improper, would not have caused the defendant's
unrelated sale to a second agent.
A less appealing case for admissibility is presented by the
situation in which the prosecution seeks to introduce predisposi-
tion evidence to show that the offense was not caused by the
overreaching aspect of its agent's conduct. A plausible argument
can be made that predisposition evidence ought to be admissible
for this purpose in states that have adopted the Model Penal
Code's entrapment provision. Section 2.13 of the Code, which re-
quires the defendant to prove that his conduct occurred "in re-
sponse to" an "entrapment" by an agent, 158 could be interpreted
to permit conviction when the offense occurred in response to
something other than the improper aspect of the agent's induce-
ment. For example, suppose that an agent sought to induce the
sale of drugs by an improper appeal to the defendant's sympathy.
The defendant was unmoved, and declined to deal with the agent
because he suspected a trap. Later his fears were assuaged, so
he contacted the agent and consummated the sale. Even though
the defendant's conduct occurred in response to the agent's solici-
tation, it did not occur in response to the aspect of the agent's
solicitation that made it an "entrapment."
Although this interpretation of the Model Penal Code's lan-
guage is plausible, it would defeat the Code's intention to focus
upon government misconduct by opening the door to routine ex-
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (2) (Official Draft, 1962) (quoted in
note 17 supra). See PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 18, § 313(b) (1973), which
adopts the Model Penal Code's requirement that the defendant prove
that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.
The case of United States v. Ewbank, 483 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1973),
provides an example of a lack of causal connection between the improper
aspect of an agent's conduct and the defendant's crime. In a jury-waived
trial, the defendant testified, and the trial judge believed, that an agent
had engaged in a persistent campaign to get the defendant to sell drugs
to him. After repeated refusals, the defendant sold the agent a vial of
hashish oil. The trial judge found the defendant guilty on grounds that
his conduct has been caused by a desire to do a favor for a third person
(the owner of the hashish oil) instead of by the agent's badgering. Ar-
guably, the same result could have been reached under the Model Penal
Code. Cf. United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir.
1972) (jury could have believed that defendant acted as intermediary to
help seller-friend rather then to help agent),
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ploration of the defendant's predisposition under the guise of de-
termining the issue of causation. In almost every case a reason-
able claim could be made that the defendant acted "in response
to" his criminal proclivities rather than the overreaching aspect
of the government's inducement. Such an interpretation of the
hypothetical-person defense would not make it completely identi-
cal to the federal defense, since under the federal defense a pre-
disposed person would be guilty whether he acted in response
to pleas for sympathy or in response to his criminal proclivities.
However, it would permit more broad-ranging consideration of
predisposition evidence than the framers of the Model Penal
Code could have intended.
c. Comparison of the admissibility of predisposition evidence
under the federal defense and the hypothetical-person
defense
There is a great deal of uncertainty about how the treatment
of predisposition evidence under the hypothetical-person defense
will differ from its treatment under the federal defense. How-
ever, a few tentative observations can be made:
(1) Negotiations between agent and defendant
In cases in which the evidence of inducement and predisposi-
tion consists exclusively of conversations between an agent and
his target, there seems to be little practical difference between
the federal defense and a hypothetical-person test. Under either
version of the defense, evidence about the negotiations leading
to the offense is likely to be admissible. Such evidence is highly
relevant both to the quality of the agent's conduct and to the
defendant's predisposition.
(2) Prior convictions
Evidence of prior convictions will probably be excluded by
courts following the hypothetical-person test. The founding
fathers of this approach-the Justices of the Supreme Court mi-
norities,'59 and the draftsmen of model codes'10-have consist-
ently opposed admission of prior convictions. They have theo-
159. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439, 443-44 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378,
382-83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
160. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 20 (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1959); BRowN ComissioN COMMENTARY, spra note 13, at 325.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rized that police may pursue ex-convicts with particular zeal, em-
ploying extreme inducements and. relying upon proof of prior
convictions to overcome the entrapment defense.'- This practice
is thought to be contrary to the rehabilitative ideals of modern
penology, since it may cause persons who have reformed to re-
lapse into crime. 6 2 It seems unlikely that courts following a
doctrine based upon this tradition -would admit evidence of prior
convictions, whatever its bearing on the decency of police conduct
in a particular case.
The federal courts will probably continue to admit such evi-
dence, if only because its admissibility is well established. 63
However, the admission of such evidence is not an inevitable con-
sequence of making predisposition a dispositive fact. The decision
whether to exclude or admit such evidence depends more upon
one's views about the sagacity of jurors and the likelihood that
agents will pursue past offenders than it does upon anything in-
herent in the nature of the subjective approach. If admission of
evidence of prior convictions prejudices the jury or causes police
to treat ex-convicts unfairly, then the evidence should be ex-
cluded regardless of which substantive test of entrapment is ap-
plicable. An occasional state court following the subjective ap-
proach has adopted this view, excluding evidence of prior convic-
tions while adhering to the rule that the defendant's predisposi-
tion is a dispositive fact.16 4
161. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443-44 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-
83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); BROWN CouMIssIoN CoMMEN-
TARY, supra note 13, at 306-07. One of the leading recent cases, People
v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973), quoted Justice Stewart's
observation that
[the] subjective test means that the Government is permitted to
entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation, and
then to prosecute him for the manufactured crime, confident that
his record or reputation itself will be enough to show that he
was predisposed to commit the offense anyway.
Id. at 21, 210 N.W.2d at 342.
162. Justice Frankfurter expressed this concern in his Sherman
opinion, saying:
Past crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open
him to police practices, aimed at securing his repeated convic-
tion, from which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole
ameliorative hopes of modern penology and prison administra-
tion strongly counsel against such a view.
163. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), quoted in Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas.
1969). For an extended discussion of the admissibility of evidence of
prior convictions, see text accompanying notes 315-24 infra.
164. See cases cited in note 320 infra.
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(3) Unpunished crimes
The federal courts will doubtless continue to treat evidence
of unpunished criminal activity as admissible for its bearing on
the issue of the defendant's predisposition. 6 5 Such evidence, for
reasons I have given, may also be highly relevant to an assess-
ment of the quality of the police agent's conduct. Reliable
knowledge that the defendant is engaged in a criminal enterprise
can justify persistence that otherwise would pass the bounds of
decency. Knowledge that the defendant has a proclivity for vice
but is currently abstaining may make reprehensible an offer that
otherwise would be innocuous. Moreover, the goals of rehabili-
tating criminals and preventing overzealous pursuit of ex-con-
victs are not undermined by the use of evidence of unindicted
crimes. It seems likely that many of the jurisdictions following
the hypothetical-person approach will permit such evidence to be
considered. Two of the three state supreme courts that have
adopted it by judicial decision have indicated their willingness
to do so.' 66
(4) Reputation evidence
The progenitors of the hypothetical-person approach repeat-
edly criticized the federal defense for allowing evidence of a
defendant's reputation for criminality to be admitted.6"' They
assumed that a hypothetical-person test would render such evi-
dence irrelevant. In fact, a police agent's knowledge of the de-
fendant's reputation may cast some light upon whether he has
acted decently. The agent who offers a temptation to a target
165. For extended discussion of the admission of evidence of un-
punished crimes under the federal test, see text accompanying notes 306-
14 infra.
166. See notes 150-54 supra and accompanying text.
167. Reputation evidence and evidence of prior convictions were
generally linked as the two paradigm examples of prejudicial evidence
admissible under the subjective approach. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's
dissenting opinion in Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 ("the Government is per-
mitted to entrap a person with a criminal record or bad reputation");
Justice Robert's concurring opinion in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 458 ("[t]he
proof received in rebuttal usually amounts to no more than that the de-
fendant had a bad reputation, or that he had been previously con-
victed"); and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman, 356
U.S. at 382 (" [t] he defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment
or run the substantial risk that. . . the jury will allow a criminal record
or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt"). On the
evils of reputation evidence, see also Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1108-
09.
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with a notorious reputation as a drug dealer has acted more jus-
tifiably than one who offers the same temptation to a target
reputed to be a law-abiding former addict. However, condemna-
tion of reputation evidence is one o:2 the traditional tenets of sup-
porters of the hypothetical-person approach, and one may expect
that jurisdictions which adopt the approach will exclude it. Its
probative value is slight in comparison with evidence of specific
criminal acts, and the danger of prejudice probably outweighs
whatever value it has.
The use of reputation testimony to rebut an entrapment de-
fense seems to have been ratified by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, so federal courts will probably continue to admit it.168
State courts may, however, accept the substantive elements of
the federal defense while rejecting its evidentiary trimmings.
Making predisposition a dispositive fact by no means requires ac-
ceptance of the notion that it can be proven by reputation evi-
dence.169
(5) Other hearsay testimony
Some federal courts have permitted predisposition to be
proven by hearsay testimony about specific acts-for example, by
an agent's testimony that an informer reported buying drugs
from the defendant. 170 Others have excluded this type of evi-
dence.171 The new Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide an
exception to the hearsay rule for entrapment cases172 (except for
reputation testimony 73), so there seems to be no basis for con-
168. See FED. R. Ev. 405 (providing that when a trait of character is
an essential element of a claim, charge, or defense, proof may be made
by evidence of specific instances of conduct or by reputation and opinion
testimony). See text accompanying notes 296-97 infra. Reputation testi-
mony is excepted from the hearsay rule by F. R. Ev. 803 (21).
169. See text accompanying notes 281-305 infra.
170. See cases cited in note 284 infra
171. See cases cited in notes 294-95 infra.
172. See FED. R. Ev. 801-04. The rules contain provisions for com-
mon-law development of new hearsay exceptions, but the new exceptions
are required to have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
equivalent to those of the established exceptions. See FED. R. Ev. 803
(24); id. 804(b) (5). The willingness of some courts to admit hearsay in
rebuttal of the entrapment defense seems to be a consequence of the dis-
favored nature of the defense rather than of any belief that the testimony
has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those of
other hearsay exceptions.
173. FED. R. Ev. 803(21) excepts reputation as to character from the
hearsay rule. FED. R. Ev. 404-05 describe the circumstances in which rep-
utation as to character is admissible.
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tinuing to admit it. In fact, there may be a stronger argument
for admitting testimony of this nature under the hypothetical-
person test than under federal law. Testimony by an officer
that an informer told him about a drug sale by the defendant
would not be hearsay under the hypothetical-person defense. It
would be offered not to show the truth of the matter asserted,
but to show its effect on the hearer-that is, to show that the
officer acted reasonably in offering an inducement (or in offering
a persuasive inducement) to the defendant.17 4 Thus, it is possible
that some types of out-of-court declarations will be admitted un-
der the hypothetical-person defense even though they would not
be admissible under the federal defense.175 However, it would be
appropriate for a trial judge in a hypothetical-person jurisdiction
to exclude such evidence where the chance that it would be used
for a forbidden purpose outweighed its value in assessing the de-
cency of the agent's conduct.176
(6) Facts not known to agent
Under the federal defense, facts about the defendant which
tend to show predisposition are admissible whether or not they
were known to the agent at the time of the inducement. Such
facts sometimes provide very convincing evidence of predisposi-
tion. Eyewitness testimony that the defendant committed a
similar crime a week after the alleged entrapment or that (un-
known to the agent) he did so a week before it can be very effec-
tive in rebutting the defense. So can testimony that after the
offense the defendant admitted that he had been engaged in a
continuous criminal enterprise.
Under the hypothetical-person defense, evidence of predispo-
sition would seem to be inadmissible unless the police agent knew
about it at the time he offered the inducement. If the evidence
was not known to the agent, it could not be relevant to a judg-
ment about whether his conduct was reasonable--that is,
174. An out-of-court statement is hearsay if it is offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted therein. See, e.g., FED. R. Ev. 801 (c); C. Mc-
CoRMwcK, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF EVIDEcNC § 249 (2d ed. 1972). State-
ments offered for their bearing on the good faith or reasonableness of
subsequent conduct of the hearer are not hearsay. See id. at 589-90.
175. See text accompanying notes 294-96 infra.
176. Compare FED. R. Ev. 403; UNirom RuLES OF EVIDENCE § 403. Of
course, the complete exclusion of such evidence from the fact-finder's
knowledge can only be accomplished in jurisdictionq which send the is-
sue to the jury. Many supporters of the hypothetical-person approach
prefer that entrapment be the province of the trial judge. See note 341
infra.
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whether his methods of inducement created an impermissible
risk of leading a hypothetical person astray. Such evidence
should be admissible only in the rare case in which there is a
genuine issue about the causal connection between the agent's
conduct and the defendant's criminal act.1 7
III. EVALUATION OF THE
HYPOTHETICAL-PERSON DEFENSE
A. POTENTIAL DETIMENTS
1. Acquittal of Chronic Offenders
One danger of the hypothetical-person defense is that it will
lead to acquittal of persons who should be convicted. By focus-
ing upon the conduct of agents instead of the criminal proclivities
of the defendant, it creates a risk of acquitting dangerous chronic
offenders.
The danger of acquitting chronic offenders would be amelio-
rated somewhat if evidence of a defendant's involvement in crim-
inal activities were admitted for its bearing upon the decency of
the agent's inducement.178 However, so long as the defense fo-
cuses upon the quality of the agent's conduct rather than the de-
fendant's character, such evidence would be admissible only
where it was known to the agent at the time of the inducement,
and only for the purpose of evaluating his conduct. 7 9 Evidence
having an important bearing upon culpability would still be ex-
cluded. For example, testimony that police had discovered con-
traband or other indicia of criminal activity in a subsequent
search of the defendant's premises'80 or that (unknown to the
177. See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 128-53 supra.
179. See text at 215 supra.
180. A target's favorable response to a police solicitation may lead to
a search of his dwelling. For example, police agents may, by an appeal
to sympathy or friendship, induce a target to sell a small amount of
drugs. The sale could provide probable cause for a search of the target's
dwelling, thereby leading to the discovery of other drugs. Under the
federal defense, evidence of the possession of other drugs could be used
to prove predisposition to sell or as a basis for indicting the defendant
on a separate charge of possession or possession with intent to distribute.
Under the hypothetical-person approach, such evidence could not be
used for the purpose of showing that the defendant was predisposed to
make the original sale. Moreover, if the defendant were charged with
possession of drugs found during the search, he could argue that the evi-
dence ought to be excluded as the fruit of an illegal entrapment. The
preventive rationale of the hypothetical-person approach would support
this argument, since allowing the police to take advantage of the ancil-
lary fruits of an entrapment might encourage overreaching conduct.
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agent) the defendant regularly participated in criminal enter-
prise would be inadmissible.
2. Conviction of Nondisposed Defendants
A more subtle danger of the hypothetical-person approach
is that it will result in the conviction of persons who ought to
be acquitted. It creates a risk of convicting nondisposed persons
who were not already engaged in criminal activity and who
might never have committed the type of crime charged but for
the agent's overtures. This risk arises from the fact that the de-
fense focuses upon the inducement offered by the agent-
whether he made an undue appeal to friendship, sympathy, fear,
or the possibility of inordinate gain. If the inducement offered
would not have tempted a hypothetical law-abiding person, the
fact that the particular defendant was led astray will not save
him, even if he had never before performed an act of the nature
induced by the agent.
Very frequently, an agent will need to make more than one
solicitation. The targef may initially disclaim any connection
with illegal activity, or tell the agent that he lacks present ability
to fulfill the request. The agent will persist, but without exert-
ing any overwhelming pressure. Such cases pose a special di-
lemma for the hypothetical-person defense. This dilemma can
be illustrated by considering the situation presented by the Su-
preme Court's first major entrapment case, Sorrells v. United
States.'8 1 The officer, a prohibition agent, testified that while
posing as a tourist he visited the home of the target. 8 2 He was
introduced by three local residents who were acquaintances of
the target. The agent asked the target to get him some liquor.
The target replied that he did not have any. After some friendly
conversation, the agent made a second request without success.
The conversation turned to war experiences. (The agent and the
181. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
182. Id. at 439. For purposes of this example, the testimony of the
officer has been used. The defense witnesses gave slightly different tes-
timony. They said that there had been three to five requests, that, the
defendant had said that he "did not fool with whiskey," and that the de-
fendant was absent for 20 or 30 minutes while getting the whiskey. See
id. at 439-40.
The Supreme Court held that the question of entrapment turned on
the defendant's predisposition, and reversed the conviction because the
trial judge had refused to give entrapment instructions. Id. at 452. In
a minority opinion, Justice Roberts said that entrapment had been estab-
lished as a matter of law, so the indictment should be quashed. Id. at
459 (separate opinion).
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target had been members of the same division during the First
World War, though they had not met during their service.) Then
the agent made a third request. The target relented and sold the
agent a half gallon of whiskey for five dollars.
A tribunal that must decide whether to convict on the basis
of the evidence just described faces a hard choice. If it holds
that such inducements are permissible, then some defendants will
be convicted who might never have sold whiskey but for the
friendly overtures of an agent. On the other hand, if it deems
the agent's conduct to be an entrapment, then apparently any
bootlegger (or drug dealer in a comparable situation) can do
business freely if he screens his new customers by engaging them
in friendly conversation for an hour or two and refusing to sell
until the third request. (It is perhaps more likely that bootleg-
gers would not be able to do business freely, because agents would
extinguish such an extreme rule by misrepresenting what took
place-but that is not a desirable result either.) Because of the
restrictions such a result would place on law enforcement, it
seems probable that many courts applying the hypothetical-per-
son approach would hold conduct like that of the agent in Sor-
rells to be permissible, notwithstanding the willingness of the
Sorrells minority to find entrapment as a matter of law.
Repeated solicitations of this nature raise a jury issue under
the federal test.183 The jury could consider a variety of evidence
in addition to the conversation between the officer and the de-
fendant. The defendant could bring forward evidence tending
to show that he was not engaged in the whiskey business. For
example, he could produce evidence that officers searched his
premises under a warrant and failed to find any of the trappings
of a moonshiner. He could show that he was regularly employed
and living within his means. He could testify that he had bought
the whiskey elsewhere on behalf of the agent, and corrobate this
testimony with evidence that he absented himself for some time
while getting the whiskey. His neighbors could testify about his
character.
Even if the defendant lacked evidence of the nature de-
scribed, he could argue that the prosecution's failure to introduce
evidence of predisposition raised a reasonable doubt. The exclu-
sion of evidence about prior criminal activity, prior convictions,
and subsequent conduct evincing predisposition is a double-edged
183. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also
United States v. Abbadessa, 470 F.2d 1333, 1336 (10th Cir. 1972).
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sword. In some cases the defendant will be aided by a test that
treats such evidence as inadmissible, particularly if he is a
chronic offender who has regularly engaged in criminal activity.
However, if the defendant was not predisposed, refusal to admit
such evidence may harm him. If predisposition evidence is ad-
missible and the government is unable to come forward with it,
the absence of such evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about
the defendant's guilt.8 4 By dispensing with predisposition evi-
dence (except perhaps when it bears on the propriety of police
conduct),"85 the hypothetical-person test aids the chronic offender
at the expense of the nondisposed novice.
Almost every inducement by an agent involves some degree
of appeal to friendship, sympathy, or desire for profit. An agent
seeking to simulate bribery of a corrupt public official must culti-
vate the official's friendship and trust. An agent seeking to pur-
chase a small amount of narcotics often must pose as an addict
who has lost his ordinary source of supply, thereby implicitly ap-
pealing to sympathy because of the imminence of withdrawal.
Moreover, an agent will sometimes need to invent a good reason
not to take drugs in the seller's presence, as by claiming that he
is buying them for a girlfriend;' 8 such a ploy obviously appeals
184. See United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975)
(held, entrapment established as a matter of law under subjective test;
court noted, inter alia, absence of prior narcotics activity); People v. Sar-
to, 65 0.0.2d 353 (Mont. Co. Common Pleas 1973) (applying subjective
test and noting, in support of judgment of acquittal, lack of proof that de-
fendant had previously engaged in drug traffic). Compare People v.
Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959). Although California follows
the subjective test, at the time of the Benford case it excluded evidence
of prior convictions or prior criminal activity by the defendant. Id. at
11, 345 P.2d at 935. Therefore, in a case in which the prosecution ad-
duced no evidence about prior criminal conduct, the court noted that the
absence of such evidence could not aid the defendant in establishing a
reasonable doubt about predisposition: "Since the prosecution in Califor-
nia cannot prove prior criminality of defendant to overcome the defense
of entrapment, the absence of such evidence here does not in and of itself
have the significance which it had under federal law in the Sherman
case. [Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)] ...." Id. at 12,
345 P.2d at 936.
185. See text accompanying notes 128-55 supra.
186. 'With the necessity of future transactions in mind, the under-
cover agent must be able to transport the narcotics away from the seller.
Frequently the seller will demand that they be 'shot up' right there. The
agent must explain that they are, for example, for 'his 'woman who is
sick,' or for a 'friend who is "real bad" (trying to, but cannot "dry
out")'." Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doc-
trine of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 137, 156
(1963) (empirical study of crime detection by the Chicago police depart-
ment).
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to friendship. Even an agent posing as a drug dealer interested
in purchasing large quantities runs some danger of seducing a
user who does not normally sell drugs. The agent's indiscrimi-
nate eagerness to purchase large amounts may tempt a user into
acting as a middleman because of the prospect of windfall profits.
The federal defense deals with the situations I have just de-
scribed by inquiring whether the particular defendant was pre-
disposed to commit the offense. Courts following the hypotheti-
cal-person test are more likely to give blanket approval to forms
of persuasion that are reasonably needed for effective investiga-
tion, thereby permitting conviction of some nondisposed persons
who were seduced into crimes which they otherwise would never
have committed.
Any test that focuses solely upon the quality of the agent's
conduct must necessarily allow agents substantial leeway.
Agents cannot detect criminal activities unless they are able to
go a certain distance in making appeals to friendship, sympathy,
or personal gain. Since most targets will in fact be "wary crim-
inals" instead of "unwary innocents," one may expect a judicial
tendency to draw the line of decency at a point that requires the
target to exercise a substantial amount of self-control. 8 7 But an
inducement which is fair in the abstract may be unfair in a par-
ticular case, for reasons that are unknown to the agent and there-
fore do not affect the propriety of hds conduct.
The proper role of a crime detection method that uses police
agents to instigate offenses should be the detection of persons
who are already involved in the type of criminal activity solicited
by the agent. Instigation should not be used to induce crime by
susceptible persons who are not already engaged in the criminal
activity; and if such a person is caught in the net, he should be
acquitted. The hypothetical-person approach creates a danger
of conviction of such persons--persons who, because of individual
circumstances or traits, are particularly susceptible to an induce-
ment that the hypothetical person should be able to resist, but
who are not, and might never be, regularly engaged in criminal
activity. The federal test, properly defined and limited, holds a
better chance of avoiding this consequence. Under the present
187. The Alaska supreme court may already have taken a step in this
direction by requiring that the inducement be effective to cause an "av-
erage man" to commit the crime. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226
(Alas. 1969) (discussed in note 26 supra and accompanying text). The
federal test has never required a defendant to exercise an "average"
amount of self-restraint.
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federal test, courts generally refuse to foreclose the entrapment
defense even if the agent's inducements were very mild, so long
as the defendant has presented some evidence of reluctance.'
8 8
Defendants in such cases could not possibly hope for acquittal
under a test that focused solely upon the nature of the induce-
ment.
3. Inaccuracy in Fact-finding
One justification offered by the Russell majority for adher-
ing to the subjective approach was that otherwise the prosecution
would have no way to defeat an entrapment defense:
"'Indeed, it would seem probable that, if there were no reply
[to the claim of inducement], it would be impossible ever to se-
cure convictions of any offenses which consist of transactions
that are carried on in secret.' 1189
This assertion, generated by Judge Learned Hand 90 and quoted
in the majority opinions in both Sherman and Russell,""' is some-
what exaggerated. Under the doctrine advocated by the minori-
ties in Russell and Sherman, the defendant is entitled to acquittal
only if a police agent used improper inducement. 92 If the defend-
ant testifies that the agent offered such an inducement, the agent
can take the stand and deny that he used any improper means. 93
The prosecution usually has an advantage in a swearing
match between an agent and the typical defendant, particularly
188. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
189. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973).
190. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952)
(Hand, J.).
191. 356 U.S. at 377 n.7; 411 U.S. at 434.
192. The recent proponents of hypothetical-person defenses have
clearly indicated that the defense of entrapment cannot be sustained in
the absence of overreaching conduct by agents. See United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (agents may
offer opportunities for commission of crime; entrapment has occurred
only if "their conduct is of a kind that could induce or instigate the com-
mission of a crime by one not ready to and willing to commit it");
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (agents may "act so as to detect those engaged in a criminal con-
duct and ready and willing to commit further crimes," but "in holding
out inducements they should act in such a manner as is likely to induce
to the commission of crime only these persons and not others"); text
accompanying notes 21-31 supra (describing Model Penal Code and its
progeny).
193. However, there is one situation in which the hypothetical-person
defense might create problems of proof for the prosecution. Often, par-
ticularly in drug cases, criminal activity is induced by an informer co-
operating with the police in return for leniency. The informer may dis-
appear, change his story, or prove to be less believable than the defend-
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when the defendant has the burden of proof. 194 After all, the en-
trapment defense places the defendant in a rather unenviable po-
sition. Usually he must concede that he committed the criminal
act.195 In this posture, he must try to convince the fact-finder to
believe his testimony that unfair inducements were used.
However, the fact that inducements are offered in secrecy
creates another problem. The hypothetical-person approach has
the undesirable effect of focusing the fact-finder's attention upon
the factual issue least susceptible to reliable proof-the nature
of the inducement offered to the defendant. Since inducements
are offered in private, the finder of fact will often have to choose
between the testimony of an informer who has a criminal rec-
ord and that of a defendant who has admittedly committed a
criminal act.190 A decision based upon the demeanor of these two
witnesses in the atmosphere of a trial is not likely to be very
reliable. 97 Whether this circumstance favors the prosecution or
the defense is unclear, but whichever the case, justice is not well
served if the finder of fact must guess at the truth.
Admittedly, there will be conflicts in testimony under a test
that focuses upon the defendant's predisposition instead of the
agent's conduct, and in some cases evidence about predisposition
will consist wholly of the uncorroborated testimony of an in-
former and a defendant. For example, the informer may claim
that he merely requested drugs and that the defendant eagerly
provided them, while the defendant may claim that the informer
ant. (Alternatively, the government may want to keep him off the stand
in order to safeguard his undercover role, though a closed hearing, see
note 338 infra, would ordinarily provide adequate protection.) In such
cases the judge or jury may accept the defendant's story about the nature
of the inducements. Under the federal test, such testimony could be
overcome by evidence of predisposition, whereas under the hypothetical-
person test, predisposition evidence must normally relate to the issue of
the decency of the inducement, see text accompanying notes 119-53 supra,
and there are forms of inducement which would not be justified what-
ever the target's predisposition.
194. Most formulations of the hypothetical-person defense place the
burden of proof on the defendant. See notes 334-35 infra.
195. Normally a defendant must admit that he committed the crimi-
nal act to raise the entrapment defense. See note 308 infra.
196. One field study of entrapment in narcotics cases reported that
the factual issues usually turned upon what happened during contacts
between the informer and the defendant prior to the offense. T=FAxY,
supra note 13, at 261. Although the author was referring to states that
apparently followed the subjective test, the problem would be doubly
troublesome in a hypothetical-person jurisdiction.
197. See Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for
Federal Courts, 55 MnN. L. REv. 903, 933-37 (1971), for discussion of the
many reasons for doubting the value of demeanor as a guide to the truth.
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pretended to be buying drugs for a girlfriend suffering with-
drawal, and that he sold drugs from his own supply only after
much coaxing. However, in other cases evidence about predispo-
sition will be of a more reliable nature. For example, the prose-
cution may offer evidence of other crimes, possession of para-
phernalia and quantities of contraband, the defendant's post-in-
ducement admissions to reliable persons,198 or the defendant's
ability to procure large quantifies of contraband on short notice.
The defendant also has an opportunity to corroborate his defense
with reliable evidence. For example, he might offer evidence
that he was regularly employed at a full-time job and that he
was living within his income. 199 More importantly, the defend-
ant can point to the absence of evidence of prior crimes and argue
that the government has failed to prove predisposition beyond
a reasonable doubt 200 because it failed to corroborate the testi-
mony of its informer despite its opportunity to do So. 2 0 1 In short,
198. In drug cases, the initial solicitation of a sale is usually made
by an informer instead of an undercover police officer. See note 226
infra. However, the informer is often told to try to get the target to sell
drugs to an undercover police officer; such a sale is preferred to a sale
to an informer because it provides more reliable proof that the defendant
committed the criminal act. See Comment, supra note 186, at 154-55 (em-
pirical study of practices of Chicago police department). In negotiating
the sale or sales with the undercover officer, the defendant will fre-
quently make statements indicating that he is a regular drug dealer. Cf.
Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958) (defendant bragged to un-
dercover officers about knowing someone "high up in the narcotics traf-
fic" and of his ability to procure heroin; held, jury entitled to disbelieve
his otherwise uncontradicted testimony that he had been entrapped by
an informer). Although undercover police officers sometimes give per-jured testimony, the reliability of their testimony certainly seems to be
greater than that of an informer who is trying to obtain leniency by ac-
quiring convictions. Under the federal test, admissions to the under-
cover officer would be admissible; under the hypothetical-person test,
the admissions would have no bearing on the issue of whether the in-
former had previously used unfair methods of inducement.
199. See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975)
(held, government failed to meet its burden of production on issue of
predisposition; fact that defendant, regularly employed as truck driver,
had no prior history of drug dealing,- and had been furnished drugs by
government agent considered relevant); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.
2d 602 (5th Cir. 1971) (fact that at time of crime defendant was em-
ployed as a fireman by the City of El Paso relevant to predisposition).
200. Under federal law, and the law of most other subjective-testjurisdictions, the government has the burden of persuasion beyond a rea-
sonable doubt once the defendant has properly raised the entrapment de-
fense. See notes 332-33 infra and accompanying text; cf. note 39 supra
(standard entrapment instruction).
201. See text accompanying notes 182-85 supra.
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the hypothetical-person test will often require the fact-finder to
make an imponderable choice between the uncorroborated testi-
mony of two unsavory witnesses; the federal test permits corrob-
oration with relatively reliable evidence.
B. POTENTIAL BENsEFis
1. Protecting the Purity of the Judicial System
Members of the Supreme Court who have favored the hy-
pothetical-person approach have seemed reluctant to state un-
equivocally that their goal is control of police conduct. Justice
Roberts in Sorrells told the Court to maintain "the purity of its
own temple" 20 2 without specifically mentioning the possibility
that improper police conduct would be deterred. Justice Frank-
furter in Sherman said that the "transcending value at stake" was
"[p] ublic confidence in the fair and honorable administration of
justice. '20 3 Only incidentally did he allude in the final paragraph
of his opinion to the desirability of providing "guidance for offi-
cial conduct for the future,"20 4 Justice Douglas's dissent in Rus-
sell avoided specific mention of a deterrence rationale, saying
only that the government agent involved had played a "debased
role., 20 5
These Justices were no doubt concerned about maintaining
public respect for the criminal justice system. Yet the hypothet-
ical-person approach is not an effective way to preserve this re-
spect. Unless police conduct has been outrageous, 20 6 it seems un-
likely that the public will be offended by convictions of de-
fendants who have been found-beyond a reasonable doubt and
202. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (separate
opinion of Roberts, J.).
203. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 385. Justice Frankfurter alluded to the desirability of
guidance for official conduct in his argument that the entrapment issue
should be determined by the trial judge rather than the jury; no state-
ment of this nature appears in his description of the rationale of entrap-
ment. Id. at 380 (discussion of rationale).
205. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Sagarin & MacNamara, The Problem of Entrapment, 16
CRnIw= & DELIN. 363, 366 (1970): "On the moral level, it is argued that
law itself and law enforcement should not be sullied. Law should be
robed in pristine purity, always serving as an example of righteousness
to the people."
206. When police conduct has been outrageous, the due process clause
should mandate acquittal in any case. See text accompanying notes 61-
80 supra.
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by a unanimous vote of twelve other citizens-to be ready and
willing to commit the crime charged. It is more likely that the
judiciary will lose respect by embracing an entrapment defense
that ignores culpability and seeks to control police conduct by
acquittal of professional criminals.
The quoted passages may also reflect the judgment that
"purity" is an end in itself-one which should be pursued regard-
less of collateral effects upon public respect or police conduct.
This judgment is, of course, impervious to rational criticism-nei-
ther logic nor fact can prevail against an assertion that a conse-
quence is evil because it is "impure" or "ignoble." All one can
do is record disagreement with a doctrine that, without any ex-
pectation of affecting police conduct, pursues "purity" by putting
aside the guilt or innocence of the person on trial and asking
whether police conduct might have tempted a hypothetical per-
son.
2. Preventing Police Misconduct
a. The feasibility of prevention
As might be expected, a number of advocates of the hypo-
thetical-person defense have not been content to rest upon a
"purity" rationale, but have argued that the defense will serve
to prevent police misconduct.2 0 7 The commentaries to the Model
Penal Code and the Brown Commission proposal both take this
position.208
If rules about entrapment are to have a substantial deterrent
effect upon government misconduct, it appears that the follow-
ing conditions ought to be fulfilled:
1. The rules should be articulated with enough clarity and
detail to serve as a practical guide in the investigation of crime;
2. The rules should be communicated to and understood by
the persons engaged in the frontline detection of crime;
3. The sanction (acquittal of the target) should be both
certain enough and severe enough to ensure observation of the
rules:
207. See authorities cited in note 135 supra; cf. United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 447 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("the agent's un-
dertaking to supply this ingredient . . . was, I think, precisely the type
of governmental conduct that the entrapment defense is meant to pre-
vent").
208. See note 135 supra.
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a. In order for the sanction to be certain, officers and in-
formers who have violated the rules must be willing to testify
truthfully about the violation, or the fact-finder must be in a po-
sition to separate truth from perjury reliably; and
b. In order for the sanction to be sufficiently severe, per-
sons engaged in the control of crime must place a reasonably high
value upon the conviction of entrapment targets (as opposed to
some other goal, such as confiscation of contraband or a high ar-
rest record) and must perceive an acquittal as a form of punish-
ment for their misconduct.20 9
(1) Feasibility of clear, detailed rules
The present formulations of the hypothetical-person test do
not provide much guidance to officers and informers. They
merely tell agents not to offer inducements that would tempt
a law-abiding hypothetical person. Of course, the vagueness of
this general standard does not necessarily preclude the possibility
that case law will yield, over a period of time, a collection of clear,
detailed rules. With this possibility in mind, supporters of the
hypothetical-person test usually advocate that the defense of en-
trapment be tried before the judge instead of the jury, so that
a set of detailed standards can develop as judges write opinions
dealing with specific fact situations.2 10
Even with time and experience, development of detailed
rules will probably prove to be quite difficult. Nothing as clear
and understandable as the Miranda rule,2 1 ' which can be satisfied
209. For a similar list of factors necessary for the successful opera-
tion of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases, see LaFave, Im-
proving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I:
Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. Rnv. 391, 395 (1965):
For the exclusionary rule to be completely effective ... it would
seem necessary: (a) that the requirements of the law on arrest,
search and seizure, and in-custody investigation be developed in
some detail and in a manner sufficiently responsive to both the
practical needs of enforcement and the individual right of pri-
vacy; (b) that these requirements be fashioned in a manner un-
derstandable by the front-line lower-echelon police officer and
that they be effectively communicated to him; and (c) that the
police desire to obtain convictions be sufficiently great to induce
them to comply with these requirements.
See also LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role
in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MIcH. L. REV.
987, 1003 (1965); cf. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Pun-
ishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, 960-70 (1966) (describing conditions
which influence the preventive effect of criminal penalties).
210. See text accompanying notes 341-43 infra.
211. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1969).
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by form warnings about constitutional rights, can reasonably be
expected. Once the subject is in custody, rigid per se rules about
matters such as interrogation can be formulated, since it is feasi-
ble to treat all defendants in a similar fashion. However, it is
much more difficult to establish standardized procedures for the
delicate process of investigation and detection. Officers and in-
formers need to be able to respond differently to the multifarious
situations with which they will be presented.
The difficulty of developing clear per se rules can be illus-
trated by considering specific techniques of inducement which
might be prohibited. Among the inducements that have fre-
quently been criticized are appeals to sympathy or friendship,
offers of inordinate gain, and repeated solicitation of criminal ac-
tivity after a target has initially refused.212 These inducements
cannot be outlawed as a class without jeopardizing legitimate
detection. 213 An appeal to friendship that causes an obviously re-
luctant person to sell a small amount of drugs is reprehensible;
a similar appeal to a corrupt public official by an informer may
be justifiable, particularly if the target's reluctance is expressly
based upon considerations of expediency, and his methods of op-
eration preclude approach except through friends. Similarly,
an offer above the black market price for drugs would be inex-
cusable when used to induce an addict to sell a small amount,
212. Justice Frankfurter condemned "[a]ppeals to sympathy, friend-
ship, the possibility of exorbitant gain, and so forth." Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (concurring opinion). Professor Don-
nelly made a similar list of forbidden tactics, saying that "if the officer
uses inducements that would reasonably overcome the resistance of one
not a chronic offender, such as pleas of desperate illness, continued and
persistent coaxing, appeals to sympathy, pity, or friendship, or offers of
inordinate sums of money, the court should find as a matter of law that
there was entrapment." Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1114. Compare ex-
amples of forbidden conduct described in note 213 infra.
213. The leading hypothetical-person cases have so far shown no in-
clination to endorse blanket prohibitions of classes of inducement. People
v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973), simply described the com-
plicated factual situation before it and stated that under the circum-
stances an entrapment had been committed. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d
226 (Alas. 1969), and State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974), at-
tempted to provide somewhat more explicit guidance, but used carefully
hedged language. Grossman stated:
Examples of what might constitute prohibited activity, depend-
ing upon an evaluation of the facts in each case, are extreme
pleas of desperate illness, appeals based primarily on sympathy,
pity, or close personal friendship, and offers of inordinate sums
of money.
457 P.2d at 230 (emphasis added). State v. Mullen contained a virtually
identical passage. 216 N.W.2d at 383.
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but might be justifiable if agents were negotiating a $100,000 pur-
chase. Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. 214
There is another objection to creation of per se rules in en-
trapment cases. The rules would have to be disseminated to
frontline police officers and to criminals acting as police agents.
If an effort to educate these persons succeeded, the rules would
also become known to potential targets. Thus a person involved
in a criminal enterprise could attempt to immunize himself by
requiring a suspected agent to break one of the rules during the
negotiations leading to an offense. For example, if agents were
prohibited from persisting after an initial refusal, a drug dealer
could simply refuse to sell to new customers on first request.
Ironically, professional criminals are the ones most likely to be
sophisticated enough to take such precautions.
There is some evidence that offenders have already used such
tactics where fixed restrictions have been placed upon methods
of solicitation. For example, police in one western city had a pol-
icy of never allowing a prostitute to touch them, and of never
"setting the price." Consequently prostitutes would seek to dis-
cover whether a customer was an officer by attempting to kiss
him, or by asking him how much he would pay.215 Narcotics sell-
ers sometimes take similar precautions, as by requiring potential
buyers to use narcotics in the seller's presence.210
Admittedly, it would be naive to suppose that drug dealers
would be able to immunize themselves simply because an appel-
late court placed fixed restrictions upon methods of solicitation.
However, this prospect is unrealistic only because many agents
would not abide by the restrictions. They would use the means
necessary to induce a sale, and then give false testimony at trial.
Surely that is not a desirable result.
The sea of troubles that has attended the development of
rules governing police searches has led many critics to question
214. For example, supplying contraband to a target for resale is nor-
mally unjustifiable, but should be permitted when the agent is acting as
a supposed courier in a criminal enterprise organized by others. See text
accompanying notes 86-103 supra. Supplying means necessary for a
crime-a boat for smuggling, a chemical for drug manufacture, a plate
for counterfeiting-is normally improper, but may not be so if the agent
is attempting to establish his credibility with a large criminal enterprise.
Cf. text accompanying notes 71-85 supra.
215. See J. SKOLNICK, JusTIcE WimOuT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT
iN DimOCRATIc SocIETY 103 (1966).
216. TFFnAy, supra note 13, at 252.
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the value of the exclusionary rules in search and seizure cases.2 17
These troubles will also impede the development of appropriate
rules by courts administering the hypothetical-person defense.
Like the exclusionary rule in search cases, this approach to the
entrapment defense presents courts with the formidable task of
formulating a general code designed to influence police conduct.
This code must be formulated without adequate empirical data
about the nature of police practices, the need for them, or the
effect of judicial decisions upon them. The question posed by
the federal entrapment defense-the culpability of the defendant
at bar-is much better suited for case-by-case determination.
(2) Communication and understanding of the rules
Another obstacle to the use of entrapment doctrine to control
the conduct of agents is the problem of communicating the rules
to their addressees. Much has beeen written about the difficulty
of teaching police officers about search and seizure rules. Lower-
court judges often fail to explain clearly their reasons for sup-
pressing evidence,218 and dissemination of information by prose-
cutors and police supervisors has been very spotty.219 Formal
police training about search and seizure has been inadequate.220
The difficulty of attracting intelligent and competent recruits has
also been a pervasive obstacle to adequate understanding of ap-
pellate court doctrine.22 1 This problem has been compounded by
the fact that many important police decisions-when to search,
when to arrest, how to deal with informers-are left to lower
level police officers without much guidance from police super-
intendants or other higher officials. 222
These problems seem petty when compared with the prob-
lems of educating agents about rules of entrapment. Entrap-
217. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U.L. REV.
1 (1964); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL
L. REv. 80 (1969); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 53 CALIF. L. Rzv. 929, 951-53 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 754-57 (1970);
cf. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule (pts. I & II), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 566 (1965).
218. See LaFave, supra note 217, at 402-03; LaFave & Remington,
supra note 209, at 1005.
219. See LaFave, supra note 217, at 415-21, 593-607; LaFave & Rem-
ington, supra note 209, at 1005; Oaks, supra note 217, at 730-31; cf. K.C.
DAvis, POLICE DiscRmox 9-12 (1975).
220. See LaFave, supra note 217, at 593-607; LaFave & Remington,
supra note 209, at 1007.
221. See LaFave, supra note 217, at 607-08.
222. See K.C. DAviS, POLICE DiscpxnoN 32-52 (1975).
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ment rules are addressed to situations in which an agent has
solicited the commission of an offense. Investigation by solicita-
tion of offenses is used almost exclusively in the detection of con-
sensual crimes. Probably the crime most commonly investigated
by this method is drug trafficking. (In the period 1970-74, 65 per-
cent of the 405 reported federal entrapment decisions involved
drug offenses. 22 3 ) Investigation of drug trafficking requires use
of informers with contacts in the drug culture; drug sellers are
not "pushers" who prowl around looking for new customers. 224 It
223. The 405 federal entrapment opinions rendered between January
1, 1970, and January 1, 1975, fell into the following categories:
Drug offenses (excluding alcohol) 65%
Alcohol offenses 6%Bribery, government corruption 6%
Counterfeiting 7%
Firearms offenses (transportation, sale) 7%Other offenses 9%
The 405 entrapment cases were obtained by a computer-aided search,
using the LEXIS system, of a data base containing the full text of all
reported federal cases in the five-year period. The computer retrieved
all cases containing the word "entrapment" or any other word beginning
with the root "entrap." The 550 cases retrieved were read and classified.
All cases in which a criminal defendant sought relief from conviction or
prosecution on grounds of entrapment were classified as entrapment
cases. Under this criteria, 145 of the 550 cases were discarded on grounds
that they were not entrapment cases. The computer retrieved only cases
in which opinions were delivered either by trial or appellate judges; en-
trapment cases (including jury acquittals) that did not elicit an opinion
were not contained in the data base.
Because of the limited nature of federal criminal jurisdiction, it
seems probable that the entrapment defense arises in a wider variety of
contexts in state criminal prosecutions. For example, entrapment is
probably raised fairly frequently at the trial level in cases involving
prostitution, homosexuality, and other consensual sexual crimes. See
TIFFANY, supra note 13, at 214-39; Note, Decoy Enforcement of Homosex-
ual Laws, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 259 (1963). However, an identical compu-
ter-aided review of New York and Ohio entrapment cases in the same
five-year period indicated that a majority (13 of 25) of the cases eliciting
opinions involved drug offenses. Moreover, the entrapment doctrine is
less important in cases involving minior vice crimes than in cases involv-
ing drug sales. Charges such as prostitution and homosexual solicitation
are likely to be disposed of in the lowest level of criminal court-often
in courts that are not even courts of record. In deciding whether to
acquit or dismiss, judges in these courts may be influenced more by a
general weighing of the equities than by appellate court doctrine. See
TIFFANY, supra note 13, at 224-26 (prostitution cases). See generally J.
ROBERTSON, ROUGH JUSTICE (1974).
I am grateful to Pauline Bouchard, a third-year student at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School, for compiling the information con-
tained in this footnote and in note 44 supra.
224. See Wilson, Moore, & Wheat, The Problem of Heroin, PUB.
INT., Fall 1972, at 1, 10-12 (notes that research studies show that
peer group friends introduce novices to drugs; drug dealers do not
risk "missionary work").
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is therefore impracticable for an officer to buy drugs by simply
approaching a seller and asking for them. 22 5 Instead, informers
with contacts in the drug culture must be used for the initial soli-
citation. In fact, the great majority of drug cases are "made"
through the use of informer-solicitors. 226 These informers are
commonly drug offenders who have been promised leniency in
return for cooperation. 227
It has been said that "[p]olice departments seldom employ po-
licemen as such. They employ the best available men and then
try to make policemen of them.... This is a burden borne by
no other professional discipline. 228  In drug cases, it would be
more accurate to say that the worst available are chosen and then
turned into quasi-policemen. The problem of educating the ad-
dressees of entrapment doctrine will be one of teaching police of-
ficers to be educators. In order for the hypothetical-person test
to be effective, officers must teach their informers the intricacies
of appellate court doctrine.
(3) Certainty and severity of the sanction of acquittal
The question whether the sanction of acquittal is severe
225. It is impossible for a policeman or a narcotics agent, even
though not in uniform, to make contact with the underworld and
make a "buy" without using an informer or undercover agent as
a decoy. A narcotics pusher, retailer or wholesaler . . .would
no more sell to any one of the approximately 285 federal nar-
cotics agents in this country than he would be foolish enough to
sell directly to a police commissioner.... An informer may
pose as an addict or as a dealer in narcotics. Federal narcotics
arrests are generally based on an original introduction by an in-
former to either a user or supplier and are usually made only
after two or more sales.
Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal
Prosecution, 28 FoRDHAm L. REV. 399, 403 (1960).
A field study of the Chicago police department reported that nar-
cotics officers preferred, for evidentiary purposes, to make purchases
themselves. However, they usually had to be satisfied with observing
purchases by informers. See Comment, Administration of the Affirma-
tive Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U.
Cm:. L. REv. 132, 154-55 (1963). See also TIFFAwY, supra note 13, at 254-
56.
226. One source has estimated that 90 percent of the solicitation of
drug sales is done by private individuals acting for the police rather than
by undercover police officers. See TIFANY, supra note 13, at 252.
227. Id. at 253. See also K.C. DAvis, POLIcE DiscRETiox 28-31 (1975).
For examples of cases in which the informer was charged with a drug
crime at the time he induced the defendant's crime, see Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 374 (1958); United States v. Lauer, 287 F.2d
633 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 818 (1961).
228. Gourley, State Standards for Local Police Recruitment and
Training, 53 J. Cnm .L.C. & P.S. 522, 524-25 (1962) (emphasis omitted).
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enough to deter officers and informers from entrapment is a
matter about which little empirical evidence is available. In the
search and seizure context, some commentators have suggested
that the acquittal sanction is not severe, since police have goals
other than conviction. They may seek to suppress vice simply
by making arrests. Arrest in itself is a substantial punishment,
particularly if the defendant must remain in jail pending trial.
Also, aggressive searches and frisks may in themselves manifest
authority and serve certain police goals.2 29
One can only guess at the degree to which similar considera-
tions apply in entrapment cases. In the case of some vice crimes,
harassment and disruption of the illegal activity can become a
more important goal than conviction of offenders.230 Where that
occurs, acquittal of targets would have little deterrent effect,
since harassment and disruption can be accomplished by arrest
without conviction. However, police regard sale of narcotics as
a serious offense, and probably most arrests for this crime are
made for the purpose of obtaining convictions. 231 Therefore, ac-
quittal would be regarded as a significant punishment.2 32
Whatever the severity of the sanction of acquittal, it will
have little effect if it is not applied with a fair degree of cer-
tainty. If the entrapment doctrine is to succeed in deterring im-
229. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 215, at 219-25; LaFave, supra note
217, at 421-47; LaFave & Remington, supra note 209, at 1010-11; Oaks,
supra note 217, at 720-24.
230. See LaFave, supra note 217, aL 447-52; LaFave & Remington,
supra note 209, at 1010-11:
Despite the current difficulty in convicting ordinary gamblers,
public and institutional pressures for police action continue.
The result often is a program of searches and arrests without
any thought of prosecution or conviction. Such a program
serves some purposes which police may feel are advantageous
to law enforcement: offenders are subjected to at least a brief
period of incarceration; they must spend money to gain their
release or to terminate the proceedings; any gambling parapher-
nalia or gambling funds will be seized; there are costs attendant
upon the interruption and relocation of the criminal operation;
and certain property used in the illegal business may be sub-jected to forfeiture. Where these results have replaced convic-
tion as an objective of police action, it is not unusual for the
police to become even less selective in deciding whom to arrest
or search. [footnotes omitted]
231. "Police do not consider harassment of the narcotics seller to be
an adequate response, as narcotics sale is such a serious offense. Instead,
police enforcement is intended to bring about the arrest, prosecution, and
conviction of the seller of narcotics, with the expectation that he will be
given a substantial prison sentence." TirFANY, supra note 13, at 264.
232. Acquittal may also be a very serious sanction for the informer-
entrapper if he i. denied leniency in the case pending against him on
grounds that he did not obtain a conviction.
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proper governmental conduct, courts must identify cases in which
entrapment has occurred and separate them from those in
which it has not. There is substantial evidence that the exclu-
sionary rule in search and seizure cases is being partially de-
feated by police perjury.233 This problem will be doubly or triply
present in entrapment cases.
Consider the paradigm versions of the hypothetical-person
test promulgated by the Model Penal Code and the Brown Com-
mission proposal. By concentrating on the nature of the induce-
ment rather than the defendant's predisposition, both focus the
fact-finding process upon exactly the factual transaction which
is least susceptible to reliable proof-the secret transactions be-
tween the informer (usually a criminal who must produce results
in order to obtain leniency) and the defendant.23 4 The fact-
finder will be faced with the problem of resolving, primarily on
the basis of demeanor evidence, the inconsistencies between the
testimony of these two parties.23 5 The goal of the test is to pun-
ish agents who have used improper inducements, but an agent
who has used an improper inducement is likely to lie about what
he did. Even a relatively conscientious police officer may lie if
he perceives that otherwise a hardened criminal will escape on
a "technicality. '230 It is difficult to imagine a less reliable fact-
finding process. By contrast, the federal test permits considera-
tion of a broader range of evidence, including relatively reliable
circumstantial evidence. 23 7 Moreover, police officers will have
more incentive to tell the truth, since a habitual criminal will
not escape punishment merely because persuasive inducements
were used. Indeed, it is possible that, because of its appeal to
the consciences of police officers, the federal test has as much
preventive effect as would the hypothetical-person approach. 238
233. See Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure
Dead?, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1967, at 41, reprinted in F. REmGTON, D. NEW-
mw, E. KIMBALL, M. MELni & H. GoLDsTEIN, CRIMNAL JUSTICE A nuvms-
TRATioN 272-73 (1969) (description of perjured "dropsie" testimony in
narcotics cases); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-
Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLumV. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 94-
96 (1968) (study describing dramatic increase in "dropsie" testimony af-
ter exclusionary rule applied to states); Comment, The Outwardly Suf-fi-
cient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
96, 111-12 & nn.58-60 (1971); cf. J. SKOLNCcI, supra note 215, at 211-
29 (1966).
234. See text accompanying notes 223-27 supra.
235. See text accompanying notes 196-97 supra.
236. See note 233 supra and accompanying text.
237. See text accompanying notes 119-125 supra.
238. A rule's deterrent effect will partly depend upon whether it ap-
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b. Goals of prevention
There are many reasons to doubt that the hypothetical-per-
son defense will have a substantial effect upon the conduct of
government agents. However, even if such an effect were
achieved, one would still need to ask whether it justified acquit-
ting habitual offenders and convicting nondisposed persons. In
balancing the benefits and detriments of the defense, one must
ask exactly what evils it seeks to prevent.
Perhaps it is best to begin by emphasizing the narrow scope
of the hypothetical-person defense. The defense only restricts
the type of inducements that police agents may offer. It does
not prevent police from sending undercover agents to spy on pri-
vate conduct or to infiltrate political organizations. It does not
prevent these spies from pretending friendship in order to gather
information. These activities, with their detrimental effects on
privacy and trust, will continue under either version of the en-
trapment defense. Moreover, the hypothetical-person defense
will not prevent an agent from merely asking an apparently law-
abiding person to commit a crime, so long as no undue pressure
is applied. Thus, an undercover agent may enter a drugstore and
ask a pharmacist to give him dexedrine without a prescription,
even if he is on a fishing expedition and intends to visit every
drugstore in town. The defense is only concerned with prevent-
ing the use of overly persuasive inducements.239
peals to the sense of moral obligation of its addressees. See Andenaes,
The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949,
956-59 (1966), For example, police officers who would regard the "fram-
ing" of an innocent person as morally abhorrent are willing to circum-
vent search and seizure rules because these rules are regarded as bother-
some technicalities. Cf. Oaks, supra note 217, at 729. An entrapment de-
fense designed to exonerate nondisposed persons might be expected to
have greater appeal than a rule which condemns police conduct because
it might have tempted a hypothetical person.
239. Presence or absence of reasonable suspicion may be one factor
to consider in determining whether the application of pressure by the
agent was justifiable, see BaowN ColvnssioN COmmENTARY, supra note
13, at 322-23, but a random spot-check in the situation described in text
would not be forbidden, since the agent has exerted no pressure which
might cause a hypothetical law-abiding person to commit the offense.
The defendant would not qualify under either the Model Penal Code or
the Brown Commission version of the defense. See note 17 supra.
A number of commentators have argued that solicitation of crime
should never be permitted unless the agent has reasonable grounds to
suspect that his target is engaged in crime. See authorities cited in note
18 supra. This "reasonable suspicion" defense deserves consideration,
since it might reduce intrusive undercover work. However, in order to
gather evidence that a target was committing a consensual crime, it will
often be necessary either to elicit incriminating evidence from friends of
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Several consequences may flow from the use of overly per-
suasive inducements. First, they can offend innocent persons
who resist them and refuse to commit the crime. If the defense
is intended to protect such persons, it is analogous to the prophy-
lactic use of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases.
However, the harm done by an illegal search is greater. A search
involves an invasion of privacy, often accompanied by a tense en-
counter with police officers and, as in the case of a body search,
an affront to personal dignity. A person who has merely been
subjected to solicitations accompanied by appeals to friendship,
pleas for sympathy, or promises of inordinate gain has not been
harmed nearly so much. The harm done would be comparable
if a request were accompanied by threats or some other form of
extreme coercion, but it seems unlikely that agents have more in-
centive to use such tactics under the federal defense than they
would have under the hypothetical-person defense. Except in
very unusual circumstances, a defendant who yielded to threats
or coercion could not be found beyond a reasonable doubt to
have been predisposed to commit the crime. Moreover, the due
process clause probably requires acquittal of a person subjected
to such tactics regardless of predisposition. 240
Second, the use of an overly persuasive inducement might
cause the commission of crime by a predisposed person who was
awaiting any favorable opportunity to commit the offense. It is
doubtful that the hypothetical-person defense is designed to pro-
tect such persons, though it will incidentally (and regrettably)
have that effect. The use of an inducement that might persuade
a nondisposed person is not in itself cruel, and the discovery of
persons already engaged (or about to engage) in criminal activity
is a gain rather than a loss.
Third, the use of an overly persuasive inducement might
cause the commission of crime by a normally law-abiding person
the target, instruct undercover agents to make friends with him, or place
him under surveillance. These activities are almost as intrusive as solic-
itation of crime. In some instances they would be more so. Sending
agents to make friends with a druggist in order to find grounds for sus-
pecting that he was illegally selling drugs would be a greater invasion
of privacy than sending a stranger to make an unadorned request for
drugs. Moreover, the reasonable suspicion defense has many of the
weaknesses of the hypothetical-person defense: Development of detailed
rules that provided clear guidance to police agents would be difficult;
enforcement could be stymied by fabricated testimony; and the defense
would sometimes lead to the acquittal of dangerous offenders.
240. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
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who will, when the issue is presented, erroneously be found to
have been predisposed. For example, a jury may give too much
weight to evidence of past offenses, thereby returning a guilty
verdict against an ex-convict who was trying to reform. Advo-
cates of the hypothetical-person approach have repeatedly voiced
concern about this possibility. As Justice Frankfurter said in his
concurring opinion in the Sherman case:
Appeals to sympathy, friendship, the possibility of exorbi-
tant gain, and so forth, can no more be tolerated when directed
against a past offender than against an ordinary law-abiding cit-
izen. A contrary view runs afoul of fundamental principles of
equality under law, and would espouse the notion that when
dealing with the criminal classes anything goes. The possibility
that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition the
defendant might not have committed the particular crime unless
confronted with inordinate inducements, must not be ignored.
Past crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him to
police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from
which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole ameliorative
hopes of modern penology and prison administration strongly
counsel against such a view.241
The commentary to the Brown Commission proposal even sug-
gests that providing additional protection to "habitual criminals"
would be the principal impact of its proposed change in federal
law:
The entrapment defense, as presently recognized in the Fed-
eral courts, has been found not to be "a significant limitation
upon police encouragement practices." The proposed statute is
not expected to exert any more restraints upon police law en-
forcement procedures than does the present law. Yet, it is also
true that the proposed statute might require more cautious be-
havior on the part of law enforcement personnel when dealing
with habitual criminals than is presently the case. This is so be-
cause the predisposition of the defendant is not of crucial concern
in the proposed statute whereas the present law requires a lack
of predisposition as a condition precedent to an entrapment....
One of the most serious shortcomings of the present entrap-
ment law is that the predisposition element tends to encourage
or tempt law enforcement into a "devil-may-care" or "anything
goes" attitude toward persons of a known criminal reputation
.. .242
Even if the quoted passages are correct in their assumptions
about police conduct,243 the concerns voiced do not mandate ac-
241. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958). See also
MODEL PE wz CODE § 2.08, Comment at 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
242. BROWN ComlvssIoN COM mNTuY, supra note 13, at 306.
243. There is doubt about whether agents actually pursue persons
with past records more vigorously than others. See text accompanying
notes 316-17 infra.
[Vol. 60:163
ENTRAPMENT CONTROVERSY
ceptance of the hypothetical-person approach. It may be more
realistic to admit that the "ameliorative hopes of modem penol-
ogy" have not been realized, and to hope that pursuit of past of-
fenders will have a deterrent effect instead of a criminogenic
one.244 At any rate, one need not embrace the hypothetical-per-
son defense in order to protect past offenders from overzealous
pursuit by police officers who believe that the entrapment de-
fense can be defeated merely by evidence about reputation or
prior convictions. Sufficient protection could be provided by
adopting a version of the federal approach that excluded evi-
dence of past convictions and criminal reputation from the fact-
finder's consideration. Exclusion of such evidence would still
leave the government with ample means to prove predisposi-
tion.2
45
With this procedural alteration, the federal test would pro-
vide greater protection against conviction of law-abiding former
offenders than would the hypothetical-person test. The federal
test protects such persons against conviction even if the induce-
ments offered were relatively mild, while the hypothetical-per-
son test protects only persons who have been subjected to pres-
sure so obnoxious that courts are willing to condemn its use in
all circumstances. Moreover, by permitting broad-ranging evi-
dence of predisposition to come in, the federal test allows a de-
fendant to introduce affirmative evidence that he was law-abid-
ing or to rely upon the prosecution's failure to adduce evidence
of criminal propensity as raising a reasonable doubt.24 6
c. The need for prevention
Obviously, the frequency with which police agents use im-
proper inducements ought to be considered in deciding whether
to adopt an approach that attempts to control their conduct. Al-
though the available data is tentative and incomplete, it suggests
that the use of overreaching inducements is probably not a com-
mon practice.
Studies of police behavior have turned up evidence of cor-
ruption, brutality, and violations of constitutional rights,247 but
244. See text accompanying note 318 infra.
245. For examples of ways the government could prove predisposi-
tion, see text accompanying notes 119-25 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 184 supra.
247. See generally CoM1pussiox TO INvEsTIGATE ALLEGATIONS or Po.cE
ComupmoN AND THE Cimy's Azm-CoInur roN PRocmuRm, Tm Kx.upp
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have not found comparable evidence of entrapment. Jerome
Skolnick discovered that narcotics officers frequently violated
search and seizure rules248 and that they sometimes allowed in-
formers to commit crimes as payment for their services, 2 9 but
he apparently did not observe any instances of entrapment worth
reporting.2 ° Two other field studies that directly focused upon
entrapment did not uncover evidence that police agents were us-
ing overreaching methods of persuasion with any frequency. The
first of these, a study of narcotics enforcement in Chicago, re-
ported finding "[a]n extremely low incidence of police conduct
which might qualify as entrapment ... a situation which would
still exist even if appellate doctrine were more exacting. '2 1 The
second, a study of detection of consensual crimes in Michigan,
Kansas, and Wisconsin, suggested that informers in narcotics
cases might be willing to apply undue pressure, but concluded
that "[i] t is difficult to know whether the use of improper en-
couragement methods by agents constitutes a serious problem,
because the conduct of agents at this stage of the process is usu-
ally not observed.
' '252
CoiVssiOIx REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1973); THE PRESIDENT's CoM-
missION ON LAw ENFORCEMVNT Am ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: Tim POLICE (1967); J. SKOLNICK, supra note 215. See
also Oaks, supra note 217; authorities cited in note 233 supra.
248. J. SKOLcs, supra note 215, at 139-61.
249. Id. at 129.
250. Although Skolnick examined narcotics enforcement at length,
id. at 112-64, he reported no instances of overreaching inducement. His
only mention of entrapment occurs in a discussion of prostitution en-
forcement, where he reported police concern over the trickery attending
the use of decoys but no instances of conduct which would qualify as
entrapment. Id. at 103. This police attitude contrasted sharply with at-
titudes toward search and seizure rules; the police admitted violations of
those rules and advanced justifications for refusing to follow them. Id.
at 144-45.
251. Comment, supra note 225, at 161.
252. TIFFANY, supra note 13, at 254-55.
Professor Rotenberg, the author of the quoted passage, also studied
enforcement of liquor laws against prostitution and homosexuality, ap-
parently without observing any significant use of improper inducements.
See id. at 231-39 (homosexuality), id. at 240-49 (liquor); id. at 214-30
(prostitution). With regard to prostitution, he reported: "The issue
[entrapment] seldom arises at the trial court level because police do not
feel that there is any practical necessity for the use of methods which
are likely to constitute entrapment as it has been defined by appellate
courts." Id. at 224. Although this passage might be read as a comment
on the inadequacy of appellate court doctrine rather than the purity of
police practices, the description of prostitution enforcement contained in
the remainder of the section indicates that the police did not find it nec-
essary to apply undue pressure. See, e.g., id. at 221:
The requirement that reality be simulated not only significantly
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The results of armchair speculation about the frequency of
misconduct are inconclusive. On the one hand, informers who
are cooperating in return for leniency are likely to be unscrupu-
lous. To save themselves, many would be willing to seduce a
nondisposed target. On the other hand, informers are likely to
find that hard-sell persuasion does not work. A desperate appeal
may produce suspicion rather than pity. Even the offer of "in-
ordinate gain" may not be an effective inducement. A seller of
drugs is more likely to trust someone who haggles over the price
than someone who makes an overgenerous offer.
Informers normally have contacts within a criminal subcul-
ture. They are acquainted with persons who are dealing in drugs
or committing other vice crimes. They have little reason to en-
gage in a campaign to seduce an obviously reluctant person when
easier pickings are available. Even if an informer succeeds in
badgering a nondisposed person into comnnitting an offense, it is
unlikely that a "high quality" arrest will ensue.253
Admittedly, the available evidence is inconclusive. It may
be that the problem is under control, or that it is inherently self-
controlling because use of undue pressure is counterproductive.
If so, the federal version of the defense is clearly preferable. In
the absence of an overriding need to control police conduct, the
goal of a criminal trial should be to adminster justice to the de-
fendant at bar.
On the other hand, it is possible that agents frequently use
inducements that would tempt a nondisposed person. Even so,
the detriments of the hypothetical-person defense probably out-
weigh its benefits. It is unlikely that conduct of informers and
officers can be controlled effectively by use of the hypothetical-
person defense. Moreover, the benefits to be gained by prevent-
ing overreaching inducements probably would not outweigh the
injustice created by acquittal of chronic offenders and conviction
of nondisposed persons.
affects the encouragement method itself but also affects its lim-
its. Thus, an officer who is in plain clothes and driving an un-
marked car will stop his car late at night at a corner where a
woman is standing alone, but he will not do anything more if
the woman does not approach the car. The reason is that the
real prostitute requires no more encouragement than that.
253. A "high quality" arrest is an arrest for a serious crime, such as
sale of a substantial quantity of drugs. In drug cases, officials have be-
come increasingly less interested in arresting mere users and seller-users.
This development has probably decreased the incentive informers may
have had to apply undue pressure to induce users to make sales.
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IV. AN APOLOGIA FOR THE FEDERAL DEFENSE
A. Tim PRIVATE-PERSON EXCEPTION
The federal defense seeks to excuse nondisposed defendants
who would have refrained from crime but for temptations of-
fered by government agents. Judicial opinions supporting this
approach have not attempted to describe elaborately the ration-
ale for exonerating such persons, perhaps because it seems ob-
vious that they are less blameworthy and less dangerous than
the ordinary offender. Since they are less blameworthy, they are
less deserving of retributive punishment; since they are less dan-
gerous, the need for protection of society by prison or probation
supervision is diminished.
Critics of the federal defense have argued that this rationale
cannot support it, since courts applying it have universally de-
dined to permit the defense to be raised in cases where an "en-
trapment" was accomplished by a private person rather than a
government agent.2154 As the Model Penal Code commentary
points out, defendants entrapped by government agents are "nei-
ther less reprehensible or dangerous nor more reformable or de-
terrable" than defendants who have been led astray by private
persons. 255 Therefore, the argument runs, it is illogical to say
that the entrapment defense is based upon a concern for protect-
ing "innocent" persons.256
254. For examples of federal cases recognizing the private person ex-
ception, see Holloway v. United States, 432 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1970);
Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1968);
Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
255. See MODEL PEuAL CoDE § 2.10, Comment at 14 (Tent. Draft No.
9,1959).
256. The scholarly examinations of the defense of entrapment
have . . . revealed the inadequacies of the subjective test. To
speak of entrapment as an implied statutory condition, and then
to focus inquiry on the origin of intent, the implantation of crim-
inal design, and the predisposition of the defendant does not
make much sense. If entrapment is a substantive condition of
guilt, then it ought to apply when private persons induce the
commission of an offense. But no court has ever been willing
to make such an application of the Sorrells doctrine. An external
standard, if it can be achieved, is certainly preferable to a doc-
trine founded in theoretical riddles.
Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969). For similar state-
ments, see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa
1974); Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1109 ("If the genesis of intent formula
is to be taken seriously, why limit entrapment to instigation by govern-
ment agents?"); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encourage-
ment, 49 VA, L, Rgv. 871, 898 (1963),
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This argument is based upon two related fallacies:
(1) The notion that, since the entrapment defense sometimes
treats persons of equal culpability differently, it therefore can-
not be concerned about culpability; and
(2) The notion that the entrapment defense must have one
aim and only one.
The first notion fails to recognize that rules intended to ex-
cuse nonculpable persons from criminal liability must sometimes
be limited in scope because of the danger of contrived defenses.
The defense of mistake of law is one example of a defense that,
though intended to protect innocent persons, has been curtailed
for this reason. There, as in the case of entrapment, it would
sometimes be just to relieve a defendant of criminal liability even
if he intentionally committed a forbidden act. If the crime was
malum prohibitum and the defendant diligently made efforts to
determine whether his conduct would be legal, then he is neither
blameworthy nor dangerous. However, he may still be subject
to criminal punishment. In fact, the Model Penal Code would
not exonerate such a defendant unless his mistaken belief was
based upon the advice of a public official.257
A person who relied upon the advice of private counsel may
have acted just as diligently and honestly as a person who relied
upon the advice of a public official. Why this distinction be-
tween persons of equal culpability, when one is "neither less rep-
rehensible or dangerous nor more reformable or deterrable" than
the other? The distinction does not mean that the defense of
mistake of law is not really concerned with culpability, or that
it must be intended to deter wrongful conduct on the part of pub-
lic officials. It reflects recognition of the possibility of contriving
the defense with the help of a venal lawyer. Accordingly, the
commentary to the Model Penal Code states that the draftsmen
limited the mistake of law defense to situations "where the possi-
bility of collusion is minimal" and where "a judicial determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the belief in legality should not
present substantial difficulty."28
The private-person exception to the entrapment defense is
analogous. If entrapment by private persons were a defense,
there would be a great danger of collusion and false claims; and
257. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Official Draft, 1962).
258. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment at 138 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
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it would be difficult to ascertain the truth. For example, one
member of a conspiracy could take the blame for the offense,
testifying that he had entrapped his co-conspirators--thereby pre,
senting the tribunal with uncontradicted testimony of entrap-
ment by all of the parties in a position to have first-hand knowl-
edge of the relevant facts. Alternatively, a defendant could
claim entrapment by a person who could not be located by the
prosecution, thereby leaving the issue to hinge upon his own un-
contradicted testimony. Even if the alleged private entrapper
could be located and denied the entrapment, he might turn out
to be a witness whose testimony was confused, incredible, or sub-
ject to impeachment by past convictions. By contrast, when the
alleged entrapper is a government agent, the prosecution has the
opportunity to put him on the stand to contradict the defendant's
testimony. Moreover, since the government has control over the
circumstances of the inducement, it can try to have a credible
person present or otherwise develop proof that no undue pres-
sure was applied.2 50
The private-person exception can also be justified on the
ground that, while entrapment doctrine is properly concerned
with culpability, it serves other goals as well. There is no reason
why there should be only one policy basis for federal entrapment
doctrine. There is nothing strange about saying that the pres-
ence of multiple factors will tip the scales when the presence of
one factor would not be enough. A supporter of the federal ap-
proach who is concerned about prctecting persons of diminished
culpability may also properly be concerned about preserving re-
spect for the courts, controlling police conduct, and excusing vic-
tims of discriminatory law enforcement. He may properly limit
the defense to circumstances in which these policies would be
served simultaneously. Under this theory, the private-person ex-
ception to federal entrapment doctrine can be supported on ei-
ther or both of the following grounds:
(1) The goals of entrapment doctrine include prevention of
improper police conduct and preservation of respect for the crim-
inal justice system. These goals may be served by acquitting de-
fendants entrapped by government agents; they cannot be served
by acquitting defendants entrapped by private persons. Hence
the private-person exception. However, acquittal of dangerous
chronic offenders is too high a price to pay for the possibility
259. For example, informers are sometimes equipped with electronic
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of achieving these objectives. Hence the distinction between pre-
disposed defendants and nondisposed defendants.
(2) Use by police of overreaching inducements against non-
disposed persons is a matter of greater social concern than the
use of such inducements against predisposed persons. Zealous
pursuit and temptation of predisposed persons may be an effec-
tive way of discovering major offenders. However, similar treat-
ment of a nondisposed offender is an inefficient way to uncover
crime. An excessive amount of time and money is likely to be
spent engineering an offense that yields a "low quality" arrest-
e.g., an arrest for sale of a small amount of drugs. Overly zealous
pursuit of nondisposed persons therefore raises a suspicion that
police agents have motives other than even-handed detection of
the crime charged. For example, the defendant may be targeted
for arrest because he is known as a political radical. Permitting
conviction of nondisposed persons who have been led astray by
police may therefore have a chilling effect upon exercise of politi-
cal freedoms and permit vendettas against unpopular defendants.
Permitting conviction of nondisposed persons seduced by private
persons does not raise the same danger, since these private temp-
tors want to avoid arrest rather than induce it.
B. OBscuR= AM CONFUSION
Critics have frequently complained that the federal defini-
tion of entrapment is vague, obscure, or mysterious. 260  Justice
Frankfurter criticized its "unrevealing tests.12 61 Professor Rot-
enberg has expressed doubt that its concept of an "otherwise in-
nocent" defendant has any meaning at all.2 32 State v. Mullen
(one of the three state supreme court cases to reject the federal
defense) hypothesized that the jury would be confused by its
"welter of catch-phrase concepts. '263
transmitters, thereby permitting conversations with the defendant to be
recorded and preserved. See note 337 infra.
260. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1107-08; Orfield, The De-
fense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DuxE L.J. 39, 43-44
(federal test is an "elusive doctrine" lacking meaningful distinctions);
Rotenberg, supra note 256, at 897; The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HAnIv. L. REv. 1, 247 (1973) (federal approach leads to "bewildering and
ambiguous instructions"); Comment, Entrapment: A Critical Discussion,
37 Mo. L. Rsv. 633, 648, 659 (1972); authorities cited in notes 261-63 infra.
261. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
262. TiFFANy, supra note 13, at 267.
263. State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 1974).
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It is easy to exaggerate the obscurity of the federal test. On
the whole, the case law has yielded a coherent and comprehensi-
ble body of doctrine. However, confusing language has some-
times crept into the opinions. I will briefly discuss two concepts
which have caused difficulty.
Judicial opinions have often said that entrapped persons de-
serve acquittal because they are "innocent." Some critics have
found this term confusing, apparently because it connotes com-
plete lack of culpability.26 4 Entrapped defendants are not inno-
cent in this sense. In fact, they are guilty of engaging in the
exact conduct described in the statutory definition of the crime
with which they have been charged. However, they are entitled
to acquittal because they might not have committed a crime of
the nature charged had they not been tempted by the agent. It
is doubtful that calling such defendants innocent persons really
engenders much confusion, but in hopes of achieving greater pre-
cision I have described them as "nondisposed."
A more serious obstacle to understanding has been created
by language in some cases stating that the test of entrapment
is whether the "criminal design" or "intent" to commit the crime
originated with the police agent or with the defendant.265 This
language is confusing because a government agent can be
thought to originate the intent to commit a particular offense
whenever he solicits the commission of that offense, regardless
of the amount of pressure applied or the defendant's penchant
for crime. Of course, mere solicitation of crime is not prohibited.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa
1974); TIFFANY, supra note 13, at 267.
265. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932), the Court
indicated that an entrapment occurs when "the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government." Other examples of an "origin of
intent" formulation are contained in Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944,
945 (10th Cir. 1950), which approved an instruction stating that entrap-
ment exists when "government agents induce and originate the criminal
intent of the defendant," and State v. Nelsen, 228 N.W.2d 143, 147 (S.D.
1975), which says that the issue is "does the evidence show that the crim-
inal intent is traceable to the defendant or to the Government Agent?"
See also Note, The Defense of Entrapment in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J.
825, 842 (1968) (stating that under California law "the jury must deter-
mine whether the intent to commit the crime originated in the mind of
the officer or informer, or in the mind of the defendant"); Annot., 22
A.L.R. Fed. 731, 737-38 (1975) (stating that "[w]here the criminal intent
originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured
into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, no
conviction may be had").
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The "origin of intent" formula is simply an inartful way of ex-
pressing the idea that a defendant should not be excused if he
was ready and willing to commit the type of offense charged.
The fact that a doctrine has sometimes been explained awk-
wardly is no reason for discarding it. The federal defense can
be formulated in a fashion that makes it as comprehensible to
a jury as the hypothetical-person defense. The standard federal
jury instructions do so by telling the jury that it should convict
the defendant only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was ready and willing to commit crimes such as those charged
whenever a favorable opportunity arose.260
The assertion that it is unduly difficult for juries to conceive
a distinction between a predisposed offender and a nondisposed
offender is an odd basis for advocating a shift from federal doc-
trine to the hypothetical-person defense. The latter uses the
same concept; the only difference is that the fact-finder is asked
to consider the impact of an inducement upon an imaginary non-
disposed person instead of a real defendant. For example, the
Model Penal Code provides that an entrapment has occurred
when the agent uses methods "which create a substantial risk
that such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it"; 2 7 the Brown Commission
proposal defines entrapment as conduct "likely to cause normally
law-abiding persons to commit the offense. '2 68 State v. Mullen,
while asserting that the federal test's "catch-phrase concepts"
would cause jury confusion, 269 adopted the Brown Commission
version of the defense and held that entrapment would remain
a jury issue, expressing confidence that "[c] ertainly the jury can
weigh conduct which might induce 'a normally law-abiding per-
son' to commit a crime as surely as it can weigh (in a tort case)
the required conduct of a 'reasonably prudent person.' "270 The
court did not explain why jurors would be able to understand
the concept that certain inducements might unreasonably tempt
a hypothetical person, and yet be confused when asked whether
a real person had been led astray.
266. See 1 E. Dsv'rT & C. BLAcKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS § 13.13 (2d ed. 1970) (quoted in note 39 supra).
267. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (b) (Official Draft, 1962) (quoted
in note 17 supra).
268. See BROWN CoMnOsSIoN PROPOSAL, supra note 17, § 702(2)
(quoted in note 17 supra).
269. See note 263 supra and accompanying text.
270. State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974).
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C. "FicTIoNAL" LEGISLATIVE INTENI
Critics of federal entrapment doctrine have frequently main-
tained that it is premised upon a contrived view of legislative
intent.271
The Sorrells majority based its decision upon the theory that
Congress could not have intended the National Prohibition Act
to apply to persons who had been entrapped into selling li-
quor.2 72 As the federal defense developed, it was applied gen-
erally to statutes punishing nonviolent crimes, without further
discussion of congressional intent. The majority in Russell, con-
ceding that the argument against the legislative intent rationale
was "not devoid of appeal,"273 nevertheless reiterated that en-
trapment doctrine was rooted in "the notion that Congress could
not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a prescribed offense, but was in-
duced to commit them by the Government." 27 4
rn Sherman, Justice Frankfurter complained that "the only
legislative intention that can with any show of reason be ex-
tracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal pre-
cisely the conduct in which the defendant has engaged,"275 and
Justice Stewart repeated this criticism in his 1973 dissent in Rus-
sell.27 6 The true foundation of entrapment doctrine has been de-
scribed as "the public policy which protects the purity of govern-
ment and its processes" 277 or the supervisory power of the federal
courts to "formulate and apply 'proper standards for the enforce-
ment of the federal criminal law in the federal courts.' "278 It
is said that because the basis of the doctrine is judicial supervi-
sory power instead of congressional intent, the defense must fo-
cus solely upon the propriety of the conduct of government
271. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441-42 (1973)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 456 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7,
19, 210 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1973).
272. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932).
273. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
274. Id. at 435.
275. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
276. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973).
277. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (minority
opinion of Roberts, J.).
278. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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agents, rather than on whether the defendant was predis-
posed.27 9
Perhaps there was some justification for describing the legis-
lative intent rationale as "fictitious" when entrapment doctrine
was still in its formative stages, although the defense had re-
ceived recognition in federal court prior to the passage of the
statute construed in Sorrells. 280 However, the argument should
clearly have no application to modern criminal statutes. The en-
trapment defense has been recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court for over 40 years. Surely there is nothing extra-
ordinary in assuming that Congress intends its enactments to be
subject to the entrapment defense, just as they are subject to
other common-law defenses (such as insanity and duress) that
permit acquittal of persons who have performed all of the acts
described in a statute as prerequisites of criminal liability.
At any rate, the controversy is a sterile one. If the doctrine
is based on a judicial policy concerned with protecting the purity
of the courts or deterring police misconduct, one must still face
hard questions about the limits of the policy. Is the purity of
the courts soiled whenever police agents use an improper induce-
ment, or only when the improper inducement leads to an evil re-
sult, such as corruption of the innocent? Is the public policy
against improper police conduct compelling enough to justify ac-
quittal of the guilty, or is it sufficiently served by acquittal of
nondisposed defendants? These questions cannot be answered
simply by saying that the basis for the entrapment doctrine is
judicial policy rather than congressional intent.
D. ADMISSION OF HEARSAY
One of the most common criticisms of the subjective defense
is based upon the premise that it leads inexorably to the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence about predisposition.281 Justice Stew-
art's comment in his Russell dissent is typical:
279. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-42 (1973) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
280. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); cases
cited in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 443 & n.4 (1932).
281. See, e.g., State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 380, 381 (Iowa 1974)
(stating that the subjective test "leads inexorably" to an examination of
a defendant's past misdeeds, "rumored and otherwise" and that "the
subjective rationale ... comes with too much dangerous baggage of
hearsay, suspicion and rumor evidence"); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); People v. Turner, 39 Mich.
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[A] test that makes the entrapment defense depend on whether
the defendant had the requisite predisposition permits the intro-
duction into evidence of all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and ru-
mor-all of which would be inadmissible in any other context-
in order to prove the defendant's predisposition. It allows the
prosecution, in offering such proof, to rely on the defendant's
bad reputation or past criminal activities, including even ru-
mored activities of which the prose.ution may have insufficient
evidence to obtain an indictment, and to present the agent's sus-
picions as to why they chose to tempt this defendant. This sort
of evidence is not only unreliable, as the hearsay rule recog-
nizes; but it is also highly prejudicial .... 282
It is hard to understand the basis for this widely prevalent
notion that making predisposition a dispositive fact necessarily
requires making predisposition provable by reputation and other
forms of hearsay evidence. Rules that make other states of mind
-malice, knowledge, recklessness, negligence--dispositive facts
are not thought to require the admission of hearsay evidence to
prove those states of mind. There is nothing special about predis-
position that requires the use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay.
There are many ways in which predisposition can be proven more
reliably. For example, in a drug case, the prosecution could pre-
sent evidence that the defendant readily complied with the re-
quest for drugs; that the defendant obtained a large quantity of
drugs on short notice for sale to the agent; that in discussions
leading up to the transaction, the defendant disclosed previous
drug deals or displayed familiarity with the drug trade; or that
drugs or paraphernalia of the drug trade were found in a search
of defendant's dwelling.
Despite the lack of any pressing need, a number of federal
courts have permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be in-
troduced to refute the entrapment defense. Some of it has been
shockingly unreliable. It has included "reputation" evidence
from witnesses who would be incompetent to testify about repu-
tation in ordinary criminal cases. For example, testimony by a
police officer that a single confidential informer told him that
the defendant had a reputation for dealing in drugs has been ad-
mitted.28 3 It has also included hearsay testimony that an un-
7, 20, 210 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1973); Orfield, supra note 260. Cf. Donnelly,
supra note 13, at 1106-07.
282. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
283. See United States v. Simon, 488 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1973). But
see Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1961) (reputa-
tion witnesses must be personally familiar with defendant's reputation
in the community).
In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), the government pro-
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named informer reported observing criminal acts by the defend-
ant,28 4 or that the defendant had previously been arrested
(though not convicted) for a crime similar to the one charged. 285
Perhaps the willingness of courts to admit testimony about
reputation can be explained by the apparent similarity between
raising the entrapment defense and "putting character in issue"
in a non-entrapment case.28 6 However, this similarity cannot ex-
plain why the prosecution has been allowed to rebut the entrap-
ment defense by introducing hearsay evidence about specific acts,
or by using "reputation" witnesses who lack personal knowledge
of the defendant's reputation. Such evidence would not be ad-
missible to rebut the testimony of a defendant's character wit-
nesses in a non-entrapment case.287
duced trial testimony that the defendant had "the general reputation of
a rum-runner." Id. at 441. However, it did so only after the defendant
had produced witnesses to testify about his character, id. at 440, and the
admissibility of this testimony was not in controversy. It appears to
have conformed to all the requirements governing prosecution use of rep-
utation testimony in non-entrapment cases. See notes 286-87 infra.
284. See United States v. McKinley, 493 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Brooks, 477 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Simon, 488 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1973). But see cases cited in notes 294-
95 infra.
The defendant is in a particularly difficult bind when the hearsay
declaration is that of a "confidential informant" whose identity is pro-
tected by the informer's privilege, since the defense then has no opportu-
nity to subpoena the hearsay declarant. See United States v. Brooks, su-
pra (holding that testimony by a government witness that unnamed in-
formers had told him of other narcotics transactions by the defendant
was admissible, and that the trial judge properly refused to require that
the names of the informers be revealed); Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d
529 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1103 (1969).
285. See Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970).
Contra, United States v. White, 390 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1968).
286. The accused is said to "put his character in issue" when he in-
troduces evidence of good character to prove his innocence. The defend-
ant's character witnesses are permitted to testify only about reputation.
C. McCoRM Fc HAxDTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIENCE § 191 (2d ed. 1972).
But see FED. R. Ev. 405 (a) (permitting witnesses to give personal opinion
about character as well as testimony about community reputation). By
"putting character in issue," the defendant opens the door to rebuttal rep-
utation testimony by prosecution witnesses. C. McCoRMIcK, supra, §
191; note 287 infra.
(The common phrase "putting character in issue" is slightly mislead-
ing, since character is not an ultimate issue (dispositive fact) when a de-
fendant produces character witnesses for the purpose of showing that he
did not commit the criminal act. See C. McCoRIi cK, supra, § 191; text
accompanying note 288 infra.)
287. Generally, the prosecutor is permitted to rebut the defendant's
evidence of good reputation in three ways: (1) The prosecutor may
cross-examine the defendant's character witnesses in an attempt to show
19761
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Moreover, the analogy between "putting character in issue"
and raising the entrapment defense is a false one. In a non-en-
trapment case in which the defendant has chosen to offer testi-
mony about his reputation, his character is not a dispositive fact.
Character evidence is offered merely to support the inference
that because the defendant was a good man he would not have
committed the offense charged. There are many other ways to
defend against the charge, and more convincing evidence can be
offered by both sides. Therefore, the courts have limited such
character evidence to reputation testimony, on the theory that
proof of specific past conduct of the defendant, while it may be
more probative than reputation evidence, would confuse juries,
unduly prolong trials, and create a danger of unfair surprise.28
Conversely, the relative unreliability of reputation evidence can
be tolerated because it is not crucial, and the defendant can al-
ways avoid its admission by not calling character witnesses.
By contrast, in an entrapment case in a jurisdiction applying
the federal test, a trait of the defendant's character (his propen-
that they are not really acquainted with community opinion. In doing
so, he is normally permitted to ask whether the witness has heard that
the defendant committed specific crimes or acts inconsistent with the
reputation vouched for. However, most jurisdictions do not allow the
prosecutor to refute the witness's answer with extrinsic evidence. (2)
The prosecutor may call to the stand witnesses who will testify that the
defendant has a bad reputation for the trait in question. However, these
witnesses are not permitted to testify about specific criminal acts.
Moreover, they must themselves be persons who have knowledge of the
defendant's reputation in the community. (3) A minority of jurisdictions
permit the prosecutor to introduce evidence of convictions of the defend-
ant for recent crimes which are inconsistent with the trait of character
vouched for by the defense witnesses. However, prosecution witnesses
are not permitted to testify about arrests that have not resulted in con-
viction or about statements by out-of-court declarants concerning unin-
dicted crimes committed by the defendant. See generafly C. Mc-
CoRMICK, supra note 286, § 191. On the requirement that reputation wit-
nesses be shown to be personally familiar with the defendant's reputa-
tion in the community, see Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 517
(1st Cir. 1961), and cases cited therein; 3 J. WiOMOHE, EVIDENCE §§ 691-
92 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); cases cited in 5 id. § 1612 n.1 (1974).
The new Federal Rules of Evidence are in conformity with the com-
mon-law rules described above, except that they permit opinion as well
as reputation testimony. See note 286 supra. They adopt the majority
rule prohibiting the introduction of other convictions. See FED. R. Ev. 404
(b).
288. See C. McCoimcK, supra note 286, § 191 at 456 & n.69. The
new Federal Rules of Evidence permit opinion as well as reputation testi-
mony, see note 286 supra, on the theory that it does not involve these
dangers of prolongation, confusion, and surprise. See FED. R. EV. 405,
Advisory Committee Note.
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sity to commit the type of crime charged) is a dispositive fact.
If the jury finds that he was not predisposed he will be entitled
to acquittal; a contrary finding will ordinarily result in convic-
tion.289 Predisposition is in no sense a collateral issue. There
is every reason to require the most reliable evidence available,
and not to tolerate the use of reputation or other hearsay evi-
dence.
Character is also a dispositive fact in certain types of non-en-
trapment cases. For example, in a slander case in which the de-
famatory words disparage a trait of the plaintiff's character,
character is a dispositive fact if the defendant raises the defense
of truth. Similarly, in an action for negligently entrusting a mo-
tor vehicle to an incompetent driver, a trait of the driver's char-
acter (his competency) is a dispositive fact. In such cases, evi-
dence of a trait of character is not being offered merely as a
basis for inferring some other fact, as it is in a non-entrapment
case in which a criminal defendant introduces character evidence.
Character is one of the ultimate issues upon which liability turns.
Therefore, common-law doctrine provides that character may be
proven by evidence of specific prior acts indicative of the trait
of character in issue.290 In other words, when character is a cen-
tral issue, the more reliable form of evidence has been admitted,
even at the cost of time and convenience. Once this more reliable
evidence becomes admissible, the reasons for relying upon repu-
tation evidence no longer apply. Accordingly, some courts have
held that reputation evidence is inadmissible when character is
a dispositive fact.291 This approach should be followed in en-
trapment cases. If the defendant was actually ready and willing
to commit the offense, the prosecution should be able to prove
predisposition by evidence of a more reliable nature.2
92
The theory that accepting the subjective approach neces-
sarily requires admission of reputation and other hearsay evi-
289. Predisposition is normally the only dispositive fact in issue in
entrapment cases. Defendants rarely raise the entrapment defense in
cases in which they deny committing the criminal act. See note 308
infra.
290. See C. McCoRmicx, supra note 286, § 187; 1 J. WIGmORE, Evi-
DENC. § 202 (3d ed. 1940).
291. See C. McCoRmcK, supra note 286, § 187 at 444 & n.9; Huntt
v. McNamee, 141 F. 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1905) (incompetency of independ-
ent contractor hired by defendant could not be proven by reputation but
only by specific acts of conduct); Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Ore. 621, 87
P.2d 209 (1939).
292. For a description of types of evidence which may be used to
prove predisposition, see text accompanying notes 119-27 supra.
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dence has not been universally accepted. The Supreme Court of
California has accepted the subjective approach while at the same
time refusing to permit proof of predisposition by reputation or
other hearsay evidence.2 93 Some federal courts have gone part
way, excluding hearsay evidence that is particularly unreli-
able.294 Moreover, a 1969 opiniona from the Third Circuit ex-
pressed unqualified disapproval o: the entrapment exception to
the hearsay rule.29 5
The Federal Rules of Evidence, which became effective in
1975, may preclude federal courts from excluding reputation
testimony. These rules provide that when a trait of character
is an essential element of a charge or defense, reputation and
opinion testimony about character may be admitted 290 as well
as testimony about specific instances of conduct.297 However,
the rules give no warrant for admitting second-hand reputation
evidence (testimony by a person who does not have personal
knowledge of community sentiment) or hearsay evidence of spe-
cific instances of criminal conduct.298 Perhaps these anomalous
features of the federal entrapment defense will die out.
In states that have not codified their rules of evidence, there
is no such obstacle to ending the use of reputation evidence to
rebut the entrapment defense. The admission of reputation evi-
dence cannot be justified when the prosecution is allowed to in-
troduce evidence of specific acts. Such evidence ought to be ex-
293. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir.
1973) (trial judge committed reversible error by admitting testimony
that defendant was on police list of suspected violaters compiled from
information received from persons of unknown reliability); United States
v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112, 113-14 (7th Cir. 1970) (trial judge committed
reversible error by allowing jury to hear officer's testimony that two
years earlier informer, now dead, had told officer of obtaining drugs from
defendant); Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 516-17 (1st Cir. 1961)
(testimony about anonymous telephone calls and hearsay testimony
about statements from named informers who were not shown to have
personal knowledge of criminal activity held inadmissible). But see
cases cited in notes 283-85 supra.
295. United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1969)
(admission of testimony that out-of-court declarant had told officer that
defendant was "under the influence of bennies" and "would sell [drugs]
to anyone approaching him" was reversible error). The position of the
Ninth Circuit is unclear. Compare United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283,
291 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1969) (dictum) (disapproving hearsay), with Pulido
v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. '1970) (admitting arrest record).
296. FED. R. Ev. 405 (a).
297. Id. 405(b).
298. See note 172 supra and accompamying text.
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cluded unless the defendant opens the door by calling character
witnesses to testify about his reputation.
The use of reputation and other hearsay evidence is certainly
not an inevitable consequence of differences between the subjec-
tive and hypothetical-person approaches to the substantive law
of entrapment. One of the strange quirks of the entrapment con-
troversy is that it is commonly assumed that the hypothetical-
person approach will lead to exclusion of testimony about out-
of-court statements, when in fact there may be a greater need
for use of such statements under this approach than under one
that focuses directly on the defendant's predisposition. The need
for such statements arises from the fact that it may be necessary
to consider what the police agent knew about the defendant in
order to determine whether the agent's conduct was proper.299
For example, repeated requests by the agent that the target
commit a crime may constitute entrapment. However, a target's
refusal on first request is often an ambiguous act. It may indi-
cate that the target is a reluctant innocent, or it may strengthen
suspicion that he is a wary criminal. The more successful the
target has been in his criminal enterprise, the less likely he is
to be eager to deal with strangers; for while ready compliance
is a sign of willingness, it is also the sign of a novice. Sometimes
the agent would be justified in persisting after the refusal. In
determining whether persistence was justified, it would be help-
ful to scrutinize the target's reasons for refusal in light of what
the agent knew about the target's proclivities. 300
If the agent's knowledge of the target is to be taken into ac-
count, it may be necessary to admit out-of-court statements about
the target's activities, for the agent's knowledge will frequently
come second- or third-hand from police sources. When such state-
299. See text accompanying notes 128-42 supra. The current authori-
tative formulations of the hypothetical-person approach seem to permit
at least some evidence of what the agent knew about the target's activi-
ties to be admitted for the purpose of evaluating the agent's conduct.
See text accompanying notes 143-53 supra.
300. The grounds given by the target for refusal need to be con-
strued in light of what is known about him. Suppose, for example, that
the agent asked a target for cocaine, and the target refused, saying that
cocaine was dangerous. If the agent had information that the target was
a dealer in cocaine (or even a user), the grounds given for refusal would
suggest that the target was lying because he thought that the agent was
a police spy. The agent might be justified in persisting, and even in try-
ing to build up the target's confidence in him by developing a personal
relationship-in other words, by making an "appeal to friendship." See
generally text accompanying notes 128-53 supra.
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ments are offered only to show that the agent acted properly,
they do not fall under the traditional definition of hearsay at all.
The evidence would not be offered to show the truth of the mat-
ter asserted (that defendant was already engaged in crime) but
to show its effect on the hearer (that the agent reasonably be-
lieved that the defendant was engaged in crime) .301
The history of the entrapment exception to the hearsay rule
supports the idea that there is a stronger case for admission of
out-of-court statements under a test that focuses upon the pro-
priety of police conduct than there is under the subjective test.
During the formative years of federal entrapment doctrine, some
courts supposed that entrapment could be established by show-
ing that the inducing agent lacked reasonable cause to suspect
crime,3 0 2 or that the presence of reasonable suspicion was an al-
ternative basis for defeating an entrapment defense. 30 3 Under
these theories statements by out-of-court declarants to agents
were admissible to show reasonable suspicion.3 0 4 Federal opin-
ions which have questioned the entrapment exception to the
hearsay rule have pointed out that under the modern doctrine
the issue is predisposition, not reasonable cause, so out-of-court
statements to the agent need not be admitted.30 5
301. See note 174 supra.
302. See text accompanying notes :112-14 supra.
303. See text accompanying notes 115-17 supra.
304. See Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948). The
court held that testimony that an officer had selected defendants for in-
vestigation "[b] ecause of [his] previous knowledge of their liquor activ-
ity" and because he had received "numerous reports--one source was a
sheriff" was admissible. It reasoned that the evidence was not offered
to show guilt but to show that the officer had "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the intent and purpose to violate the law existed in the mind
of the accused." Id. at 1010. Cf. Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512,
516-18 (1st Cir. 1961). See also United States v. Perry, 478 F.2d 1276,
1280 (7th Cir. 1973). In Perry the court noted that the defendant com-
plained that some of the evidence introduced against him had been hear-
say. It justified admission on grounds that
to negative a claim of entrapment, it is permissible to entertain
evidence of the defendant's reputation and of the officers' basis
for their actions.... The better practice might be to separate,
where possible, the evidence adduced to show predisposition and
the evidence offered to show reasonable grounds [but the fail-
ure to do so was not prejudicial error in this case].
Id. at 1280 (emphasis added).
305. This brings us to the legal question whether, when entrap-
ment is in issue, testimony reciting a statement of an absent per-
son which in fact indicates that the accused was predisposed to
criminal behavior should be admitted even for the stated limited
purpose of showing that the officers were justified in or had
probable cause for providing the accused with an opportunity to
commit the crime in question.
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In short, if the issue is whether an agent's methods of induce-
ment were reasonable, second- and third-hand statements to the
agent about the target's prior conduct may need to be consid-
ered in evaluating the agent's conduct. On the other hand, if the
question is whether the defendant was ready and willing to com-
mit the offense, the court may properly require that more reli-
able evidence be offered. Since the prosecution can prove predis-
position by subsequent conduct and by prior conduct not known
to the agent, it is not burdensome to require that it do so without
the use of reputation and other hearsay evidence.
E. ADMIssIBmLI OF EvmmCp OF OTHER CRMES
Proponents of the hypothetical-person approach have fre-
quently criticized the federal defense on grounds that it permits
the admission of "prejudicial" evidence about other crimes com-
mitted by the defendant.30 6 This evidence may take the form
of testimony about convictions, about arrests which did not result
in convictions, or about criminal activity that led neither to ar-
rest nor conviction. Because these three types of testimony raise
distinct issues, I will discuss them separately.
1. Evidence of Unpublished Crimes
Trial testimony in entrapment cases frequently includes ac-
We hold that such evidence is inadmissible. The basic ques-
tion in an alleged entrapment case is whether the accused was
ready and willing to commit the crime if an opportunity should
be presented. . . . Proof that the agents of government did no
more than provide the wrongdoer with an opportunity for crim-
inal conduct would suffice to negative entrapment. No signifi-
cant purpose would be served by a further showing of their
reason for approaching him.
United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1001 (3d Cir. 1969). Similar
language appears in United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 291 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1969).
306. It is a strange doctrine that makes guilt or innocence de-
pend upon whether a defendant has committed other similar of-
fenses. However bad a person may be, however guilty of crime,
it is nevertheless a principle of our system of criminal law ad-
ministration that conviction and punishment must be for some
specific act or crime proved against an accused by competent ev-
idence compelling an inference of guilt as to the specific act, and
not for a general criminal depravity or wickedness. The admis-
sion of this kind of evidence invariably prejudices the jury
against the accused and diverts their attention from an impartial
consideration of the evidence of the particular crime charged.
Donnelly, supra note 13, at 1108. See also Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); BROWN COMMSSION
COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 325.
1976]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
counts of crimes for which the defendant was not arrested,
charged, or convicted.
There are legitimate reasons why the prosecution may choose
to use evidence of other crimes as predisposition evidence rather
than charging those crimes separately. Although the prosecution
might be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a par-
ticular crime was committed, the probability that it was commit-
ted may be valuable evidence of predisposition to commit a sub-
sequent crime.
For example:
(1) An undercover officer is present when a defendant will-
ingly sells cocaine to a third party. The officer decides that it
would be unwise to attempt to make a purchase himself at that
time. At this point it would be difficult to prove that defendant
had illegally sold cocaine. He may have been defrauding his cus-
tomer; he may have been mistaken himself about the nature of
the substance; the whole affair may have been a practical joke.
Soon afterwards, however, the officer succeeds in purchasing a
drug from the defendant which is analyzed as cocaine. The evi-
dence of the apparent prior sale indicates that the defendant was
ready and willing to make the subsequent sale.
(2) An addict is apprehended in possession of heroin. He of-
fers to cooperate in return for leniency, and claims that he
bought the heroin from D. At this point, the prosecutor has little
chance of convicting D on the basis of the informer-addict's un-
corroborated testimony. Therefore, an undercover officer ar-
ranges to have the informer-addict introduce him to D. The of-
ficer succeeds in making a purchase from D of heroin identical
to that taken from the informer-addict. The addict's testimony
of prior purchases from D is probative evidence of predisposition
in a case in which D is charged with a sale to the officer.
The usual objections to using testimony about uncharged
crimes as evidence of character are that such evidence confuses
the issues, prolongs trials, causes unfair surprise, and prejudices
the jury. 07 These objections do not apply to entrapment cases.
In the usual criminal case, character is an evidentiary fact of
relatively minor importance; in entrapment cases, character is a
307. See Michelson v. Unitea States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) (dis-
allowance of evidence of prior crimes "tends to prevent confusion of
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice"); 1 J. WIMORS, EVIDENCE §§
57, 194 (3d ed. 1940).
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dispositive fact-normally the only dispositive fact in dispute.3 08
Obviously, the dangers of confusion of issues and prolongation
of the trial cannot justify exclusion of valuable testimony bear-
ing on this central issue. The danger of unfair surprise can be
handled by requiring notice of intent to introduce the evi-
dence.3 00
The argument that testimony about prior criminal conduct
is "prejudicial" because the jury may punish the defendant for
being a bad man instead of for committing the specific act
charged3 10 is based upon a misleading analogy of entrapment
cases to cases in which the defendant has denied committing the
criminal act. In the latter type of case, there is a risk that the
jury will decide that the defendant must have committed the act
charged because he previously committed similar crimes. This
danger of prejudice is sufficient to justify exclusion of evidence
of other crimes. In entrapment cases, there is rarely a genuine
dispute about whether the defendant committed the criminal act;
indeed, many jurisdictions do not even permit a defendant to
maintain a defense of entrapment and a defense of complete in-
nocence simultaneously.311 The fact-finder knows that the de-
fendant committed the act charged. The issue is precisely
whether he was a "bad man" who was predisposed to commit the
type of crime charged. On this issue, evidence of recent criminal
activity of a similar nature is as reliable as any other. Nothing
308. Normally a defendant who raises the entrapment defense will
not contest testimony that he committed the criminal act. In fact, manyjurisdictions do not permit a defendant to raise the entrapment defense
while denying the commission of the crime. See Groot, The Serpent Be-
guiled Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the
Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254, 256. The paucity of cases
on the issue of whether the entrapment defense is barred to a defend-
ant who denies commission of the crime, see id. at 264 n.44, suggests
that defendants rarely try to maintain both defenses simultaneously.
Such a posture would normally be unwise in a drug case, where defend-
ant's denial of participation would likely destroy whatever credibility his
claim of entrapment might have. See United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d
981, 985 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that "[w]hile we hold that a defendant
may both deny the acts and other elements necessary to constitute the
crime charged and at the same time claim entrapment the high risks to
him make it unlikely as a strategic matter that he will choose to do so").
309. See State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. 1975) (requiring no-
tice by the defendant of intent to raise the entrapment defense, and a re-
ciprocal written statement by the prosecution specifying the other of-
fenses it intends to show that defendant committed).
310. See note 306 supra.
311. See note 308 supra.
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is added to the controversy over whether predisposition should
be a dispositive fact by labeling such evidence "prejudicial."
A rule excluding evidence of prior unpunished crimes would
have a harsh effect upon defendants who never previously com-
mitted crimes of the nature charged. If such evidence is admissi-
ble, these defendants will benefit from the government's failure
to produce it.3 1 2 Excluding the evidence benefits chronic offend-
ers to the detriment of others.
2. Arrests or Charges Which Did Not Result in Conviction
In jurisdictions following the subjective approach, the prose-
cution has occasionally sought to prove predisposition by intro-
ducing records of prior arrests that did not result in convictions.
Sometimes this evidence has been admitted under the anything-
goes theory of predisposition evidence-that since the defendant
has opened the issue of entrapment, any evidence having the re-
motest bearing on his propensity is admissible.3 1
This attitude is insupportable. Evidence of an arrest record
shows nothing more than that one officer once believed (or pur-
ported to believe) that the defendant had committed a crime. It
has all of the vices of opinion and hearsay testimony.
The inadmissibility of evidence about an arrest itself does
not, of course, require exclusion of direct testimony about the
312. See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
The court held entrapment had been established as a matter of law. In
explaining why the government's evidence of predisposition had been in-
sufficient to support a jury verdict, the court noted, inter alia, that the
prosecution "conceded that West had no history of past participation in
the narcotics traffic." Id. at 1085. See also cases discussed in note 184
supra.
313. See Pulido v. United States, 425 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (9th Cir.
1970) (held, a 12-year-old record of an arrest that did not lead to convic-
tion was admissible; "[airrest records for related offenses should be
treated as one species of [admissible] hearsay evidence of predisposi-
tion"). Contra, United States v. White, 390 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1968) (al-
ternative holding).
Pulido is among the cases which have used the statement in Sor-
rells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932), that "if the defendant
seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appro-
priate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition,"
as a basis for an argument that evidence having even the remotest bear-
ing on predisposition ought to be admitted. This language actually pro-
vides little guidance, since the Court's statement that a "searching in-
quiry" should be made is qualified by the word "appropriate." See
Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512, 515-16 (1st Cir. 1961) (noting use
of qualifying word "appropriate" and excluding certain hearsay evi-
dence).
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events that caused the arrest. If the prosecution has first-hand
testimony of a criminal act which formed the basis for an arrest,
then that testimony should be admitted on the same basis as
testimony of prior acts which did not result in arrests.3
14
3. Records of Prior Convictions
The admission of evidence of prior convictions raises prob-
lems different from those presented by evidence of crimes not
charged. The evidence that the crime occurred is reliable
enough; a competent tribunal has determined beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant was guilty. However, it is possible
that defendant's conviction and subsequent punishment caused
him to change his ways. Moreover, there is a danger that police
might feel free to offer ex-convicts very attractive inducements,
planning to rely upon prior convictions to establish predisposi-
tion at trial. Justice Frankfurter expressed these concerns in his
opinion in Sherman, saying that the majority view violated "fun-
damental principles of equality under law" by encouraging police
agents to tempt past offenders with stronger inducements than
could be used against other citizens, and that "the whole amelio-
rative hopes of modern penology" counseled against this prac-
tice.315
Although these arguments are troubling, it is not clear that
their assumptions about police practices are accurate. The over-
zealous pursuit of past offenders may be less common than cri-
tics of the federal test have suggested. In drug cases (the offense
category in which entrapment claims most frequently arise) 31 6
officers commonly ask informers to set up drug sales. The in-
former, not the police officer, usually determines who the seller
will be.31 7 The theory that informers will single out ex-convicts
depends upon the unproven assumption that they will concentrate
314. An exception should be made, however, when the arrest led to
an acquittal on a plea of not guilty. Principles of judicial econ-
omy should preclude relitigation of the issue of guilt. However, when
a prosecution was nol prossed or dismissed, or when an arrest never led
to complaint or indictment, direct evidence about criminal conduct which
caused the arrest should be admissible, though the fact of arrest itself
should be inadmissible.
315. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring.) See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 443-44
(Stewart, J., dissenting); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 14-15
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); BROWN CoMMIssIoN COMMENTARY, supra note
13, at 306-07.
316. See note 223 supra.
317. See notes 225-26 supra and accompanying text.
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on targets who have criminal records rather than on other poten-
tially vulnerable persons, because they know (or are told) that
certain potential targets have crimimal records and that stronger
inducements can be used against these targets.
Even if agents do pursue persons with past records because
of those records, then there is still a question whether the prac-
tice is detrimental. Arguably, past offenders are exactly the
persons against whom agents should be allowed to use persuasive
inductments, so long as the inducements fall short of duress or
the sort of outrageous conduct which violates due process. There
is no "fundamental principle of equality under law" which re-
quires that past offenders be treated exactly the same as per-
sons with clean records. Past offenders are subjected to parole
supervision and other legal disabilities. Moreover, the "ameliora-
tive hopes of modern penology" have not lived up to expecta-
tions. Prison rehabilitation efforts have rarely succeeded.318 If
agents do pursue past offenders with special zeal, this practice
may actually deter crime by increasing the risk of detection. The
litigated entrapment cases present us with instances in which
past offenders yielded to solicitations by government agents; no
one knows whether there are other past offenders who resisted
crime they could successfully have committed for fear that they
were dealing with a government agent.
At any rate, acceptance of the argument that prior convic-
tions should be excluded from evidence need not lead to rejection
of the subjective approach. There is nothing illogical about ac-
cepting an entrapment defense based upon predisposition while
at the same time excluding evidence of prior convictions for rea-
318. Empirical studies of rehabilitation programs suggest that they
have almost always been failures. One recent project examined all stud-
ies of rehabilitative programs which were published in English from 1945
through 1967. Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22. After discarding studies
whose design and execution did not meet "the conventional stand-
ards of social science research," id. at 24, the project team scrutinized
231 studies dealing with such disparate methods of treatment as ed-
ucation, vocational training, psychotherapy, probation/parole, and half-
way houses. The project leader, sociologist Robert Martinson, concluded
that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that
have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism,"
id. at 25, and that, but for the retributive and deterrent functions of pun-
ishment, it might be wisest simply to release low-risk offenders and to
provide mere custodial incarceration for dangerous offenders. Id. at 49-
50.
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sons of extrinsic policy. Evidence of prior convictions can be
helpful in determining predisposition, but it is not indispensable.
Other probative evidence will normally be available to the prose-
cution.3
19
State courts and legislatures may properly embrace the sub-
jective approach while at the same time excluding evidence of
past convictions. At least two have done so. 320  However, the
lower federal courts are not equally free. Precedent in the
courts of appeals strongly supports admissibility.321 Moreover,
although the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the ad-
missibility of prior convictions, its opinion in Sherman seems to
condone admission. In Sherman, the trial court had admitted
evidence of prior convictions over the defendant's objections.3 22
The Court did not express disapproval of the admission of this
evidence, but merely noted that
a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old possession
conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to
sell narcotics at the time [the agent] approached him, particu-
larly when we must assume from the record he was trying to
overcome the narcotics habit at the time.323
This passage implies that evidence of prior convictions may
properly be considered, even though in the Sherman case the evi-
dence was not, in itself, sufficient to justify a finding of predispo-
sition.
The discussion thus far has concerned the use of evidence of
prior convictions by the prosecution. A different issue is pre-
sented when the defendant seeks to place before the jury the fact
319. For a description of evidence which may be offered to prove
predisposition, see text accompanying notes 119-25 supra.
320. State v. Nelson, 228 N.W.2d 143 (S.D. 1975), and People v. Ben-
ford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959), follow the subjective approach
but exclude evidence of prior convictions. But see People v. Foster, 36
Cal. App. 3d 594, 111 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1974). The Foster case
questioned the continuing validity of this aspect of Benford. The prin-
cipal basis for doing so was People v. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457 P.2d
841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969). Although Schader was not an entrapment
case, it stated broadly that trial judges have discretion to admit prior
convictions when probative value outweighs prejudicial effect. Id. at
772-73, 457 P.2d at 848, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 8. Cf. People v. Mora, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 824, 117 Cal. Rptr. 262 (Ct. App. 1974).
321. See, e.g., Nutter v. United States, 412 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 927 (1970) (prior conviction for narcotics violation
held admissible in trial for similar offense); Whiting v. United States, 296
F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961) (dictum) (prior convictions admissible, so long
as crime is similar). See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 293, 309-13
(1975).
322. See United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
323. 356 U.S. at 375-76.
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that he has no criminal record. This evidence should be admissi-
ble regardless of how the issue of prosecutorial use of prior con-
victions is resolved. The policies that have been advanced to pro-
hibit use of prior convictions by the prosecution do not apply to
use of a clean record by the defense. The jury would not be prej-
udiced; rehabilitation would not be thwarted. A rule prohibiting
use of evidence about prior convictions except at the defendant's
initiative would be precisely analogous to the rule excluding evi-
dence of the character of the accused unless he has introduced
evidence of good character. 324  Of course, once the defendant
chooses to claim a clean record, the prosecution should be allowed
to rebut his claim by proving prior convictions.
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. ALLOCATION oF BURDEN OF PROOF
The classic description of the allocation of burden of proof
in federal entrapment cases is contained in Judge Hand's opinion
in the first Sherman appeal:
[In entrapment cases] two questions of fact arise: (1) did
the agent induce the accused to commit the offense charged in
the indictment; (2) if so, was the accused ready and willing
without persuasion and was he awaiting any propitious oppor-
tunity to commit the offense. On the first question the accused
has the burden; on the second the prosecution has it.325
Judge Hand's description is still frequently cited,326 but two
qualifications must be added to it in order accurately to describe
the current federal case law. First, modern case law indicates that
while the defendant has the burden of production on the issue
of inducement, he does not have the burden of persuasion. To
raise an issue for the jury, he need only produce, through govern-
ment witnesses or otherwise, some evidence that government
agents induced the offense. He need not persuade the trial judge
that the evidence is credible.327 Nor is he required to persuade
the jury. Almost every federal court of appeals that has con-
324. For a description of this rule, see C. McCoRmvcI, supra note 286,
§ 191.
325. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952).
326. United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1965) (quot-
ing from "the often-cited discussion by Judge Learned Hand"). Other
cases quoting Judge Hand's formulation include United States v. Braver,
450 F.2d 799, 801 n.5, 802 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Prieto-Olivas,
419 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800,
803 (3d Cir. 1967); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 174 (9th Cir.
1966); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 652 n.6 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963).
327. See cases cited in notes 50, 53 supra.
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sidered the issue has disapproved jury instructions placing the
burden of persuasion upon the defendant on the issue of induce-
ment.
328
This view has not received unanimous approval. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the defendant has the
burden of persuasion as well as the burden of production on the
issue of inducement, and has affirmed a conviction in a case in
which the trial judge told the jury that the defendant had the
burden of proving inducement by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 3 2 9 However, because the Second Circuit has defined "in-
ducement" to include a mere request that a crime be committed
(unaccompanied by any pressure),330 there will ordinarily be no
dispute over whether the government induced the crime and
hence no occasion for instructing the jury about the burden of
persuasion on the issue.
328. This result has been accomplished by disapproving the so-called
"bifurcated" instructions, which tell the jury that the defendant has the
burden of persuasion on the issue of inducement while the government
has the burden on predisposition. See United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d
504, 509-10 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602, 606
(5th Cir. 1971); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175 (9th Cir. 1966);
Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 202-03 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966); Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127, 129 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). (The holdings of Sagansky and Notaro were modified in later
opinions, but the modifications do not affect the aspect of those cases
which deals with bifurcated jury instructions. See United States v.
Christopher, 488 F.2d 849, 851 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973); Kadis v. United States,
373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967).)
The standard federal instruction makes no reference to any require-
ment that the defendant prove inducement. See note 39 supra.
329. United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801-03 (2d Cir. 1971). The
portion of the trial judge's instruction dealing with the defendant's bur-
den of proof read as follows:
The question of entrapment involves two issues. The first issue
is whether the defendant was led or induced to commit the crime
by anyone acting for the government. That is, did the govern-
ment initiate the criminal transaction? On this issue the de-
fendant has the burden of proof. He does not have to prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt but he must prove it by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence. That is, he must satisfy you that
it is more likely than not that the government initiated the crim-
inal transaction involved in this case. If you do not find such
inducement then there was no entrapment, but if you do find
such inducement then you must consider the second issue.
Id. at 801 n.4. Cf. United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir.
1965) (conviction reversed because, under language of trial judge's bifur-
cated instruction, jury might have believed that defendant had burden
of proving inducement beyond a reasonable doubt).
330. E.g., United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1966).
Note that in the instruction quoted in the foregoing footnote the trialjudge defined inducement merely as initiation of the criminal transac-
tion.
19761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Judge Hand's statement must be further qualified by noting
that several recent cases have supplemented the requirement
that a defendant produce evidence of inducement by requiring
him also to produce some evidence tending to negate his propen-
sity to commit the crime.331 These cases thus seem to impose
upon the defendant a burden of production on the issue of pre-
disposition.
The federal courts have uniformly held that once the entrap-
ment defense has been properly raised, the government has the
burden of persuasion on the issue of predisposition, and that pre-
disposition must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.33 2 Most
of the states that have endorsed the subjective version of the en-
trapment defense have followed suit.3 33
The Model Penal Code and the Brown Commission proposal
place the burdens of production and persuasion on the defend-
ant,334 as do most of the other formulations of the hypothetical-
331. See text accompanying note 51 eupra.
332. See United States v. Mosely, 496 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1221-23 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742, 752-
53 (6th Cir. 1973); Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir.
1967); Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1966); cases
cited in note 39 supra.
333. See State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 436, 501 P.2d 378 (1972); State
v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 249 A.2d 238 (1968); Reed v. State, 130 Ga.
App. 659, 204 S.E.2d 335 (1974); Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644,
282 N.E.2d 394 (1972); State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964);
State v. Carrillo, 80 N.M. 697, 460 P.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1969); Striplin v.
State, 499 P.2d 446 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972). Illinois provides by stat-
ute that once the issue of entrapment has been properly raised by the
defendant the burden of persuasion rests on the state. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ct 38, §§ 3-2, 7-12, 7-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
A few subjective-test states have placed the burden on the defend-
ant. See People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411(1970); State v. Gilman, 110 R.L 207, 291 A.2d 425 (1972); Hawthorne v.
State, 43 Wis. 2d 85, 168 N.W.2d 82 (1969). In some states, statutes copied
almost verbatim from the Model Penal Code have, despite their source,
been construed by state courts to establish a subjective test. Compare
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1972), with People v. Calvano, 30
N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972). These statutes, like
the Model Penal Code, place the burden of persuasion on the defendant.
See People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1972); statutes cited in note 16 supra.
334. Section 2.13 (2) of the Model Penal Code places the burden upon
the defendant to "[prove] by a preponderance of evidence that his con-
duct occurred in response to an entrapment."
Section 702(1) of the Brown Commission proposal states that en-
trapment is an affirmative defense. Section 103 of the proposal states
that affirmative defenses are defenses as to which the defendant has the
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.
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person defense.33 5 The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code justi-
fied this allocation of the burden of proof on grounds that:
The defense does not assert that the defendant has not en-
gaged in criminal activity nor does it truly seek to excuse or jus-
tify a criminal act. The defense is, in fact, a complaint by the
accused against the state for employing a certain kind of unsa-
vory enforcement. The accused is asking to be relieved of the
consequences of his guilt by objecting to police tactics. He is a
plaintiff and should be required to come forward with the evi-
dence and to establish the main elements of his claim by a pre-
ponderance of proof.3 3 6
This argument obviously does not apply to the subjective ap-
proach under the rationale that I have ascribed to it, for that ra-
tionale does "truly seek to excuse" a criminal act. Furthermore,
the argument is unconvincing even if its premise about the basis
for the entrapment defense is accepted. The allocation of the
burden of proof should not depend upon whether the defense
"truly seeks to excuse or justify" or whether it "places the de-
fendant in the position of a plaintiff." There are better bases
for allocating the burden of proof-as by determining which
party has easier access to evidence; by deciding whether the issue
is such that proof of an affirmative proposition is more feasible
than proof of a negative proposition; by deciding whether the
policies underlying the defense are so important that factual
doubts should be resolved in its favor. If all of these criteria
were fulfilled-if the prosecution had better access to evidence,
if it were more feasible to prove that agents had acted properly
than that they had acted improperly, if entrapment were a fa-
vored defense because of the importance of controlling police
335. See 5 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 625.5 (Supp. 1973) (entrapment
an affirmative defense); id. at § 626.7 (defendant has burden of persua-
sion by preponderance of evidence on affirmative defenses); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 313 (b) (1973) (defendant must prove by a preponderance
of evidence "that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment");
Act 9, ch. 2, § 237, 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws 51 (entrapment as an affirma-
tive defense); id. § 115(2) (b) at 40 (defendant has burden of persuasion
by preponderance of evidence on affirmative defenses). But see TEx.
CODES ANN. § 8.06(a) (1975) (entrapment is "a defense"); id. § 2.03
(after a "defense" has been raised state has burden of persuasion beyond
a reasonable doubt); UTAH CODE ANNOT. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1975) (en-
trapment is "a defense"); id. §§ 76-1-501, 76-1-502 (after "a defense" has
been raised state has burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt).
However, the Utah supreme court has viewed its statute as a codification
of the subjective approach, despite the fact that the statute is based on
the Model Penal Code; and it is not clear that the Texas statute will be
construed to establish a hypothetical-person defense. See note 16 supra.
336. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
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conduct-would it be wise to argue that the burden should be
on the defendant because the defense does not really "excuse"
his conduct and because the defendant is placed in the position
of a "plaintiff"?
Since the nature of the inducement offered is dispositive un-
der the hypothetical-person approach, there are good practical
reasons for placing the burden of persuasion on the government.
The government has a better opportunity to develop reliable evi-
dence about the nature of the inducement offered to the defend-
ant. Both parties have access to this evidence, which usually
concerns private conversations between the defendant and a gov-
ernment agent, but only the government knows that the evidence
will be put to courtroom use. It can therefore take measures de-
signed to make sure that its version of the conversations are be-
lievable. Although the informer system often requires the gov-
ernment to use agents of limited credibility, it can sometimes
take the precaution of secretly recording the conversations or of
having the informer bring along an undercover officer.33 7 At the
very least, government witnesses are in a better position to recall
the content of the conversations, since they know they may be
required to testify about them.338
The real basis for placing the burden of persuasion on the
defendant may lie in an unspoken feeling that entrapment is a
disfavored defense (since it allows guilty persons to go free) or
that the substantive definition of entrapment under the hypothet-
ical-person defense is so lenient that defendants should be proce-
durally handicapped. Whatever the validity of these feelings in
cases involving habitual offenders, the effect of the rule is to
place an additional obstacle in the path of the nondisposed de-
fendant.
337. See TtFFANY, supra note 13, at 256 (narcotics informers are
sometimes supplied with miniature radio or other electronic device to
transmit conversations to police); Wall St. T., Sept. 22, 1975, at 7, col. 2(prostitution decoys reported to carry hidden microphones).
338. Sometimes the government will be reluctant to permit the in-
former to testify, since revealing his identity may compromise future un-
dercover work or place him in physical jeopardy. However, if the de-
fendant has raised the issue of entrapment and satisfied his burden of
production by showing that the government initiated the criminal trans-
action, he has shown that he knows the informer to be an informer
(though he may not know the informer's true name), and any further
governmental interest could be protected by closed hearings and by sus-
taining objections to questions about the informer's name and address.
Cf. United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975)
(trial court did not err in excluding public from trial in order to protect
identity of undercover agent).
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There are also sound reasons for placing the burden of per-
suasion on the government when, as under the federal test, pre-
disposition is a dispositive fact. Although the defendant has ac-
cess to evidence about his own predisposition, the government is
often in a better position to offer reliable evidence. The degree
of pressure applied by the government agent is relevant to the
determination of whether the defendant was predisposed, and, as
I have already suggested, the government can more easily obtain
and preserve evidence about the nature of its inducement. More-
over, even the most upright defendant may not be able to offer
any evidence about his lack of propensity for crime other than
his own testimony and testimony of friends about his character.
If the defendant was in fact predisposed, the government should
be able to offer convincing evidence-for example, testimony
about the defendant's possession of criminal paraphernalia, his
prior criminal activities, his oral admissions to undercover agents,
or his ready acquiescence to an agent's suggestion of criminal ac-
tivity. It is reasonable to ask the government to persuade the
fact-finder with evidence of this nature when it seeks to convict
for an offense committed at the suggestion of a government
agent. There is no reason to believe that placing the burden of
persuasion on the government has led to an excessive number
of acquittals. In fact, the available evidence indicates that the
entrapment defense rarely leads to acquittal.3 39
339. See Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. Calm. L. 165, 188-
90 (1974) (defense counsel interviewed by author indicated the defense
was rarely successful); Comment, Administration of the Affirmative
Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. Cm.
L. REV. 137, 150 (1963) (similar results from interviews with police and
prosecutors); cf. TirFANY, supra note 13, at 287. Attorneys in the Minne-
apolis-St. Paul area have expressed similar views. In summer 1974, the
author and two student research assistants interviewed nine lawyers
(five defense attorneys and four prosecutors) in the area. With the ex-
ception of one prosecutor in a supervisory position, the lawyers were
chosen because they were reputed to have handled large numbers of
drug cases. The interviewees all agreed that the entrapment defense
rarely resulted in acquittal. Some called it "weak" or "theoretical."
The defense attorneys had cumulatively handled 650-700 drug cases
in 70 years of practice. Of these, 50 to 55 were tried to verdict on not
guilty pleas. The entrapment defense was raised in five of their cases
and failed in each.
The three trial prosecutors had tried an estimated 20 to 25 drug cases
to verdict in 15 years of practice. The entrapment defense had been
raised in one of their cases, where it failed.
The supervisory prosecutor reported that the entrapment defense
had little impact on trials or on plea bargaining, but that his office some-
times screened out cases prior to initiating prosecution because informers
had used improper tactics. He estimated that the entrapment defense
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B. FUNCTION OF JUDGE AND JURY
Courts following the subjective approach have generally
treated the entrapment defense as a jury issue.340 This approach
is consistent with the view that the primary purpose of the sub-
jective approach is acquittal of "innocent" (nondisposed) per-
sons, since questions of the guilt or innocence of a particular
defendant have traditionally been issues for the jury.
Supporters of the hypothetical-person approach have ar-
gued that the defense should be submitted to the judge,3 41 saying
that "preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only
to the court,"3 42 and that only judicial opinions, "through the
gradual evolution of explicit standards in accumulated prece-
dents," can "give significant guidance for official conduct for the
future." 43
had resulted in acquittal in five to 10 of approximately 700 criminal cases
which had been tried to verdict by his office in the previous 10 years.
See also Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1975, at 1, col. 1:
There are no statistics on the frequency of the use of the
entrapment defense, but Jerry Newton, an assistant U.S. attorney
in Los Angeles, says that out of the hundreds of trials in South-
ern California involving narcotics traffic, the entrapment defense
is used in fewer than 5% of cases. The government will get
convictions in all but one or two of those, he says.
340. The majority opinions in Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell all held
that the issue was for the jury. State courts have usually followed suit.
See generally Defeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibil-
ity: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 243,
268-71 (1963). However, Minnesota has endorsed the subjective ap-
proach while permitting the defendant to choose whether the issue will
be determined by the judge or the jury. See State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d
445 (Minn. 1975).
341. In their minority opinions in Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell,
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Stewart argued that the issue should
be decided by the trial judge. The Model Penal Code specifically pro-
vides for judicial determination, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Official
Draft, 1962), as did the leading case of Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226,
230 (Alas. 1969). The Brown Commission proposal takes no position, on
grounds that the Commission's mandate did not extend to procedural
proposals, see BRowN ComwassioN COMMENTARY, supra note 13, at 305,
but Professor Starrs, the author of the commentary, expressed a prefer-
ence for judicial determination. Id. at 325.
Unlike many supporters of the hypothetical-person test, the Iowa su-
preme court has expressed the view that the issue of entrapment should
be submitted to the jury. See State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa
1974). Moreover, statutes based upon the Model Penal Code have usu-
ally omitted its judge-trial provision. See statutes cited in note 16 supra.
342. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (minority
opinion of Roberts, J.).
343. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
[Vol. 60:163
ENTRAPMENT CONTROVERSY
To a large extent the validity of this dichotomy depends
upon the resolution of other issues. For example, the assignment
of the issue to the jury under the subjective approach seems
sound only if reputation and other hearsay evidence is ex-
cluded. If such evidence is not excluded, the defendant should
have the option of trying his entrapment defense before the
judge, who is normally better qualified to give such evidence its
proper weight.344
Similarly, the theory that the issue should be relegated to
the judge under the hypothetical-person approach depends upon
the soundness of its assumption that judges can set detailed rules
of conduct for police agents. If this assumption is correct, then
the defense should be the province of the court. The trial judge
is in a better position to take a long-term view based upon the
goals of the criminal justice system. Moreover, his application
of law to fact can be set forth in a memorandum opinion, subject
to judicial review, rather than being buried in a general verdict.
However, there is substantial doubt that courts can establish
detailed rules of conduct.34 5 If the standard remains a vague one
-such as whether the agent's conduct would have created a sub-
stantial risk that a nondisposed person would commit the offense
-there is much to be said for submitting the issue to the jury.
The jury's collective experience should make it competent to
evaluate how a normally law-abiding person would have reacted
to the agent's inducement. Moreover, the jury can perform the
function of ameliorating the strictness of the law by making it
conform to community mores. In other contexts the exercise of
the jury's ameliorative function may be arbitrary and sporadic,
since to perform that function the jury usually must disregard
the judge's instructions. Some jurors will feel conscience-bound
to follow the instructions, even if they believe the law to be un-
just. However, no such objection is applicable to entrapment
cases since the jury can follow the instruction to consider how
a law-abiding person would have reacted to the agent's induce-
ment, yet determine that the crime was such a petty or fre-
quently committed one that this hypothetical person might com-
mit it with very little prodding.
344. Cf. State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (Minn. 1975) (per-
mitting the defendant to choose between having the entrapment defense
determined by the judge in a pretrial hearing or submitting it to the jury
at trial).
345. See text accompanying notes 210-17 supra.
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Assignment of the entrapment defense to the jury in hypo-
thetical-person jurisdictions will help prevent the fact-finder
from being exposed to predisposition evidence which has no sub-
stantial bearing on the propriety of the inducement offered.340 A
trial judge sitting with a jury can hold a voir dire hearing to
determine whether the evidence is sufficiently probative on the
issue of police conduct to justify incurring the risk that the jury
will use it for a forbidden purpose. If the determination goes
against the admissibility of the evidence, the jury need never
know that it existed. If the issue is tried before a judge, such
evidence may have a prejudicial effect, since the judge must hear
it to rule on its admissibility. Moreover, in cases in which the
trial judge admits the evidence, the generous presumption that
the judge based his decision only on admissible evidence (even
when he erroneously admitted other evidence) may impede the
development of appellate doctrine governing the admission or ex-
clusion of predisposition evidence.347
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The principal goal of the hypothetical-person defense is to
control the conduct of police and informers. There are many rea-
sons to doubt that it can succeed in doing so. Because of the
nature of undercover work, courts will probably never develop
a set of rules simple yet specific enough to provide clear guidance
to police agents. Standardized procedures cannot govern the
sundry and unpredictable events that occur during encounters
between target and temptor. Moreover, even if such procedures
could be formulated and somehow taught to the army of addicts
and criminals used by police to set up controlled offenses, it is
doubtful that they would be followed-particularly since the
rules would inevitably become known to targets as well as police
agents.
The doubtful preventive effect of the hypothetical-person de-
fense would be purchased at a price. The defense creates a risk
346. It is probable that jurisdictions following the hypothetical-per-
son approach will find it necessary to admit evidence of the defendant's
predisposition in circumstances in which it has a strong bearing upon the
propriety of police conduct. See text accompanying notes 128-55 supra.
347. See Altom v. United States, 454 F.2d 289, 296 (7th Cir. 1971);
Thompson v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 155 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 329 U.S. 762 (1946); C. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or
EvDENc § 60 (2d ed. 1972) (judge will be presumed to have ignored
inadmissible evidence admitted over objection).
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that dangerous chronic offenders will be acquitted because they
were offered inducements that might have tempted a hypotheti-
cal law-abiding person. More subtly, it creates a danger that
persons will be convicted who do not deserve punishment. This
danger stems from its attempts to evaluate the quality of gov-
ernment conduct without considering the defendant's culpability.
The notion that sauce for the wolf is sauce for the lamb leads
to unhappy consequences, since the sauce will be brewed with
wolves in mind. Because many targets are professional crimi-
nals, judges will be reluctant to rule that entrapment has oc-
curred simply because an agent found it necessary to appeal to
friendship, make multiple requests, or offer a substantial profit.
Yet approval of such conduct would lead to unfair results in cases
where the target was law-abiding but ductile. For example, con-
viction of someone who has been solicited by a friend may be
fair enough in the general run of cases, but unfair if the target
was a nondisposed person who would not have committed the
type of crime charged but for a request from that particular
friend.
The danger of acquitting wolves and convicting lambs would
be ameliorated if courts following the hypothetical-person test al-
low predisposition evidence to be introduced for its bearing on
the propriety of the agent's inducement. The degree of persist-
ence permitted would then depend upon whether the agent had
sound reasons to believe that his target was already engaged in
criminal enterprise. However, this approach would- create even
greater uncertainty about the boundaries of permissible induce-
ment and further limit the defense's utility as a guide to police
conduct. Moreover, so long as evidence about the target's pro-
pensity for crime is admitted only insofar as it bears on the pro-
priety of the agent's inducement, highly probative evidence bear-
ing on culpability will be excluded. For example, facts about
the target which were not known to the agent at the time of in-
ducement would be excluded.
The federal defense has the virtue of focusing upon the cul-
pability of the defendant. It attempts to distinguish between
persons who are blameworthy and persons who are not. In the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, that should be the goal
of our law of crimes.
This focus upon culpability is not inconsistent with the rule
limiting the entrapment defense to persons who have been se-
duced by government agents. Admittedly, a defendant is no
more blameworthy if his seducer turns out to be a private temp-
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tor rather than a government agent. However, permitting the
acquittal of defendants who have been led astray by private
temptors would create too great a danger of contrived defenses.
Moreover, the distinction between private temptors and govern-
ment agents can be supported on the theory that none of the
principal rationales of the entrapment defense (diminished culpa-
bility, deterrence of misconduct, respect for courts, protection
against discriminatory law enforcement) alone justifies acquit-
ting a defendant who intentionally committed a criminal act, but
that when more than one rationale is served an acquittal is justi-
fied.
The greatest fault of federal entrapment doctrine lies in the
permissiveness of its ancillary rules of evidence. Suspicion, ru-
mor, second-hand reputation evidence, and other testimony
which would normally be barred by the hearsay rule has been
welcomed by some courts. This indiscriminate attitude toward
predisposition evidence is by no means a necessary feature of the
subjective test. If the accused was already engaged in a course
of criminal conduct, the prosecution should be able to develop
an arsenal of reliable predisposition evidence. If it cannot, the
danger of wrongful acquittal is outweighed by the danger of con-
victing a person whose only real vice is a bad reputation. Rep-
utation and other hearsay evidence should not become admissible
merely because the accused has raised the defense of entrapment.
If construed to exclude such testimony, the subjective de-
fense should present more reliable evidence to the fact-finder
than the hypothetical-person defense. The latter focuses upon
the nature of the inducement offered; consequently, trials are
likely to be reduced to a swearing match between unreliable wit-
nesses about words said in private. Under the subjective ap-
proach, the nature of the inducement offered is relevant to the
question whether the defendant was a strayed lamb or an en-
snared wolf, but so are a. number of other facts susceptible to
more reliable proof-including similar crimes by the defendant,
the defendant's admissions to police officers, his access to contra-
band, and his possession of criminal paraphernalia. The admissi-
bility of such evidence is a double-edged sword. The prosecution
can rebut an entrapment defense very effectively by producing
it. However, if the prosecution fails to produce the evidence, the
defendant can argue that it has not satisfied its burden of per-
suasion since, despite its opportunity to do so, it has failed to
bring forward evidence of predisposition aside from the testi-
mony of its informer,
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The nondisposed defendant will be doubly handicapped in
jurisdictions that have followed the Model Penal Code or the
Brown Commission proposal and placed the burden of persuasion
on the defendant. The defendant must convince the fact-finder
that the government used an overreaching inducement, despite
the fact that (unlike the government) he did not know at the
time of inducement that he would be charged with the crime,
and hence had no occasion to preserve evidence on this point. A
nondisposed defendant has a better chance under the subjective
approach, which requires the government to prove predisposition
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The danger of convicting nondisposed defendants could be
reduced by using the hypothetical-person defense as a supple-
ment to the subjective defense instead of as a substitute for it.
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a double-barrelled
defense which would excuse a defendant if (1) the agent used
inducements likely to tempt a hypothetical law-abiding person,
or (2) the defendant himself was not ready and willing to commit
the crime.
A multifaceted entrapment defense of this nature would not
be appropriate in cases involving major crimes. Defendants
charged with large-scale trafficking in illegal drugs, counterfeit-
ing, official corruption, or other serious crimes should not be
excused if they were ready, willing, and able to commit the
crime. The chance of meaningful control of agent misconduct is
not great enough to justify exonerating persons guilty of these
crimes.
In cases involving minor vice crimes, the acquittal of guilty
defendants does not seem to be a great price to pay for the possi-
bility of controlling intrusive police conduct. However, even in
such cases, a multifaceted entrapment defense is not the most de-
sirable legislative response. If investigation of minor vice crimes
has led to offensive police conduct, a better response would be
to reduce criminal penalties until police no longer view extensive
undercover investigation as worthwhile. The creation of a spe-
cial entrapment defense applicable only to certain offenses would
lead to confusion about the content of the defense, and to dis-
crimination between similarly situated defendants on the basis
of police conduct having nothing to do with an accused person's
culpability.
Entrapment is an aspect of the broader problem of control-
ling the activities of secret police in America. There is good rea-
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son for concern about these activities, which have on occasion in-
cluded use of agents provocateur, illegal surveillance, misuse of
information gathered by police spying, and other serious abuses.
However, the creation of new criminal defenses is not a very ef-
fective means of control. There are more desirable alternatives,
including legislative investigation, special prosecutors, and crea-
tion of bodies such as the Knapp Commission. Governmental
bodies with the power to investigate, subpoena witnesses, publi-
cize abuses, recommend discipline, and institute prosecution are
likely to be more effective than attempts at control through spo-
radic acquittal of criminal defendants. Legislative reform should
be directed toward institutionalizing such mechanisms of control,
rather than toward creating new defenses which allow guilty de-
fendants to seek acquittals on grounds that they have been vic-
tims of overreaching police conduct.
Legislatures and courts have understandably been reluctant
to endorse a multifaceted entrapment defense. The entrapment
controversy has centered around which of the two standard-
model formulations of the defense should be adopted. A major-
ity of jurisdictions have properly chosen the subjective approach
of the federal courts. In doing so they have not entirely relin-
quished the power to condemn egregious police misconduct. The
subjective defense does not preclude acquittal in extraordinary
circumstances in which the need to punish police misconduct or
preserve respect for the law is clearly worth the acquittal of a
guilty person. If the inducement offered was outrageous, then
the due process clause would preclude conviction regardless of
the defendant's predisposition. In other situations, the need to
protect nondisposed defendants and punish chronic offenders
justifies foregoing the possible preventive effects of the hy-
pothetical-person defense.
[Vol. 60:163
